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Abstract 
'Sexual citizenship' is relatively a new term, which emerged in 
recent decades with gay and lesbian demands for 'equal rights' with 
heterosexuals. Rather than taking the concept of sexual citizenship as 
given, this thesis investigates the conditions of its emergence and the 
process of its making by focusing on 'stories' of/ about homosexuals 
or homosexualities, which have been circulated, debated and 
represented in the British parliament. I analyse these stories at three 
different moments in time: during debates on the Sexual Offences Act 
in the 1960s; Section 28 of the Local Government Act in the 1980s; 
and the Civil Partnership Act in the 2000s. In particular, I explore the 
gradual coming-out of what Scott calls, 'the evidence of experience'in 
the debates, which, in the form of personal stories, has become an 
important way of (re)presenting/ relating evidence of the 'truth'of 
homosexual identities, linked in turn to the idea of their rights/ 
rightness. A number of questions guide my inquiry. What are the 
conditions upon which a (sexual) story's access to the political arena 
is authorised (or rejected)? Who tells stories or whose stories are told? 
What 'problems' do stories recount? How are personal sexual stories 
publicly represented and contested in parliament? What moral and 
political effects do these stories have on political claims about sexual 
rights and responsibilities? In addressing these questions, I explore 
the complexity of stories'journey from personal to political in the 
sexual citizenship making process, which entails not just a transition 
from non-recognition to recognition, but also a process of exclusion 
and misappropriation whereby stories, in the process of becoming 
public narrative, are often rigidified and formalised, producing 
stereotypical / fixed 'facts' and 'moral' points. In analysing this 
problematic process by which sexual stories enter into a public and 
national political domain, and make their case for the recognition of 
sexual rights in Britain, I hope to shed light on the more general 
question of what it means to be a recognised (or recognisable) sexual 
citizen in contemporary Britain. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Stories andjournys 
1995: Juhyun 
As an overseas student, I first came across issues around gay 
and lesbian movements in 1995 when I heard stories about the 
London Pride march where around two hundred thousand people 
rallied together in Victoria Park. One of my Korean friends 
commented on this story derisively: 'nowadays you can only find 
political radicalism in Britain either in gay and lesbian rights 
movements or animal rights movements'. What I understood by his 
sarcasm was that these two issues were too trivial to be considered 
social movements. One is too personal and individualistic - it is 
perhaps too personal because it is 'sexual'- and the other one is 
perhaps too apolitical and socially irrelevant. I remember I was silent 
then. 
At that time, so-called 'sexual difference' was never been an 
issue for me. The word itself was not even in my vocabulary. So 
-10- 
natural was the story (the fact) about 'we-heterosexuals' heard in 
South Korea, that the word, gay or lesbian, first appeared strange 
and mysterious belonging only to a culture called Western. I 
remember that I understood the story I heard about people who were 
publicly and politically voicing support for their sexual difference in 
Britain in 1995 as a 'fact' of cultural difference. And as a 'fact' of 
cultural 'difference', the strangeness found in sexual difference 
posed no more or less a problem than a lot of other culturallly- 
specific strangeness I found in U. K. 
By understanding the story of sexual difference as a fact of 
cultural difference, I distanced myself safely from the story I heard in 
1995.1 recognized that the story had nothing to do with me. My 
detachment from the story, however, was accomplished with an 
ambiguity; for, in hearing a remote story of the Western, I found 
myself wandering into my own experience, and felt that I was, for 
some reason, connected to the story through my intimate 
relationship with a woman -a relationship I could not then find a 
name to describe. I suppose that this ambivalent feeling of both 
detachment from and connectedness to the story I heard of the gay 
and lesbian Pride march explains why I was silent on hearing my 
friend's derisive comment on gay and lesbian movements. I didn't 
know how to respond. 
This feeling of ambivalence continued, and I found that hearing 
non-heterosexual stories of any kind became a frustrating 
experience. It was particularly painful to watch American daytime 
television talk shows such as The Jerry Springer show and The Ricki 
Lake Show, which were wildly popular even in Britain since the 
mid- 1990s. Their guests, if I mention just a few, frequently featured 
drag kings, drag queens, gay teenagers, lesbian transsexuals, 
lesbian mothers, gay fathers, bisexual couples, transsexuals and 
their girl/boy friends, cross-dressing lesbians, same-sex married 
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couples and so on. Their deep secrets and 'peculiar' stories of 
intimate/sexual life experience told in the public space of national 
television were jeered and booed by audiences and followed by the 
words of experts who quickly fixed guests' intimate/ sexual troubles. 
I often watched these shows in the dining room with my Asian 
friends. Unsurprisingly, most of them seemed to be bewildered as 
well as disgusted by what they watched. At one time, one of my 
friends, I remember, said that he wanted to change the channel, 
because he felt sick of hearing these freaky stories. He frowned and 
said, "Oh, I hate these Western perverts. I don't understand why we 
are watching this nonsense. It's not good for our mental health". We 
let him change the channel. 
Why on earth do these ýperverts' tell their weird sexual stories 
on national television, I wondered. And how could they tell these 
stories in the first place? I remember that I always used various 
unintelligible, idiosyncratic ýmetaphors% 'signs', or 'Words' to describe 
my sexual experience with a woman in my diary: nobody (including 
me), I thought, could understand what precisely I meant by them. 
But how else could it be described? My intimate relationship with a 
woman was an unsayable part of my life. Experiencing it and telling 
a story about it were two different things for me. And telling a 
comprehensible story about it in public, in the presence of others 
who would talk back to your experience, was an impossibility. My 
experience was purely the private, which drew upon no one else's 
experience and found no context to be told. My sexual experience 
could not find its expression in stories. 
So, how was it possible for these Western others to tell their 
claimed 'real' sexual stories, to publicise them, and to talk back to 
audiences and other guests who ridiculed and laughed at their 
stories? I was interested in this question, not because I felt my 
sexual experience remained radically different from theirs, but 
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because their stories forced me to question my own disturbing 
sexual experience, to recount my idiosyncratic memory, to 'name'my 
experience as they did, and to feel the need to reflect upon (or even 
tell) my own 'real' sexual story - the story I did not possess. Hearing 
their stories provoked in me a desire for some integration between 
my imaginary, untold stories and the stories of these Western 
others. At the same time, however, it was clear that there was an 
instantly recognisable danger of such a storytelling. Private stories 
that cross the boundaries of the public are open to the interpretation 
and evaluative judgements of the listeners. The ways in which guests 
aggressively interrupted each other's telling, audiences hurled 
insults at guests, professionals imposed 'correct' meaning on sexual 
stories they heard, the strangeness/ oddness found in sexual stories 
became the means of public entertainment, and my friends' angry 
refusal to hear 'Western nonsense, made me realise all too clearly 
that these 'freaky' sexual stories, told in the daytime talk shows, 
provoked far more hatred/ denigration than an invitation for 
understanding and empathy. Indeed, the recognition of myself in the 
Western 'freaks' and my potential story in their publicly 'unwelcome' 
stories led all too readily into shame and guilt, pushing me back to 
the safe world of my private secrets. Once again, their stories could 
not (and should not) be my story, not simply because of a fact of 
cultural difference, but because of the likelihood that my untold 
sexual story, perhaps identified in their told stories, would be 
demeaned, disparaged, unshared, corrected and refused. I could not 
bear the burden of shame - the price that, I thought, I should pay 
for discovering and telling of the ghastly experience of radical 
foreignness/ otherness found in me. 
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1999: Research Project 
Through my experience of anxiety and ambivalence associated 
with sexual storytelling/ listening, I have become increasingly 
interested in conditions under which one can (cannot) tell 'certain' 
personal stories; in the inter-personal relationships formed around 
oneps storytelling and listening; in the contested social/public field in 
which one's stories are enacted or shadowed; in the complex 
interplay between one's private stories and their public meaning; 
and therefore, in the suppression, discovery, and the transformation 
of one's stories within one's personal network and the wider social 
world. 
It was also with this interest I began to wonder why I had never 
heard stories of 'homosexual experience' in South Korea. The year I 
heard about the London Pride march in 1995, South Korea's London 
Embassy proudly announced that: 'Homosexuality is rare in Korea 
and for this reason it has not been necessary to frame laws relating 
to it' (IOC, 1995). Homosexuality was perhaps rare in Korea because 
one seldom told/heard stories of 'homosexual experience'in South 
Korea. Or it was, as I discovered later, rare, because if one told a 
story of same-sex experience in terms of 'homosexuality', one told 
within a carefully negotiated network of secrecy where one still 
remained publicly invisible and unrecognisable. 
In the face of what did not appear (or what was not there) in 
South Korea, I wondered what it was ýreally'like for western (sexual) 
'others'to tell their stories of being or becoming gays and lesbians in 
Britain. Coming-out, as I literally understood, meant coming out to 
the public with sexual/intimate matters which are private. Further, 
these private sexual/intimate matters were viewed by many as 
involving perverse and unnatural ways of being/living, which should 
be, therefore, hidden away from the public. I then wondered what 
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made some (or many) individuals in Britain come out to others as 
gays or lesbians, resisting the abnormality linked to their sexual 
experience. 
In 1999,1 decided to do research on gay/lesbian 'coming out' 
stories in Britain as part of my BA research project, and started 
searching the internet, reading a number of different (and also 
similar) coming-out stories told by gay men and lesbian women 
living in Britain. I eventually dropped the project, however. In 
reading stories of coming-out, I found myself searching for stories 
that could explain my sexual expereince. I was preoccupied with 
finding the meaning of what I had done, and what it could mean 
here in Britain. Some stories, I felt, provided me a means with which 
I could redefine my relationship with a 'friend' as something 
'different'- different from a pure friendship - and re-imagine myself 
as someone 'different'- different from the heterosexual. For the first 
time in my life, I was consciously reflecting upon my deviation 
through the concept, 'sexuality difference'. The more I thought about 
their stories of coming-out, the more they made me think that I 
perhaps could be a qesbian'. 
It was, as I remember, also around this time, I was asked by an 
Asian friend if I was a lesbian. I did not know why he asked me that 
question. I did not ask him why he asked me such a question: I was 
afraid what he might say then. But another friend of mine quickly 
responded to his question with a voice of anger, and said, 'It's too 
muchl'. I did not know what she precisely meant by 'too much'. Was 
she saying that I was 'not' a lesbian? Was she simply blaming him 
for being direct? Or was she saying that I was 'close'to be a lesbian, 
but not a lesbian? Then I quickly realised I was perhaps crossing the 
line 'too much. I had perhaps talked too much about my project, 
about my interest in gay and lesbian stories, or about coming-out 
stories that I had read and heard. I had perhaps shown my affection 
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for a 'special friend' too much. Or I had perhaps questioned myself 
too much, and consciously or unconsciously behaved differently. 
His question made me worried for many days, and I could not 
even focus on my work, including the project I was working on. In 
the end, I dropped the project. It was not difficult to understand why 
I was so affected by his question. I was worried then. I felt anyiety. 
Being/becoming sexually different felt life I was being/becoming a 
stranger to the familiar. Crossing the line felt as if I would no longer 
find a natural home, located close enough to be surrounded by my 
family, friends, and the community where I once belonged. In 
reading coming-out stories of others, I felt the suffering and grief 
their acts of coming-out caused to their family and friends. I did not 
want to be a cause of pain to my parents and fiiends. I could not 
take the risk of becoming a stranger to them. I thought I had to 
somehow live (or at least pretend to live) the heterosexual life, which 
was already there, given and safe. And I came back to Korea. 
2003: Parang 
It was a strange experience being at home. I found out that 
living where I used to live and being Juhyun who I used to be did not 
necessarily mean that I was 'being at home'. If home meant being in 
one's place where one feels 'most comfortable and familiar' (Ahmed, 
2000: 84), 1 was not at home in 'being at home'. I had lived away 
from home so many years. In returning home, I brought the 
memories of being away from home, the curiosity and doubt about 
myself, with me. And instead of finding comfort in what was already 
safely given at home, I was, for some reason, distressed with the 
familiarity of home. Home was lived as a discontinuity between the 
past and the present, and it was lived as a tension between my two 
names. 
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I had lived as Parang since 2003. Parang means 'blue'in 
Korean. It is my 'chosen' name. No-one in my family knows that I 
have such a name, however. Neither do the friends with whom I 
went to school or those who meet me at work call me Parang: they 
only know me as Juhyun. 
Parang is the name that connects me to many lesbians in 
Korea, however. Most of them only know me as Parang, and I only 
know them as Tree', 'Ginger"Snail', 'Moon', 'Ninety' and so on. We 
do not ask each other what our 'given' names are; for we know our 
two names do not cross the boundary that divides different sides of 
our lives in Korea. I am, as Juhyun, read as being a heterosexual. 
And I am, as Parang, read as being a closeted lesbian. 
The experience of having two names is common for those who 
inhabit two dffferent communities in South Korea. Communities are 
experienced as having rigid boundaries of belonging for each name. 
And although my body inhabits two different communities, my 
names do not cross the boundaries. If I were recognised as being 
Parang in the heterosexual world, I would lose my place recognised 
in society as Juhyun. I experience my two names as being mutually 
exclusive. At home, as I still find, there does not seem to be a 
meeting point between the two. 
The year I started having two names was also the year my 
parents started to pressure me to get married. For them, I was 
already becoming too old for marriage. They were anxious about my 
age. I was 3 1, and my parents thought that I should have had a 
child by that age. But it was also around this time I began to hear 
stories of same-sex relationships being increasingly recognised in 
western societies. With the stories of gay and lesbian couples gaining 
legal recognition in many western societies, I also came across the 
words, 'sexual rights' and 'sexual citizenship'. Many Korean lesbian 
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women whom I met through the internet in 2003 introduced me into 
a 'safe'way of being/becoming a lesbian; I learned I could be/ 
become a lesbian as Parang in South Korea. But the phrase, 'the 
sexual citizen' seemed to suggest to me that I did not need to be a 
lesbian in such a way. 'Sexual citizen' came close in cultivating an 
image in which the sides of my life as Parang were merged with the 
life of Juhyun. The term, sexual citizen seemed to be 'the'point 
where my two names could possibly meet, resolving the dilemma 
that involved a splitting of Parang and Juhyun. 
In the emerging notion of 'sexual citizenship' that emphasises 
the idea of 'belonging' and 'participation', I imagined collective 
subjectivities in which one finds one's lived stories of sexual 
difference are safely integrated with others', making their case for 
public recognition within the broad intersubjective world of citizens. 
The civilised word, citizenship and citizen, neutralised my feeling of 
fear around sexual difference. The word, I felt, was about 'Us', 
including sexual others/ strangers in the way that 'we' did not need 
to feel as strangers/ others any more in society. After all, it was, I 
expected, possible to be (or to become) an 'I' as Juhyun - the name 
familiar to my family, friends, neighbours, and to the community to 
which I thought I belonged. I was excited about the word, 'sexual 
citizen', and I became interested in stories of western 'sexual 
citizens', not as Juhyun in 1995 or Parang in 2003, but as a 
potential sexual citizen who hoped for a just inclusion of Parang as 
Juhyun. I came back to Britain in 2003, and started PhD research 
on 'sexual citizenship'in Britain. 
2005: LiUy and Mo 
I met LiRy and Mo in 2005. ' Mo was a 63-year-old white British 
1.1 met Lilly and Mo (pseudonyms) at a Gay and Grey with Dignity 
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lesbian woman who described herself as working class. Her partner, 
Lilly, was 66 and identified her class as 'working class origins, quite 
poor, educated into middle class but don't fit in'. Both had been 
married for about twenty years before they came out as lesbians. 
Mo, like most married women of her age and class, never managed 
to gain secure employment, and was living on basic state pension 
and benefits. Lilly, however, was trained as a teacher and had 
worked in various occupations including teaching until she retired,. 
and this left her a better pension income compared to Mo. In the 
face of inequalities of income and status, Mo and Lilly had developed 
little strategies to keep the relationship equal'. Lilly told me that: 
I feel one of the things about marriage is that a lot of women, 
particularly when they have children, are totally dependent on 
their husbands financially, and the relationship alters. There's 
a real power thing.... I've always felt proud that our 
relationship really is two individuals whore committing to be 
together, not that one is dependent on the other. And there are 
ways we've done it like, I have more access to a little bit more 
money than Mo,.... but one of the ways we've adjusted that is 
that Mo takes charge of money we put aside every week for 
housekeeping. Mo's in charge of that, so I'm in a way 
dependent on her (Lilly, 66). 
Mo and Lilly, however, worried that the dynamic of their 
relationship would soon be changed with the Civil Partnership Act 
being introduced in Britain. After December 5th in 2005, they said, 
same-sex partners would be treated like married couples in Britain. 
And one of the ways in which they would be treated on a par with 
Conference in Scarborough in April 2005. After the conference, I had a 
chance to talk to them about my research project, and they kindly allowed 
me to interview them for their thoughts on the Civil Partnership Bin, and 
to include their stories in this dissertation. I had originally intended to 
include their stories as well as stories of 12 other lesbian women whom I 
interviewed in 2005 in the thesis, but as the parliamentary stories 
subsequently became my main focus of analysis, I decided not to do so. 
Here, I wish to express my deep thanks to all for sharing their stories with 
me. 
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heterosexual couples was that they, like married/or cohabiting 
heterosexual partners, would be jointly' assessed for means-tested 
benefits such as income support, housing benefits or council tax 
benefit? According to Mo, this change would put her in an unwanted 
position as she would be, in both financial and emotional terms, 
dependent on Lilly. Mo said: 
As our fortunes have gone up and down, we've managed to 
work out how neither of us is too dependent on the other for 
money. But after this [Civil Partnership Act], and because of 
the benefits I will lose, I will now be financially dependent on 
Lilly. Suddenly, the next big problem is -I get free dental 
treatment, because I receive benefits, I get free -I have to ask 
Lilly. "Can I get my teeth done? " You know, this is what's 
wrong with marriage. Heterosexual women really have a rough 
time because they are kept in a position of asking all the time. 
They should have copied us. It should be that married couples 
should be treated as two individuals. 
According to The Underpensioned: Women, the report published 
by Pension Policy Institute (PPI) in 2004, married women in the U-K 
are more likely to work part time because of their caring 
2. With the Civil Partnership Act being introduced in Britain, those who 
recieve state benefits but live as if they were civil partners - live as if they 
were married/ cohabiting couples - may no longer be able to claim state 
benefits; for they will be seen as the dependent of their partners. As MP. 
Jane Griffiths (Labour), during the House of Commons debates on the 
Civil Partnership Act in parliament in 2004, tells the story: 
It should not be forgotten that gay and lesbian couples are not 
treated as households for the purpose of benefits entitlement. When 
I introduced my Bill [Jane Griffith's Relationships (Civil Registration) 
Bill] I had letters from several people in same-sex partnerships who 
said that they were claiming benefit because they could. Their 
partners could afford all the household expenses, but my 
correspondents claimed housing benefit because they could. That is 
wrong. Benefits should be paid because they are needed, not 
because someone can claiiin them. That is the sort of anomaly that 
should disappear when the Bill [Civil Partnership Bill] becomes law, 
as I fervently hope it will (HC, 12 Oct 2004, col. 204). 
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responsibilities (80% of part timers are women), and have low earning 
incomes (PPI, 2004). Rather than, however, being recognized as an 
individual who is entitled to have full welfare rights, a married woman 
is treated as a dependant of her husband who is responsible for her 
'within the limits of his own income', reinforced by less eligibility of 
welfare programmes' (Davis, 2004: 42). Not only has this idea, which 
is integrated in the current welfare system in Britain, affected 'the 
identities of men and women of the middle class'but also this has 
been 'the model of aspiration for members of the working class as 
well' (42). And the Civil partnership Act modelled upon 'marriage' is 
not free from this class as well as gender biased state regulation of 
marriage. Mo, illustrating this point, also said: 
Whoever has thought this [Civil Partnership Act] through, there 
are far more women who are living below the poverty line and 
who are living on the state benefits than there are men. So it's 
obviously women who are going to lose out. 
Mo and Lilly said that they did not want to register for Civil 
Partnership. This was not simply because they would disadvantaged 
in material terms by being considered as a valid couple by the state. 
As Mo's state benefits might be taken away with the Civil 
Partnership Act coming into force in Britain, they worried that their 
equal relationship, which they had been so proud of, would be taken 
away too. 
When I heard their stories, something Eskridge suggested came 
to my mind. In his book, The Case for Same-Sex Marriage. From 
Sexual Liberty to Civilized Commitment, William Eskridge asserts that 
'equal marriage rights will civilize both the lesbian and gay 
community'and dismantle gendered role divisions inherent in 
marriage. This is because: 'the old-fashioned marriage of 
breadwinner husband and housekeeper wife cannot be replicated by 
same-sex couples; at least one of the husbands will be a 
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housekeeper, and at least one of the wives will be a breadwinner' 
(Eskridge, 1996: 9). If this is what Eskridge finds significant in the 
same-sex marriage rights - that is to say, at least one of our lesbian 
wives will be a breadwinner - this was what Mo feared the most. She 
would be dependent on her lesbian wife who would become a 
breadwinner. Her story made me realise that citizenship, in an 
unequal world, might not always bring positive benefits. The 
prevalent ideas of sexual citizenship and rights, mobilised around 
civil partnership registration are for her not the markers of 
inclusion, but exclusion. 
2007: Thesis 
This thesis, I initially hoped, was about the stories of 
'belonging'. In searching for what it could mean 'to belong' to a 
shared community as a sexual citizen, I came to Britain in 2003, 
and embarked upon this project. By coming to Britain, I hoped to 
explore the ways in which the meaning of 'sexual citizenship' had 
involved the creation of a community, in which sexual minorities (or 
sexual others/ strangers) in Britain were recognised and accepted as 
citizens. 
There are, however, as I have gradually found, many different 
stories of belonging. And one's story of 'belonging' and inclusion' as 
a sexual citizen was often inseparably bound up with the story of 
'estrangement' and 'exclusion' of the other. My search for what it is 
to 'belong' as a sexual citizen in Britain has gradually entailed the 
other: what it is to be 'recognised' as a sexual stranger or other, and 
to be, therefore, 'excluded'from the politics of citizenship. My 
interest has become less in how stories of 'belonging', which I 
expected to hear in Britain now, differ from the stories of 'exclusion' 
of the past, but the interplay between the two, which has constituted 
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and is constituting opposing potentialities of being (or becoming) 
sexual citizens/others in Britain. This is how I 'now'understand the 
journey I have taken to write this dissertation. 
1.2 About this Thesis 
As Fraser and Gordon argue, citizenship is not merely a word, 
but a powerful humanistic term: 'Citizen and citizenship are 
powerful words. They speak of respect, or rights, of dignity .... We 
find 
no pejorative uses. It is a weighty, monumental, humanist word' 
(Fraser, & Gordon, 1994: 90). Yet, it is, as I have found, ironic that 
such a humanist word has, at the same time, constantly evoked a 
widespread anxiety over its exclusionary sense. For example, 
referring to the term 'second-class citizens', frequently used in 
reflecting the exclusive nature of citizenship in contemporary liberal 
democracies, Vogel argues that: 
This [second-class citizen] is a curious term. It suggests that 
membership of a political community is both universal and 
hierarchically ordered. The lower ranks in this order will 
typically include ethnic minorities, immigrants, poor and 
disabled people, and women. As far as the law is concerned, 
the individuals belonging to such groups are recognized as full 
members of the community. Yet, they are, in many important 
respects, treated as if they were not (Vogel, 1994: 76). 
This paradox around citizenship as the source of both belonging 
and exclusion is taken as a starting point for discussion in this thesis. 
The community imagined through the word 'citizenship'- like the 
community imagined through the word 'nation'- transcends 
boundaries of difference: it creates, in the minds of individuals, the 
image of abstract, imagined, collective subjectivities that embodies 'a 
deep, horizontal comradeship' (Anderson, 1991: 6-7). To put it 
another way, the power of the words, citizens and citizenship, lies in 
both their emotional and political appeal to create 'we', the source of 
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belonging that transcends the dividing world of individuals. Yet, 
finding commonality out of difference may, at the same time, require 
excluding many different ways of being in common, and citizenship 
that aspires to solidarity based on communal identification can easily 
lapse into exclusionary process, separating the worlds into two 
categories such as 'Us'versus Them' (Turner, 1997). These 
contradictions and contestations involved in (sexual) citizenship- 
making are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
* 
In the course of writing this thesis, I have been constantly 
reminded of the fact that citizenship is an essentially 'contested' and 
'contextualised' concept (Lister, 2003). The language of citizenship 
has been, indeed, mobilised in diverse ways in legal, political, social, 
economic, cultural, and moral discourses; and it has been used in 
different contexts (national, global, institutional, and personal) with 
different practical and normative implications. Further, the idea of 
citizenship itself is continuously extending further. The classification 
of citizenship has been constantly updated, as a wide range of new 
rights claims associated with citizenship have emerged and have 
been contested. Along with the traditional conception of civil, 
political and social citizenship (Marshall, 1950), there have been 
various 'new citizenships' emerging such as cultural citizenship 
(Turner, 2001; Pakulski, 1997; Stevenson, 2003), minority 
citizenship (Kymlicka, 1995), ecological/ environmental citizenship 
(Smith, 1998), global/ cosmopolitan citizenship (Urry, 1999), 
consumer citizenship (Cronin, 2000), disabled citizenship (Barton, 
1993), all largely altering and expanding the core idea of citizenship 
in the contemporary world. 
Sexual citizenship, as Richardson argues, is one of the new 
citizenships, recently conceptualised primarily as an attempt to 
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recapture what used to be called gay and lesbian rights (Richardson, 
2000b: 9). In fact, the emergence of the 'sexual citizen' who makes 
'sexual rights' claims is itself a recent historical and political 
phenomenon, and has only gained academic and public recognition 
in Britain since the 1990s. ' However, given the problematic nature of 
the concept of citizenship as notoriously contextualised and 
contested, any attempts to theorise sexual citizenship are not easy, 
making an adequate empirical approach even more difficult. 
Faced with this problem, a number of studies start with a kind 
of working definition of citizenship, to which a specific meaning and 
structure in relation to sexuality is added later (see Bell, &. Binnie, 
2002). My approach to the idea of sexual citizenship is different. 
Rather than determining what should constitute the basic 
components of sexual rights and citizenship in advance, I explore 
the process of complicated, and perhaps incomplete sexual 
citizenship making by drawing upon several 'contested, 
'contextualised' and 'emerging' gay and lesbian stories, which have 
entered into public debates in Britain, and established contested 
and clarifying boundaries of belonging and citizenship. 
Stories and storytelling, according to Maines, are 'ubiquitous' 
3. There is now a voluminous literature on sexual citizenship, 
approaching various issues around sexuality from the perspective of 
citizenship. For a general discussion on the subject, see: David Bell and 
John Binnie, The Sexual Citizen: Queer Theory and Beyond, (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2000); David T. Evans in Sexual Citizenshz]p: the Material 
Construction of Sexualities (London: Routledge, 1993); Morris Kaplan, 
Sexual Justice: Democratic Citizenship and the Politics of Desire, (New York: 
Routledge, 1997), Shane Phelan, Sexual Strangers: Gays, Lesbians, and 
Dilemmas of CVizenship, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001); 
Kenneth Plummer, Intimate Citizenshýp: Private Decisions and Public 
Dialogue, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003); Diane 
Richardson, 'Sexuality and Citizenship, ' Sociology 32(l) (1998): 83-100; 
Carl F. Stychin, Governing Sexuality: the Changing Politics of Citizenship 
and Law Reform (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003); Jeffrey Weeks, The 
Sexual Citizen, ' Theory, Culture & Society 15(3-4) (1998): 35-52. 
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existing in most of our communications and social activities. 
Nevertheless, storytelling is not just like any speech act. It has a 
certain structure: we select events/ experience and transform them 
into story elements by using a particular plot ordered in a specific 
time/space setting (Maines, 1993: 22). In other words, stories 'have 
a point'; they provide a means of making sense of our personal or 
collective experiences/ events through which our pasts and futures 
are reconstructed and projected. Stories are also highly 
contextualised. Located in a specific individual, institutional, social, 
historical, cultural context, 'story' events - even when they are 
translated into factual events - are likely to produce multiple 
versions of story lines, adding particular viewpoints of narrators, 
generating 'potential sites of conflict and competition as well as 
cooperation and consensus' (Maines, 1993: 23). 
As one of the most contested and contextualised stories, we 
hear stories of/about citizens through both public and personal 
languages and discourses. I (or s/he) tell(s) personal stories about 
my (her/his) expectation of or disappointment with the communities 
as (would be) citizens. We (or they) tell stories about the relationship 
between our (or their) behaviours /identities and our (or their) 
membership to a particular community as citizens or others. 
Through the story telling act, people use a particular plot and 
rhetoric, select and reconstruct both individual and collective 
events/ experience to provide the condition for their stories to 
flourish in the public. Well-crafted stories, which have (or create) 
meanings for those who listen to them, can generate a sense of a 'we' 
that Involves some degree of affective bond and a sense of solidarity' 
(Davis, 2002: 19). Told and retold, stories that circulate widely can 
often successfully translate private events/ experiences as public 
events/ experiences, constituting 'our' stories at a particular spatial/ 
social/ historical juncture (see Ewick & Silbey, 2003). Or, equally 
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possible, publicised events, which create meaning for 'us' and shape 
ýourp personal stories, can invite contestation from 'their'versions of 
events, fomenting discord and schism between 'us' and 'them' (see 
Delgado, 1989). 
In telling sexual citizenship stories, I am not simply interested 
in 'retelling' gay and lesbian stories that have personally and 
publicly been told and circulated in Britain. Sociologically grounded, 
the focus of my analysis is rather on: particular contextual 
conditions in which sexual story's access to the public is authorised 
(or rejected); the manner in which stories are emplotted; the kinds of 
interpretations or explanations of events/ experience stories offer; the 
conflicts or compromises among stories; the ways in which stories 
are articulated (or disarticulated) as stories of 'us/citizens'; and with 
what political effect at a given historical moment. Like any other 
storyteller, I also exercise a degree of selectivity in choosing 
particular stories that I will use for my analysis - ýpersonal 
experience stories around the (homo) sexual' that enter into the 
representational public/political arena, the parliament, and shape 
relations between the legitimate and the sexual in a given historical 
and social context. Such stories are not much studied as 'personal 
experience stories'types; for stories about events, told within specific 
institutional contexts of retelling/ representation, include events not 
experienced by storytellers (politicians) themselves. Nevertheless, the 
examination of such sexual stories, I argue, would help us to 
understand various ways in which power relations interplay with 
storytelling practices - the ways in which private narratives of T 
become integrated into public narratives of Ve'- contributing in the 
making (unmaking or remaking) of sexual citizenship in Britain. 
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1.3 Cba pters 
This dissertation is organised into two parts. In Part 1, The 
Context of debates: Stories of Sexual/Intimate Citizens, I review the 
contexts in which 'stories of intimate/ sexual citizenship' have 
emerged and been contested in Britain (Chapter 3), with particular 
focus on the challenges the 'narrative's turn in social sciences'raises 
for citizenship studies (Chapter 2). 
I begin in chapter 2 by reflecting on two conflicting notions of 
storytelling, postmodern storytelling on the one hand, and counter- 
storytelling on the other, which have recently emerged in the west 
and, in different ways, answer the following two questions: (1) why 
should we become interested in stories and storytelling in the social 
sciences; and (2) what do stories have say on issues around justice 
and citizenship. My task in this chapter is, then, to work closely with 
these two perspectives of storytelling - to show epistemological 
dilemmas and political questions they raise - which I then explore 
with reference to the model of 'stories of intimate/ sexual citizenship' 
currently mobilised in Britain in Chapter 3 and 4. 
In Chapter 3,1 discuss the contested 'moments' in which 
tsexual stories' are seen to have emerged in Britain, and discuss, in 
particular, the implications of attention to sexual stories and sexual 
storytelling for political theorisation of intimate/sexual citizenship. 
In Chapter 4, Politics of Storytelling, I extend the discussion, 
and explore in detail the attempts to use storytelling in the practice 
of intimate/sexual citizenship making, and problems that are likely 
to complicate and challenge the politics of 'stories of intimate/ sexual 
citizenship'. Chapter 4 is also a linking chapter which could be read 
as an introduction to Part II. Here, I provide a methodological 
framework for the analysis of 'political storytelling, and illustrate 
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some of the themes that are developed in detail in Part II. 
By way of reading stories recounted in the parliamentary 
debates on same-sex sexualities, Part II, Sexual Stories go to 
Westminster, attempts to show both the problematic aspects and the 
effects of political storytelling involved in the making of sexual 
citizens/others in Britain. Here, I compare and contrast the 
narratives deployed in the parliamentary debates on same-sex 
sexualities present within three different legislative moments - the 
Sexual Offences Act in the 1960s (Chapter 5), Section 28 of the Local 
Government Act in the 1980s (Chapter 6), and the Civil Partnership 
Act in the 2000s (Chapter 7). Each chapter follows the ways in which 
sexual stories enter the public/national political domain, the 
Parliament, and make their case for the recognition of sexual rights 
in Britain. Here, I identify: (1) the role stories and storytelling play in 
the making of sexual citizens/ others; and (2) problematic ways in 
which stories have been articulated (or disarticulated) into the 
politics of sexual citizenship in Britain. 
Chapter 8 ends the thesis by raising some questions of the 
relationship between storytelling practices and sexual citizenship 
politics, highlighting tensions between the two. 
-29- 
Part I 
The Context of debates: 
Stories of Sexual/Intimate Citizens 
-30- 
Chapter 2 
The Narrative Turn in Social Sciences 
1 Introduction 
Sexual citizenship is a relatively new term, and its newness 
encourages us to inquire about the emergence of the concept itself. 
Rather than analysing the concept of sexual citizenship as given, I 
said earlier that I make inquires about the process of its 'making' by 
focusing on 'stories'of sexual citizenship. In this chapter, I discuss a 
framework for thinking about sexual citizenship 'stories' by first 
asking the question: why 'stories"? 
Here, I argue that 'part' of the answer can be found from stories 
about stories in the social sciences themselves, which are now 
increasingly telling of what Maines calls, a 'narrative's moment' 
(Maines, 1993: 23). In chapter 2, therefore, I analyse some prevailing 
sociological stories that tell us why and how this narrative's moment 
comes about, what it entails, and what this narrative's moment may 
have say on issues around citizenship. Particular attention is paid to 
two conflicting notions of storytelling, which have recently emerged, 
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and, in different ways, answer the question, 'why stories'. They are 
postmodern storytelling on the one hand, and counter- storytelling on 
the other. My task in this chapter is then to work closely with these 
two notions of storytelling - to show the epistemological dilemmas and 
political questions they raise - which I then explore with reference to 
Plummer's model of 'stories of intimate/sexual citizenship'in the 
following chapters (Plummer, 2003). 
2.2 Narrafive Imperatives 
Narrative's moment, Maines argues, is the moment whereby the 
social scientists have increasingly come to terms with the possibility 
and the desirability of a narrative approach within the field of social 
sciences (Maines, 1993). This moment is agenuine'one in the sense 
that the renewed interest in the study of narratives now involves an 
epistemological shift within the field of social sciences (1993: 17): in 
embracing a narrative approach, social scientists, rather than viewing 
themselves first and foremost as scientists, assume the role of 
narrators who refle)dvely inquire into their own and other people's 
narratives. And however disturbing this shift may be for some, this 
narrative's moment, according to Maines, is now solidly grounded - 
narrative has now moved from the 'periphery' to the 'centre'within 
human sciences (Plummer, 1995: 18). 
In recent years, we indeed find a renewed interest in both 
theorising and analysing stories across diverse disciplinary and 
theoretical boundaries within the humanities and social sciences (see 
Kreiswirth, 2000). At the same time, the concept itself, which was 
once predominantly associated with fiction or fable rather than with 
social sciences, has undergone a significant change (Patterson & 
Renwick, 1998: 315). Framed ontologically, the concept of story or 
narrative has become an indispensable lens through which we see 
-32- 
ourselves - not (simply) as homo sapiens (rational creatures), but 
(more fundamentally) as homo narrans (storytellers) (Fisher, 1985). 
Epistemologically, story has become increasingly associated with a 
way of making knowledge claims - knowledge claims not based on the 
model of rationality and impartiality, but based on highly 
contextualised, localized, and often conflicting stories that are open to 
negotiation. Framed in this way, we hear various stories about stories 
prevailing in this narrative's moment, which, in a much shared 
manner, emphasize the storied nature of our lives and our knowledge: 
it is through stories we come to make sense of ourselves, know the 
world, understand and interact with each other. 
Questioning the status of stories as 'merely' stories, Mark 
Tumer, for example, speaks of stories as basic 'mental instruments' 
through which our lives become 'possible'- a means of 'thinking, 
knowing, acting, creating, and plausibly even of speaking' (Tumer, 
1996: 4). Stories, for Jerome Bruner, are what make our life 
meaningful; it is stories through which we 'structure' our perceptual 
experience, 'organise' memories, 'segment' and 'purpose-build' the 
very events of life (Bruner, 1986: 15,2 1). Charles Taylor, who links 
story to the notion of self/identity, argues that we can only assess our 
moral-ethical condition through webs of stories: 'in order to make 
minimal sense of our lives, in order to have an identity, we need an 
orientation to the good' and 'this sense of good has to be woven into 
my understanding of my life as an unfolding story' (Taylor, 1989: 47). 
Richard Rorty, who follows a similar line of reasoning, argues that the 
moral-ethical condition that leads to 'human solidarity' could be only 
achieved by our narrative 'imagination'- the imagination that 
increases 'our sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and 
humiliation of other, unfamiliar sorts of people' (Rorty, 1989: xvi). And 
telling stories, as it is such a large part of what we do - thinking, 
interpreting, identifying, and bonding - is, McCall argues, the very 
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'human activity' that 'creates society'(McCafl, 1990: 145). 
Stories, in this narrative's moment, seem to have appropriated 
most, if not all, aspects of human life. Indeed, stories and storytelling, 
as Maines argues, are 'ubiquitous', existing in most of our 
communications and social activities (Maines 1993). They are, in 
Bennett and Royle's words, 'everywhere' (Bennett, & Royle, 1995: 41). 
Existing so much naturally and inevitably throughout most of our 
social interactions, narratives or stories, Hayden White argues, 'could 
appear problematic only in a culture in which it was absent 
or .... refused' (White, 1980: 5). And the opening passage of Roland 
Barthe's Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives also 
captures this narrative's supposed universality perfectly: 
The narratives of the world are without number... [The] 
narrative is present in every age, in every place, in every 
society; it begins with the very history of man-kind and there 
nowhere is nor has been a people without narrative. All classes, 
all human groups, have their narratives ... narrative is international, transhistorical, transcultural: It is simply there, 
like life itself (Barthes, 1977: 79). 
If narrative is universal, we find that social science, which 
aspires to achieve a more complete, unified, and objective 
understanding of the social world, had long abandoned a narrative 
approach in its disciplinaxy field precisely because of narrative's 
overloaded status - its supposed universality. Stories may appear 
universally - as 'everywhere' as 'simply there, like life itself - but they 
are, for this very reason, not trustworthy. When contrasted to science 
that quests for truth (the correct representation of what actually 
happened), which is, in turn, subject to the collective approval of a 
group of experts who produce scientific knowledge, there are simply 
too many stories. And this is because of what story does (or does not). 
Story does not reflect 'truth' in any straightforward way. Quite 
the contrary. Stories, rather than simply reflecting what happens, 
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constitute events by imposing meaning on them. This, what Norman 
Andrews calls, 'impositionalism', means that telling a story 
necessarily involves a certain kind of interpretative violence', which, 
when judged by the yardstick of science, is not verifiable or falsifiable 
(Andrews, 1991: 120). The two scientific rules, what nineteenth- 
century science calls 'verification' and twentieth-century science 
'falsification', enable, Lyotard argues, 'the horizon of consensus to be 
brought to the debate between partners (sender and the addressee)' 
(Lyotard, 1984: 22). Although drawing a consensus is not necessarily 
the 'sign of the truth', the reverse is, nevertheless, accepted as 
correct: in the conception of scientific knowledge, there is this 
underlying presumption that 'truth of a statement necessarily draws a 
consensus' (Lyotard 1984: 22). No such rules, however, are applicable 
to stories that allow a consensus to be drawn, for stories, by their 
nature, supply a plurality of contradictory and conflicting 
'interpretations'. At best, stories can be described as self-legitimating. 
At worst, they are, by their very form as stories, deceptive - merely 
fables. 
Seen like this, the idea of narrative or story, if taken too 
seriously, endangers the very possibility of their being social 
gscience'- precise, neutral, objective, rational and, therefore, 
universal. Writing during the heyday of the positivist era, Read Bain, 
for example, argues that mere narrative approach will lead sociology 
to 'remain forever a bastard discipline sired and dammed by 
common sense and normative knowledge' or to be 'a hodgepodge of 
pretentious words, random observations, speculations, opinions, 
pious hopes and fears, attitudes, wishes, sophistical logic, and 
literary purple patches' (Bain, 1935: 486). ' Concluding that stories 
4. Driven by the quest for recognition as a scientific discipline, the social 
sciences, Maines notes, have not been friendly towards the idea of a 
narrative approach to the study of social life. Instead, the idea of value- 
neutral, quantitative, objective, and rational knowledge about human 
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are never subject to 'proof, an anthropologist, Metraux CartrY 
classifies narrative statements as 'belonging to a different mentality: 
savage, primitive, underdeveloped, backward, alienated, composed of 
opinions, customs, authority, prejudice, ignorance, ideology' (Lyotard 
1984: 27). Contrasting storytelling to 'scientific' inquiry, Maurice 
Mandelbaum, a historian, also informs us that: 
Typically, the person who tells a story may be inventing what 
he tells us, or he may be recounting what he already knows, or 
he may be inventing what he does not know about matters 
which he is recounting; but he is not in any case engaged in an 
inquiry which aims to establish what did in fact occur 
(Mandelbaum, 1967: 414). 
If storytelling is intrinsically backward, deceptive, and therefore 
inferior to scientific inquiry, why are so many social scientists 
interested in narrative or stories now? How is the use of story as a 
means of an inquiry justified? What are story's main features that 
explain its appeal to many social scientists? Further, the question 
that interests us is: what have these questions to do with a 
citizenship study in the first place? Rather than a scientific inquiry 
into citizenship, why consider stories of citizenship in general and 
stories of sexual citizenship in particular? These questions raised 
then can be summarized into two questions: (a) Why should we 
experience has been predominantly valued, which has, in turn, largely 
transformed the meaning of the term 'human experience' to that of 
measurable 'human behaviours'. Here, becoming scientific, Maines 
argues, has meant 'becoming very good at measuring things', and social 
life of experience has become 'what the measuring instrument measures' 
(Maines, 2001: 164-5). Human experience, categorised into countable and 
describable 'small units', are then rendered into 'aggregated data', 
providing 'generability' and 'predictability' for social science. By contrast, 
Maines argues: 'the richness and ambiguity represented by large samples 
of narrative data' are considered as 'unwieldy, hard to quantify and 
compare, providing little generability or predictive value, and therefore 
unscientific. These limitations have led more scientific-minded sociologists 
to dismiss the validity, reliability, and overall value of narrative data' 
(ibid. ). 
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become interested in stories and storytelling in the social sciences?; 
(b) What do stories have to say on issues around rights and 
citizenship? 
These are two main questions I plan to address in the next 
section (and also in Chapter 3 and 4 in the case of (b)). In particular, 
I shall discuss two conflicting notions of storytelling which have 
recently emerged, and which, in different ways, answer the question 
(a) by linking it to the question (b) of justice and citizenship. They 
are postmodern storytelling on the one hand, and counter 
storytelling on the other. Their similar ways of conceptualising 
storytelling as a form of social critique, and their different ways of 
facing 'an epistemological dilemma', I suggest, offer us a useful path 
towards considering those two questions posed above (see Disch, 
1994: 11). In what follows, I will, therefore, briefly outline these two 
notions of storytelling. 
2.3 Stogtellig and Sodal CrifiquelAclion 
Some recent pronouncements on our post-modern condition 
relate narrative's moment to a more extensive 'postmodern turn' 
found in the realm of scientific knowledge in western societies 
characterised as: (a) a broad scepticism towards any foundational 
knowledge claims based on 'the idea of science as Truth'; (b) a 
rejection of the necessary separation between power and knowledge 
production; and (c) a critical understanding of changed relations 
between 'knowledge producers and citizens' (see Seidman, 1994: 5). 
In postmodern theorising, social science that searches for the 
universal truth is a modernist dream. The dreamer is a middle-class, 
white, western, heterosexual man, and it is 'a dream of power over 
others' (Stivers, 1993: 411). His use of detached scientific reasoning, 
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freed from his passions, culture, history, and interests, is no more 
than a legitimating rhetoric for his particular 'interpretation' (a 
particular story) of social life, which, nevertheless, claims the status 
of universal truth - the feature of what Lyotard calls metanarrative. 
Here, 'the Science of Man' elevates the kind of evidences presented 
through the consensus of the privileged to the level of 'the' human 
scientific knowledge. At the same time, it devalues and suppresses 
other situated subjugated knowledge by regarding them as merely 
personal and irrational 'stories'. Postmodernists argue that the 
universal consensual definition of scientific knowledge attained 
through the use of 'reason'is, then, based on the exclusion of 
possible dissensus arising from multiplicities of perspectives found 
in these little subjugated 'stories', which could challenge a 
metanarrative of a culture. And if so, these subjugated little/local 
stories are important means to present differences, to reveal 
discontents in dominant accounts of the world, and to challenge the 
stability in received universal knowledge. 
Proponents of postmodern storytelling believe that the 
heterogeneity and conflictual multiplicity found in these subjugated 
little/local stories has a further important political implication in the 
postmodern condition of increduality toward metanarratives': the 
impossibility of consensus. Lyotard who supports such a view 
argues that the universal consensus upon which the modern 
Enlightenment citizenship project is built is no longer a political 
possibility. People now become aware of a plurality of conflicting 
legitimating 'little' stories in which the metanarrative that tens 'the' 
universal truth and human progress no longer has the universal 
appeal it used to have. In this context, what we can (and should) 
attempt to arrive at, Lyotard argues, is 'an idea and practice of 
justice that is not linked to that of consensus' (Lyotard, 1984: 66). 
This means that we need, rather than a single and overarching 
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theory of justice and an idea of universal citizenship, 'a new pluralist 
justice' or 'a justice of multiplicities' whereby the goal of just 
dialogue is now 'paralogy- an introduction of different ideas and 
interpretations contained in little/local stories, which constantly 
transgress the universal rules that draw the boundary of political 
community. 
The idea that storytelling is an important means to challenge a 
privileged standpoint that makes claims to universality is similarly 
found (but certainly with different political implications) in counter- 
storytelling perspectives. A counter-story, by definition, is a story 
that resists and delegitimises a dominant version of social reality. 
The dominant version of social reality, Richard Delgado argues, is 
like 'eyeglasses we have worn a long time', being 'nearly invisible', 
but nevertheless constantly being used by us to interpret the world 
we live in (Delgado, 1989: 2413). These eyeglasses we wear are the 
cultural 'stock stories' (master narrativesl' - stories that are 
implicitly or explicitly 'written for us'with reference to objectivity and 
normality, and defended by systems and institutions that constitute 
our specific culture and political community (see Fine, Harris, & 
Carney, 2001: 7). These stock stories that we 'absorb' and tell as 
members of a specific society, not only frame our sense of reality by 
filtering the world in certain ways, but also guide us in how to 
experience the reality: they are, in other words, prescriptive as much 
as they are descriptive. 
Here, the key function of dominant cultural stories, Molly 
5. A stock story is defined by Delgado as 'the one the institution 
collectively forms and tells about itself. The story picks and chooses from 
among the available facts to present a picture of what happened: an 
account that justifies the world as it is' (Delgado, 1989: 242 1). In 
justifying the world as it is, stock stories 'help maintain the status quo' 
(Richardson, 1990: 128). Stock stories are., Sarmas argues, 'those that are 
part of, and reinforce, the dominant discourse' (Sarmas, 1994: 703). 
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Andrews argues, is in offering people 'a way of identifying what is 
assumed to be a normative experience': '[Ulltimately, the power of 
master narratives derives from their internalisation. Wittingly or 
unwittingly, we become the stories we know, and the master 
narrative is reproduced' (Andrews, 2002: 1). A stable and ordered 
social reality constructed through dominant cultural stories is, 
however, never complete. For whatever reason, experiences that 
conflict with the dominant story of social lives provide a potential 
source of counter storytelling. One may find examples of this in 
experiential-based stories created by those who are underprivileged 
and marginalised in our society. Stories of counter experiences of 
reality told by marginalised persons are often denied their existence 
and regarded as 'not real', because they do not fit into the 
dominant/ normalized version of reality. Reclaiming one's own 'real' 
stories against the dominant story of reality, in this context, not only 
makes visible the fact that the latter is just one of many possible 
stories', it also 'open[s] new windows into reality', offering us 
alternative ways of seeing and knowing realities (Delgado, 1989: 
2414). 
From a counter-storytelling perspective, storytelling is, then, a 
powerful means to 'give voices to those who are silenced or 
marginalized'and to provide ways of expressing their own version of 
experiential reality different from that of the privileged (Richardson, 
1990: 128). In this way, proponents of counter storytelling, like 
postmodern critics, recognise the fact that there are conflicting 
stories we tell about the real, and the importance of such conflicting 
storytelling as a means to challenge dominant accounts of a single, 
value-neutral, objective, and natural reality. However, their 
conception of storytelling differs from that of postmodern critics in 
the sense that their endorsement of storytelling as a means of a 
social critique does not mean that consensual storytelling is no 
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longer a political possibility. Quite the opposite. Counter-storytelling 
is critical for its capacity to provide more adequate and 
transformative ways in which we can understand and communicate 
our different contextual realities, and to create a more inclusive and 
consensual political community - consensual not from the 
perspectives of the dominant, but, this time, from the perspectives of 
the below, the very location whereby our realities are truly 
experienced. 
Here, we should recognise an important difference between 
postmodern and counter storytelling perspectives: while the former 
resists any claims to foundational truth and therefore the possibility 
and legitimacy of consensus among conflicting stories, the latter 
attempts to provide grounds for trusting (counter) stories upon 
which we can build democratic consensual politics. The 'fact' of 
stories, in counter- storytelling perspectives, is measurable through 
experience, and the democratic consensus is, in turn, premised on a 
belief in the explanatory 'truth' of experience over rationalist 
abstraction. But it is precisely here, around the issue of experience, 
that we find a particular epistemological dilemma confronting both 
postmodern and counter- storytelling perspectives. 
According to Ewick and Silbey, 'the political commitment' 
found in a counter-storyteRing perspective that seeks to give 'voice' 
and bear 'witness' through stories is based on 'the epistemological 
conviction that there is no single, objectively apprehended truth' 
(Ewick & Silbey, 1995: 199). And such an epistemological 
understanding is based on the postmodern implication that: story/ 
language, rather than it simply reflecting reality, is responsible for 
creating and shaping a particular view of reality. However, this 
counter-storytelling perspective, which defines reality as a storied 
construct, has a tension with its empiricist assumptions 
underpinning an evidence-based approach to storytelling -'the 
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evidence of experience' (Scott, 199 1). On the one hand, it recognises 
that: there is no such thing as objective truth existing outside the 
webs of stories that construct a particular perspective of reality; it is 
'power' rather than the so-called truth that 'settles disputes' among 
these conflicting stories, and set the rules of consensus and 
agreement for members of a particular knowledge/ political 
community (Disch, 1994: 10). On the other hand, there sprang from 
this the evidence of empirical experience which grasps the 'truth' of 
stories, and serves as a way of talking about what really happened 
(Scott, 1991: 774). Here, the notion of experience, as Scott argues, 
appears as 'sub ective witness' to the 'authentic' and 'immediate' j 
truth of a story, establishing the possibility of (alternative or new) 
'objective knowledge' against hegemonic constructions of social 
worlds (Scott, 1991: 781). And this, in turn, provides the possibility 
of consensus among storytellers, because, however diverse and 
conflicting their perspectives and positions may be, the evidence of 
experience provides 'an unquestionable ground for explanation'- the 
'real'thing existing outside established meanings (Scott, 1991: 788). 
The postmodem approach to stories, however, problematises 
the notion of experience that lies at the heart of counter-storytelling 
perspectives. According to postmodern perspectives, consensus built 
upon any claims to foundational truth - whether it is grounded on 
abstract reason or subjective experience - is repressive; for it, by 
telling 'the' story, puts an end to stories-Seeking an alternative 'real 
unity'founded on experiential based knowledge claims is nothing 
less than a transcendental illusion: for the heterogeneous character 
of contemporary society is composed of a multiplicity of qittle' 
narratives that are incommensurable with each other. Even what 
counts as experience, as Scott reminds us, is 'nether self-evident 
nor straightforward: it is always contested, always therefore political' 
(Scott, 1991: 797). Rather than attempting to elevate experience to 
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the position of 'new' truth and close off further storytelling, 
postmodern storytellers/ listeners, who bear witness to the 
indeterminacy of experience, should aim to cultivate difference and 
fragmentation, creating a justice of disensus -a justice of 
multiplicity. The value of postmodern storytelling, committed to a 
justice of multiplicity, lies not in discovering alternative truth, but in 
denouncing 'all monopolies of narratives' (Kearney, 1998: 209). As 
Lyotard exhorts: 
Destroy all monopolies of narrative .... Remove from the Narrator 
the privilege he gives himself and show there is just as much 
power in narrative listening and narrative action (in the socially 
narrated world) .... Struggle for the inclusion of all Master Narratives, of theories and doctrines, particularly political ones, 
within the (little) narratives. So that the intelligentsia may see 
its task not to proclaim the truth or save the world, but to seek 
the power of playing out, listening to, and telling stories. A 
power that is so common that people will never be deprived of it 
without riposte. And if you want an authority - that power is 
authority. Justice is wanting it (Lyotard, 1977: 86 cited in 
Kearney, 1988: 209). 
Just what does it mean to destroy 'all monopolies of narrative' 
in pra3ds? In the world of 'radical inequality', Mary Hawkesworth 
argues, such a 'relativist resignation', proposed by postmodernism's 
seductive text ýreinforces the status quo' (Hawkesworth, 1989: 557). 
The postmodernists' commitment to multiplicities and the endless 
play of difference through story-telling/listening may sound 
appealing. Yet, as Susan Borbo argues, the postmodern ideal of 
storytelling, which celebrates our ability to 'play out' stories across 
boundaries, 'obscures the located, limited, inescapably partial, and 
always personally invested nature of human "story making"' (Bordo, 
1990: 144). Here, in seeking for a justice of multiplicity, the theories 
of postmodemism, replaces the fantasy of the ýmodernist, Cartesian 
view from nowhere'with 'a new postmodern configuration of 
detachment, a new imagination of disembodiement: a dream of being 
everywhere' (Bordo, 1990: 143). By effectively producing an equally 
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problematic, abstract, postmodem version of Archimedean 
impartiality, the theories of postmodernism, Nancy Hartsock also 
claims, 'present less an alternative to the overconfident theories of 
the Enlightenment than a parasitic continuation of its 
preoccupations' (Nartsock, 1996: 46). ' 
Perhaps more problematicaRy, the postmodern idea of 
storytelling, 'committed to a justice of multiplicity', itself reveals a 
paradoxical dilemma (Kearney, 1998: 2 10- 1). To destroy 'all 
monopolies of narratives', we need to suspend 'all' criteria of ethical 
discrimination. Yet, as Kearney rightly argues, this 'prescription 
against universal prescription can itself be taken as a universal 
prescription' (2 10). To put the dilemma more sharply: in order for us 
to protect a justice of multiplicity (a justice of dissensus), a 
fundamental ethical consensus, as it appears, 'must lie at the 
foundation of a political community'- 'we have to agree to disagree' 
(MacGowan, 1991: 203). ' Yet, an ethical limit to fragmentation/ 
incommensurability is precisely what is lacking in the postmodern 
ideal of storytelling. What we then find here is an ethical circle of 
thought being operative within the postmodern politics of just' 
storytelling, which, according to Kearney, poses the following 
6. If the transcendental voice of Enlightenment subjectivity is associated 
with the situated knowledge of those privileged, educated, middle-class, 
and white men, the omnýpresent voice of postmodern subjectivity, 
according to Nartsock and Sangari, is a situated voice of the 'self-ironizing' 
western 'bourgeois' subject whose 'felt absence of the win or the abihty to 
change things as they are' is expressed through 'the voice of 
epistemological despair' (Sangari, 1987: 161 cited in Narsock, 1996: 46). 
7. MacGowan describes this paradox clearly: 'Only some political order, 
organised around some consensus, can preserve incommensurability in a 
world where power or a different kind of social order is always capable of 
violating these separate spaces. Where there are no metaphysical 
guarantees, there can be only communal, political ones, and that means 
that the conditions of action and of freedom must be the products of a 
social order, not the result of an achieved distance from that order' 
(MacGowan, 1991: 203) 
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paradoidcal questions: 'How do you reconcile a justice of multiplicity 
with a [postmodem condition ofl multiplicity of justices? '; when we 
speak of 'the'justice of multiplicity, 'whose justice are we talking 
about? (2 10)' 
The conflict between counter-storytelling and postmodern 
storytelling creates dilemmas, which cannot be easily resolved within 
the idea of narrative as it is theorised by either marginal or 
postmodern critics. In their view, narrative is understood either as 
an authentic voice of experience or a disembodied voice of nobody. 
And between such extremities, we find that stories are either 
equated with lives themselves or embrace an abstract promise for 
disembedded lives. 
According to Disch, a dilemma arising from this recurring 
conflict is an epistemological one, which raises the following 
question: 'Is it possible to account for storytelling as a practice of 
critical understanding without recourse to the kind of Archimedean 
pronouncement that stories claim to unmask or to essentialist 
claims about the sincerity and authenticity of the marginal scholarT 
(Disch, 1994: 11). Again, this is not just a question of academics, 
but a question about the political possibility/limits of 'mutual 
understanding'- about the 'viability of democratic ideals'. 
Particularly, the question is: 'Are non-coercive relations possible, 
within and among the various groups in this world, in light of its 
pluralityT (Ibid. ). 
In Chapter 3, and 4,1 explore the ways in which the 
contemporary academic discussions around 'stories of sexual/ 
intimate citizenship' have been organised, in part, as an attempt to 
answer these two questions. Specifically, Plummer's work on 
intimate citizenship represents an interesting attempt to configure 
sexual/intimate citizenship beyond the dilemmas facing marginal 
Ar% 7%0 
and postmodern critics. In spite of their difference, the common 
problem Plummer finds in both marginal and postmodern 
storytelling perspectives is the lack of attention given to 
intersubjective relations within which the 'actions'of storytelling 
takes place. For Plummer, stories are neither simply the 
representation of the real, nor the transgressive critical practice. 
They are, rather, the products of joint' communicative 'actions' 
operating within the fields of intersubjectivity (see Plummer, 1995: 
20-24). 
Story telling, Plummer argues, 'cannot be in isolation from 
hearings, readings, consumings'(Plummer, 1995: 25). Every act of 
storytelling involves 'someone telling someone else that something 
happened' (Smith, 1980: 232)': it is inter-subjective joint actions'in 
which a teller (or tellers) and listeners/ readers constitute a 
significant feature of the narrative situation. Stories told in this 
intersubjective context, do not simply recount what happened, but 
they convey meaning for and 'request certain response from'the 
readers/ listeners (Davis, 2002: 12). According to Walter Fisher, 
audiences access stories through 'their inherent awareness of 
narrative coherence' (Fisher, 1985: 314). They question whether or 
not the stories they hear/read are intelligible, accountable, and 
reliable. And they also ask whether or not the stories are consistent 
with other related stories or with stories of their own - whether they 
'ring true to the stories they know or believe to be true' (3 14). Our 
implicit or explicit awareness of the fact that we tell a story in the 
presence of others who may (or may not) 'see and hear what we 
hear', and therefore may (or may not) respond to our story in a way 
8. No one, Richard Kearny argues, 'tells stories to onself except in the 
form of a fictional alter-ego': even when one tells a story to oneself, one 
imagines oneself as the other with whom one engages anticipated 
interactive communication (Kearney, 1998: 247). 
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that assures us of 'the reality of the world and ourselves' reminds us 
that our storytelling is intrinsically dialogic, informed by the stories 
of others (Arendt, 1958: 50). Our stories, in order to convey 
meanings of our lives, need to communicate with stories of others. 
Telling a story is then a result of being 'engaged in fitting 
together lines of activity around stories' (Plummer, 1995: 20). We 
are, Plummer argues, engaged in 'story actions'. Or as Chambers 
tells it, we 'do things with narrative', just as we 'do with words' 
(Chambers, 1984: 3). And one thing we 'do'with stories is that we 
create 'webs of interconnected narratives', which, according to 
Plummer, makes a 'grounded' moral/ political project of citizenship 
possible (Plummer, 2003: 98). This aspect of storytelling - the ways 
in which stories 'gather people around them' (174) and contribute to 
the community/ citizenship building - is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3 and 4. Here, I discuss Plummer's attempt to use 
storytelling in the practice of intimate/sexual citizenship making in 
detail (Section 3.4,3.5, and 4.2), and problems that are likely to 
complicate and challenge his ideas and politics of intimate/sexual 
citizenship (Section 4.2 and 4.3). Before I move on to this topic, 
however, I first analyse the contested ýmoments' in which 'sexual 
stories' are seen to have emerged in Britain - the late-modem 
contexts - which, Weeks argues, provide the context for the 
emergence of sexual citizens. It is to this I now turn. 
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Chapter 3 
Moments of Sexual Citizenship 
1 Transgressionl CifiZensbo 
In his article, The Sexual Citizen', Jeffrey Weeks identifies two 
distinctive moments (or elements), which have existed within feminist 
and gay lesbian politics in Britain since the late 1960s: 'a moment of 
transgression' on the one hand, and 'a moment of citizenship' on the 
other (Weeks, 1998: 36). 
Weeks characterises 'a moment of transgression' as the moment 
of 'challenge to the traditional and received order of sexual life' 
(Weeks, 1996: 82): the moment when sexual dissidents, through 
various transgressive and subversive acts, confront the existing 
institutional and social forms of exclusion, and express their 
'difference' (Weeks, 1998: 47). Here, 'carnivalesque displays'such as 
'the men dressed as nuns, the mythologized bra burning of feminists, 
the women in leather on motorbikes in the vanguard of lesbian and 
gay pride marches, the kiss-ins in public spaces in capital cities' are, 
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according to Weeks, all clear manifestations of difference, constituting 
the moment of transgression (Weeks, 1998: 46-7). It is the moment 
that involves 'the constant invention and reinvention of the self, the 
subversion of traditional ways of being/living defined as the'normal 
(ibid: 36). 
This politics of transgression, which is, in part, about the 
rejection of the status quo, is acknowledged by Weeks as a useful 
means to make excluded voices heard in public. But its usefulness, 
Weeks argues, cannot be far-reaching unless this moment of 
transgression finds its 'proper home'- the home in which the 
excluded voices find their recognition and inclusion in society. In 
other words, 'the moment of transgression' is a politically and 
tactically viable strategy only when it is complemented by the demand 
for inclusion, which he defined as the claim for 'equal rights under the 
law, in politics, in economics, in social matters and in sexual matters' 
(Weeks, 1998: 47). This is what Weeks calls 'the moment of sexual 
citizenship'. 
Elizabeth Wilson (1993a) offers a similar line of argument. 
According to Wilson, a sexual politics that only emphasises 
transgression is ultimately an 'elitist' and 'minoritarian form of 
politics' (Wilson, 1993a). By reading Foucault's notion of 
transgression in which transgression is defined as an incessant 
crossing and recrossing of every line, which in its turn create a 
transgressive spiral', Wilson recognises an elitist 'transgressive 
impulse' in that 'once a transgression becomes merely a widespread 
habit it has lost it magical aura of initiation and privileged 
experience' (Wilson, 1993a: 111). Simply prioritising transgressive 
performance and displays, while rejecting any kinds of commonly 
supported political dynamic that could possibly limit transgression 
turns this 'transgressive spiral'into an ever-circling movement 
which, according to Wilson, renders it impossible for the movement 
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to have any realistic vision of future society other than an elitist 
vision of transgressive utopia. Wilson, like Weeks, argues that the 
transgression can be a temporary political strategy, but it alone can 
never be an effective political force that can fundamentally transform 
a society. As Wilson puts it: 
The concepts of transgression, dissidence, subversion, and 
resistance - which have become familiar in radical discourse 
since the mid 1980s - are oppositional, negative. They are the 
politics of being against, they are the politics of rebellion. Yet 
since they are cast in the terms set by that which is being 
rebelled against, they are the politics, ultimately, of weakness 
(Wilson, 1993: 109). 
Why, after all, are we transgressing? Transgression's ever 
circling movement's answer seems to be 'transgression for 
transgression's sake'. It is this notion of limitless transgression with 
no final political goal in itself on which both Weeks and Wilson 
ground their criticism. For Weeks and Wilson, we need to get past 
the impasse presented by the transgression cycle. And in order to 
move beyond the ever-crossing transgressive impulse, we need to set 
limits on this transgression cycle through some mutually supported 
and persuasive political forces. 
Returning to Weeks's discussion of sexual politics, we find a 
particular kind of transgressive politics Weeks addresses in The 
Sexual Citizen, which is 'sexual'politics. The dilemma Weeks 
identifies in the moment of sexual transgression is to be found from 
the very question he is implicitly asking: what are we transgressing 
and why? 
What are we transgressing? For Weeks, the moment of sexual 
transgression has a private/public dimension. It is the moment 
when the private goes to the public: that is, sexual issues and the 
intimate personal life stories leak into'the domain of the public, 
constituting public problems (Plummer, 2001: 245). Now, why? The 
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ultimate aim of sexual transgression, according to Weeks, is 
paradoxical. The sexual transgression displayed by sexual dissidents 
within the public sphere stems from their struggle to 'protect'their 
intimacy in the private sphere; for the protection of their right of 
privacy is only possible when their right of privacy is recognized and 
respected by the public. The political dynamic underpinning the 
sexual transgression therefore necessarily intersects with demands 
for rightful inclusion in the public sphere. In other words, the 
moment of citizenship, that is the moment of mutual recognition of 
the right of privacy in the public sphere with balanced 
responsibilities, is the necessary consequence of the moment of 
transgression. As Weeks puts it: 
Without the claim to full citizenship, difference can never find a 
proper home. The sexual citizen then makes a claim to 
transcend the limits of the personal sphere by going public, but 
the going public is, in a necessary but nevertheless parado)dcal 
move, about protecting the possibilities of private life and 
private choice in a more inclusive society (Weeks, 1998: 37). 
From this point of view, we can now recognise how the notion 
of sexual citizen is understood by Weeks. For Weeks, the concept is 
'a contradiction in terms'in the sense that in order to be a sexual 
self, primarily constructed as private, we need to negotiate our right 
of privacy in terms of citizenship rights in the public sphere (ibid: 
36). For Weeks, the sexual citizen is then 'a hybrid being, breaching 
the public/private divide'through which one's sexuality is carefully 
managed in contemporary society (Ibid. ). 
This story about the sexual citizen is my starting point. More 
specifically, the concem of this chapter is to critically examine the 
modality of sexual citizenship conceptualised by Weeks through a 
number of binary pairs; transgression/ citizenship, exclusion/ 
inclusion, private/public, rights/ responsibilities and difference/ 
inequality. Although Weeks himself noted that his conceptualisation 
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of the sexual citizen was contradictory, the contradiction in Weeks's 
scheme of things was, nevertheless, complementary. It is 
complementary as long as the political purpose of the moment of 
transgression is in finding its proper home in the moment of 
citizenship, and private issues/stories go into the public domain for 
their rightful inclusion and recognition. ' 
Week's logic of argument is contradictory, however. If, as Wong 
argues, 'transgression were only to find a proper home in 
citizenship', it 'would have to be predetermined, judged, and 
absorbed by the moment of citizenship' (Wong, 2006: 211). Here, the 
questions that can be asked, however, are: who decides/defines the 
'moment'of sexual citizenship? On whose terms of Inclusion'and 
t equality', is the moment of citizenship produced and why? 
In the sections that follow, I shall repeatedly return to these 
questions, and reveal contradictions that lie behind the relationship 
between transgression and citizenship (or exclusion and inclusion, 
private and public, and difference and inequality). As a way to make 
9. In his conversation with Sue Golding, Weeks elaborates the 
complementary logic he finds between the moment of transgression and 
the moment of citizenship as such: 
What I suggest is that in any radical political movement there's 
always the moment of transgression when you try to pull the pillars 
down, when you try to challenge the status quo. In terms of gay 
liberation, it was the moment of gay liberation itself, of exploring 
sex, of cross-dressing, of experimenting with drugs, of exploring 
relationships, or whatever: that's like the moment of transgression. 
But linked to that is the moment of citizenship, which is the 
moment of making claims on society, a claim for inclusion. Making 
that claim for inclusion may seem assimilationist, but actually 
making demands on a culture which denies you is extremely radical: 
it identifies the frontiers of the conventional, it demarcates the lines 
of struggle. So, you can see transgression and citizenship as simply 
the different faces of the same moment of challenge. One is 
separating, the other is calling for belonging. But you can only do 
one with the other (Weeks, 1997: 323). 
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the contradiction apparent, I first discuss more about this 'Moment 
of sexual citizenship' conceptualised by Weeks, to which I shall now 
turn. 
3.2 ExclusionlInclusion 
Being a confident member of a society as a citizen means being 
an insider of a particular political, social, cultural, and sexual map 
(Plummer, 2003: 53). For those who mark difference in that map, the 
invitation to be a citizen does not simply involve the recognition of 
their difference. It can also, in many ways, involve the process of 
normalisation of the'difference (Seidman, 2001: 323). And the 
process of normalisation of 'the' difference is often followed by the 
process of re-differentiation and exclusion, in which who exists 
inside and who exists outside of this newly drawn map is further 
defined in terms of their citizenship status. The moment of 
citizenship, then, may not really be 'the'moment of citizenship, but 
rather be one of the 'moments' located within the boundaries drawn 
and redrawn between transgression and citizenship. In this picture, 
the boundaries of exclusion are shifting, and the moment of 
citizenship reconstructs and reconstitutes diverse (often conflicting) 
'new'moments of transgression and exclusion. 
I will return to this point later, but suffice it here to say that 
the politics of sexual citizenship, for the very reason that it involves 
the continuous political process in constructing/ reconstructing 
moments of citizenship/ transgression, calls into question the heart 
of Weeks's claim in which sexual transgression is seen to be 'the' 
strategic and constituting moment of 'the'moment of citizenship. 
Rather than celebrating 'the' moment of sexual citizenship as the 
proper home of the moment of transgression, this suggests that we 
need to question the political nature of this home existing within a 
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particular social/ cultural/ political frame in which some of those 
would-be- sexual-citizen s are defined as 'transgressive' subjectsp 
being excluded from entering this home at a given historical 
moment. 
For many, the constant mapping process in the citizenship 
politics through normalisation and re-differentiation means that 
there is always 'Otherness' created and excluded in the moments of 
sexual citizenship. Those who recognise this logic inherent in the 
politics of sexual citizenship, therefore, emphasise the costs of 
mobilising current sexual politics in terms of citizenship (Bell, 
Binnie, 2000; Richardson, 1998; Cossman, 2002; Stychin, 1998). 
For example, Seidman, in his article, From Identity to Queer Politics 
(200 1), engages, at leangh, with the question of 'normalisation' 
involved in citizenship politics. According to Seidman, gay and 
lesbian politics in the West, which have increasingly sought a 
politics of citizenship in their struggle for inclusion - for equality 
rights as members of community- have been effective only insofar as 
(would be) gay citizens have been able to present themselves as 
'virtually normal'citizens (see Sullivan, 1996). 'o And this, Seidman 
argues, is because: 
Citizenship involves not only juridical enfranchisement but 
symbolic incorporation into a national community. Individuals 
aspiring to the status of citizen must claim to possess the 
psychological, moral, and social traits that render them good 
and warrant their integration. In this regard, gays have claimed 
not only to be normal, but to exhibit valued civic qualities such 
as discipline, rationality, respect for the law and family values, 
10. According to Richardson, the 'equal rights approaches', which have 
focused on obtaining the same rights as heterosexuals, have increasingly 
come to dominate gay and lesbian politics in Europe and USA. In Britain, 
the successful lobby group, Stonewall, can be seen as following 
assimilationist and 'integrationist strategies to achieve social change' 
(Richardson, 2005: 516). 
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and national pride' (Seidman, 2001: 323). 
According to Stychin, this politics of citizenship, which creates 
the conditions for a normalisation of homosexual identities, is also a 
'politics of exclusion'. Claiming that a strategy for inclusion in the 
national imaginary of citizenship often result in the making of new 
boundaries of exclusion, Stychin argues: 'in attempting to achieve 
legal victories, lesbians and gays seeking rights may embrace the 
ideal of "respectability", a construction that then perpetuates a 
division between "good gays" and (disreputable) "bad queers". The 
latter are then excluded from the discourse of citizenship' (Stychin, 
1998: 200). 
For others, however, the fact that citizenship has been mapped 
in ever more inclusive ways can still mean that the politics of 
citizenship, for this very reason, provides an ever-constructive 
vehicle through which the moment of sexual citizenship can be 
envisaged. Particularly relevant for our discussion here is a well- 
known story of 'the three elements of citizenship' theorised by T. H. 
Marshall (Marshall, 1950); for his analysis of the progressive 
'expansion' of rights over time in Western society, starting from 'civil' 
in the eighteenth to 'political' participation rights in the nineteenth 
and finally to 'social' rights based on universal entitlements to 
education and welfare in the early twentieth century, is broadly 
adopted by its supporters, adding various 'fourth' contemporary 
elements into his evolutionary model of citizenship. " 
11. In presenting his socio-historical model of citizenship, Marshall 
distinguishes three different sets of rights associated with citizenship, 
which have been exercised through different socio-political institutions 
developed over time: 
Civil or legal rights are institutionalised through the law and include 
things such as the right to own property; freedom of speech, thought 
and faith; liberty of the person and the right to justice. Political 
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Weeks's project of 'radical humanism'in which the sexual 
citizenship politics is seen as an important means for sexual 
dissidents to struggle for their recognition in contemporary Western 
society is one example of this vision. For Weeks, the current cultural 
and political frame is explained in terms of. (1) 'the democratisation 
of relationships'; (2) 'the emergence of new subjectivities'; and (3) the 
'development of new narratives or stories about personal life' (Weeks, 
1998: 39). By 'reflecting wider social changes and providing the 
language which makes change possible', these new stories, which 
narrativize (1) and (2), are the context for the emergence of the 
sexual citizen: these 'new' stories not only work to undermine old 
binary divisions (such as heterosexual /homosexual binary divisions) 
that hitherto defined sexual politics, but also through their 
interaction bind us together, creating 'new, Inclusive' collective 
subjectivities as sexual citizens (40). 
Weeks's rather optimistic vision of the moment of sexual 
citizenship is then based on this changed map in the West where 
traditional hierarchical sexual boundaries between, for example, 
men/women and homosexuality/ heterosexuality, are seen as being 
radically dissolved, while 'new' narratives or stories around personal 
life remedy the limitations of earlier notions of citizenship', making 
the concept more 'comprehensive' and inclusive (Weeks, 1998: 39). 
Rightly or wrongly, we therefore arrive at this question: do we live in 
a society where sexual 'otherness'is negotiated in remarkably 
inclusive ways?; what political role do stories play in the making of 
'inclusive' sexual citizens? 
rights are institutionalised in the parliamentary political system and 
councils of local government and include the right to vote and 
participate in the exercise of political power. Social rights include 
the right to a certain level of economic welfare and security 
(Richardson, 1998: 84). 
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In the rest of this chapter I discuss 'the context for the 
emergence of the sexual citizen'Weeks elaborates in terms of the 
democratisation of relationships and the emergence of new sexual 
subjectivities - in the context of what Giddens termed late- 
modernity - in more detail (Section 3.3 - 3.6); and how this late- 
modern context relates to the 'inclusive' moment of intimate/sexual 
citizenship theorised by Ken Plummer (Section 3.5 - 3.6). Linking 
Plummer's idea of intimate/sexual citizenship with Young's 
conception of 'differentiated citizenship' in Section 3.6 and 3.7,1 
discuss some of the paradoxes/ dilemmas that arise in the ideas of 
'moment of citizenship', which I shall further discuss in Chapter 4 in 
relation to the contradictory role stories play in the making of sexual 
'others'/'citzens'. 
T in an aTe _, certaino 
3.3 Ljiin * of Un 
In the 1999 BBC Reith Lectures, Anthony Giddens, in 
capturing the image of a world that escapes our tight control and 
organisation, describes a kind of new society we are now living in as 
a 'Runaway World' (Giddens, 1999). The world, especially in Western 
countries, has become an 'erratic and dislocated world'that brings 
new kinds of uncertainty and risks into our lives (Giddens, 1999): it 
is a globalised world where local traditions are radically broken 
down; our sense of risk is heightened as social relations become 
more and more lifted out from local contexts of interaction; and 
even conventional ways of doing democracy are increasingly 
questioned. It is a world of 'high modernitythat involves 'crisis', 
'danger', 'anxiety, and 'insecurity' deeply affecting our living 
experiences in the world as well as our innermost personal feelings 
(Giddens, 1991: 12-3). 
This is, indeed, one of those familiar stories we frequently hear 
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about western society today. We hear about the stories of the ýPost- 
modem' (Lyotard, 1984) or at least late-modern' or 'high-modern' 
society (Giddens, 199 1) that signal the end of 'traditionalism' 
(Giddens, 1994a) and 'patriarchalism' (Castells, 1997), generating 
'risks' (Beck, 1992), 'uncertainty' (Weeks, 1995) and 'arudety' 
(Hollway & Jefferson, 1997), symbolised in globalisation (Albrow, 
1996) and individualisation (Bauman, 2001). Characterised in 
various ways as such, the society has been seen as moving into a 
world of unforeseen changes and instability both on a social and an 
ontological level. 
Particularly interesting here for our discussion is the ways in 
which sexual citizenship discourse comes into this messy picture of 
western society. According to Weeks, the fourth element that we now 
should include in the Marshallian model of citizenship is sexual 
rights (Weeks, 1995: 12 1). Our question is: why, at this particular 
moment of what Giddens describes as 'the age of uncertainty', do we 
find our sexuality has become the issue that is addressed 
increasingly in terms of citizenship? To answer this question, I find it 
useful to first engage Giddens in our conversation. This is because 
his understanding of those changes taking place in the western 
society and their relationship with our sexuality forms an important 
part of the ways in which current intellectual discourse of sexual 
citizenship is constructed in Britain. 
To begin with, it is important to note that high modernity, in 
Giddens's term,, is double-edged. However varied the ways in which 
our Runaway World is characterised maybe, this - at least for 
Giddens - does not mean that we are now simply left without any 
power to control our society. Quite the contrary; Giddens knows how 
to put the word 'opportunities' beside this 'crisis'. According to 
Giddens, those new risks and dangers that the Runaway World 
brings into our lives open up, at the same time, new possibilities of 
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action and eidstence for humankind, which could be more beneficial 
and safer in the long term. Indeed, Giddens sees this new 
opportunity as emerging from what he calls qife pohtics'(Giddensp 
1991: 209). And for us, it is particularly interesting to see the way in 
which Giddens develops his notion of life politics in close relation to 
what is happening in the sexual and emotional lives of western 
societies. From this point of view, it seems appropriate here to look 
closely at the kind of approach that he provides, largely as a way of 
foregrounding my own attempts to link it to contemporary discourse 
of sexual citizenship. 
3.4 ROtslRes Ponsibilities 
We are, according to Giddens, experiencing a deep 
transformation in the nature of sexual identity and intimacy. Like 
other traditions., the traditional family, once based on traditional 
marriage and traditional sexuality, is now in a breakdown crisis. In 
its place, we see rather contingent, uncertain, and even risky 
relationships developing with the emergence of what Giddens calls 
'plastic sexuality' (Giddens, 1992). 
'Plastic sexuality'is sexuality freed from its traditional relation 
to reproduction. Its emergence is analysed in his book, The 
D-ansformation ofIntimacy, in terms of the long-term development of 
modern methods of birth control and reproductive technologies, 
which helped sexuality, especially female sexuality, to become fully 
autonomous from its naturally given relation to 'reproduction', 
'kinship' and 'generations' (Giddens, 1992: 27). This separation 
between reproduction and sexuality has changed two things. Firstly, 
it weakened patriarchal control of the female body. The division 
between 'virtuous' married mothers and those unmarried but 
sexually active Tallen'women was an effective force through which 
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men could traditionally police women's sexuality within the 
patriarchal marriage system (Giddens, 1992: 29). This, according to 
Giddens, has now crumbled as sexuality has become almost 
completely separated from reproduction, and women, by maldng a 
further move towards sexual revolution over the past few decades, 
successfully undermined male sexual privilege. Secondly, 
heterosexuality has lost its privileged position, too. It is no longer the 
only legitimised sexuality justified by its natural connection with 
reproduction. The logical consequence of the escape of sexuality 
from reproduction is that the meaning of sexuality, freed from a mix 
of nature and tradition, becomes fundamentally bound up with 'a 
quality of individuals', something that needs to be refleidvely sought 
by individuals in their relationship with others rather than being 
pre-given (Giddens, 1992: 27). As Giddens puts it: 
'Sexuality' today has been discovered, opened up and made 
accessible to the development of varying life-styles. It is 
something each of us 'has', or cultivates, no longer a natural 
condition which an individual accepts as a preordained state of 
affairs. Somehow, in a way that has to be investigated, 
sexuality functions as a malleable feature of self, a prime 
connecting point between body, self-identity and social norms 
(1992: 15). 
If plastic sexuality is sexuality that has no intrinsic content or 
form, but something that has to be reflexively sought by individuals 
in their relationship with others, its emergence, according to 
Giddens, is closely linked to the development of a new form of 
personal relationship -the pure relationship'. The pure relationship 
as an ideal type is a reflesdve relationship, being constantly 
negotiated by both parties as a part of our 'refie3dve project of self 
(Giddens, 1991: 5). For this very reason, it is also Internally 
referential', meaning that the relationship is sustained not by 
external forces, but by mutual efforts of both parties to bring 
sufficient emotional satisfaction for each other (Giddens, 199 1; 
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Giddens, 1992: 58). Here, love becomes 'confluent love, that Giddens 
contrasts with 'romantic love'. Emerging in the late eighteenth 
century with the idea of individuality, freedom, and self-realisation, 
romantic love depended on 'projective identification' with the other 
through whom one found a feeling of completeness (1992: 6 1). This 
was the idea of true love or what Giddens calls, 'forever' and 'one- 
and-only'kinds of love that could be easily associated with the 
traditional and monogamous marriage institution (1992: 46,6 1). 
Confluent love found in the pure relationship is in many ways quite 
opposite. It is contingent, temporary and relative rather than fixated 
and monogamous: the relationship lasts 'until further notice' 
depending on the degrees to which intimacy develops (1992: 63). 
'Commitment'and trust'based on mutual emotional satisfaction 
and sexual pleasure are important for intimacy to grow, but as the 
relationship is inherently voluntary, it can also be easily broken up. 
This is what Giddens calls a 'contradiction' of the pure relationship. 
It is a feature of the pure relationship that it can be terminated, 
more or less at will, by either partner at any particular point. 
For a relationship to stand a chance of lasting, commitment is 
necessary; yet anyone who commits herself without 
reservations risks great hurt in the future, should the 
relationship become dissolved (1992: 137). 
There are two main ways in which this contradiction between 
'trust' and 'risk' inherent in pure relationships can be resolved: there 
are, in Giddens own words, 'good'and 'bad'ways to resolve our 
intimate problems (Giddens, &. Pierson, 1998: 127-8). The good way 
is to form an intimate relationship based on 'dialogues', trust' and 
emotional care for other's feelings and desires. It is a relationship 
between autonomous equals, and each party in the relationship, 
therefore, 'has equal rights and obhgations'(Giddens, 1999). Mutual 
respect and communication is the key dynamic that makes a 
relationship work. And this 'emotional democracy, as Giddens calls 
it, opens up revolutionary possibilities of a 'wholesale democratising 
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of the interpersonal domain' including our friendship, kinship and 
other social relations (Giddens, 1992: 3). The bad one, by contrast, 
is precisely the opposite. It's a way of life sunk into compulsiveness 
through 'addiction' or 'co-dependence'. Driven by an-Ndety and 
insecurity, it draws back to tradition and the ritual of the past where 
relationships are primarily based on 'arbitrary power', 'coercion' or 
'violence' (Giddens, 1999). As a result, our autonomy and equality 
gained through detraditionalisation are sacrificed here. 
Having said our intimate problems emerged with plastic 
sexuality and pure relationships as such, it is interesting to see how 
he finally translates his analysis of intimacy into politics - qife 
politics'. Life politics is 'the politics of life-style' closely related with 
decisions involved with the question, 'how shall I liveT (Giddens, 
1992: 197). In such a way, life politics is directly related to the ways 
in which we develop our self-identities (including our sexual 
identities) and personal (or sexual) relationships in society. What 
Giddens is trying to show from his discussion of contradictions in 
the pure relationship is that our life choice decisions, uprooted from 
tradition, now have ethical dimensions: as autonomous equal 
beings, we can now choose our lifestyles, but what we choose has 
direct impacts on others with whom we form our personal and social 
relationship. Stories of plastic sexuality prevail 'here' in late-modern 
societies, and the possibility of intimacy that promises democracy in 
our post-traditional and post-patriarchal society is 'real'. What we 
need is, then, to develop some kinds of ethical guidelines or 
principles for our choice making. And our sexual identities and 
relationships, seen as this life political issue, should also be placed 
in this ethical frame, the one in which 'a conjunction of happiness, 
love and respect for others' is possible (1992: 18 1). 
Apart from a rather grand moral narrative based on 'good' and 
'bad'ways we can lead our personal lives, precisely what this ethics 
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of personal life would be like in our post-traditional society is not 
much discussed by Giddens. Nor does he provide any specific ways 
in which 'good'ways of doing intimacy can be encouraged against 
'bad'ways. What is implicitly suggested by Giddens, however, is that 
we can in some way institutionalise this new ethics by specifying 
rights and obligations, not simply in 'formal'but also in 'substantive' 
ways (Giddens, 1992: 187). It is interesting here to note that 
Giddens, in his final suggestion for a desirable late-modem society, 
uses this traditional language of citizenship of 'rights and duties' 
that need to be extended to the sphere of the intimate. As Giddens 
quite bluntly puts it: 
Rights and obligations: as I have tried to make clear, in some 
part these define what intimacy actually is. Intimacy should 
not be understood as an interactional description, but as a 
cluster of prerogatives and responsibilities that define agendas 
of practical activity (1992: 190). 
How has this conclusion shifted the terrain of the debate 
around intimacy? 
3.5 PrivateIPublic 
'Intimate citizenship'as conceptualised by Ken Plummer is 
perhaps the perspective that deals with the subject that is left by 
Giddens most directly. 
In a similar way to Giddens, Plummer recognises stories of 
Intimate troubles'having emerged in our intimate/ private lives as 
we enter a late modem world. In Plummer's own words, we now face 
Intimate troubles' around 'new families', 'new sexualities', 'new 
genders', 'new reproductive technologies', 'sexual abuses' and 'a 
whole gallery of new personal typesincluding sex addicts or people 
with AIDS (Plummer 2003: 5-7). Again, Eke Giddens, these troubles 
-63- 
are seen as having emerged as a result of proliferating personal 
choices. The old grand narratives and structures that once provided 
firm guidelines over one's life have now gone. Using familiar 
vocabularies similar to those employed by Giddens, Plummer 
suggests that we are now entering a world of 'choices', 'fle)dbilities' 
and 'multiplicities' against 'unity, 'permanence' and 'continuance' 
(Plummer, 2001: 239; 2003: 18). As choices available for the 
individual increase, so does our feeling of uncertainty, arudety, or 
danger over our choices. This, according to Plummer, generates a 
tension around what he calls 'contested intimacies'in late modern 
society where conflicting choices, practices and morals over the 
kinds of personal/ private lives we now should be leading become the 
main cultural and political battle (Plummer, 2000: 439; 2001: 246). 
How does the language of citizenship come into this battle? 
Having described various intimacy troubles that have emerged in 
late modem society, Plummer asks the following questions: Uow can 
we live in a world of growing differences, contradictions, tensions, 
and confusions without finding a few slender threads of continuity to 
which we can cling? Can we indeed find some universals - however 
tenuous - on which we can agree in a time of such rapid change 
and, for some, social disintegrationT (Plummer, 2003: 49-50). For 
Plummer, a language of citizenship, when it is reworked in the late 
modern context, can provide a useful map that can guide us to 
answer these questions. 
Citizenship has been traditionally understood in terms of 'a set 
of practices' Ouridical, political, economic and social) and 'a bundle 
of rights and duties'that arise there from, which together define a 
person as a common member of a polity (Turner, 1993; Isin, & 
Wood, 1999). Conceptualised in this way, citizenship provides a 
singular and universal identity to citizens - associated with our 
common membership of a polity and bound up with equal rights and 
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obligations, we are required to leave our narrow individual or group 
interests and differences behind, and to play an active part in the 
political, social and economic lives of our community. 
It is perhaps this universal aspiration of citizenship that 
attracts Plummer who attempts to find a way we can reach the 
terrain of common ground in the context of growing intensity of 
Intimate troubles'. At the same time, however, Plummer recognises 
fundamental problems intensely emerging in both theories and 
practices of citizenship in our late modern society, which need to be 
addressed before we utilise the idea of citizenship in the sphere of 
the intimate. The main problem Plummer identifies is arising from 
the fact that the universal citizen identity in a polity, often formally 
prescribed in the law, is now to be constructed out of evermore 
heterogeneous life styles and various particular identities emerged in 
late modern context. In other words, what concerns Plummer here is 
the problem of citizenship in late modern society where life politics 
based on choices and differences make the search for the universal 
identity implied by citizenship becomes increasingly difficult (see 
Purvis &. Hunt,: 457-8). The problem multiplies even further since 
these newly emerging areas around life politics have never given due 
attention to the way in which citizenship has been traditionally 
conceptualised. These problems, combined together, directly 
challenge his efforts to theorise citizenship above the complex 
heterogeneity of intimate/ private lives. 
What is to be done? According to Plummer, we need to modify 
our conception of citizenship so as to accommodate present social 
changes (Plummer, 2003: 14 1). Indeed, he suggests the term, 
'invention of intimate citizenship', as a possible response. 
Extending the notion of rights and responsibilities to 'our most 
intimate desires, pleasures and ways of being in the world', intimate 
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citizenship concerns issues like: 'the decisions people have to make 
over the control (or not) over one's body, feelings, relationships; 
access (or not) to representations, relationships, public spaces, etc.; 
and socially grounded choices (or not) about identities, gender 
experiences, erotic experiences' (Plummer, 1996: 48; 2003: 14). 
Here, intimate citizenship, at least in theory, bridges a gap between 
the private, the zone of one's personal choices and lifestyles, and the 
public, where the traditional notion of citizenship has been clustered 
around one's political and social lives. It refers to the process of 
'public discourse on the personal life'in which a multiplicity of 
personal choices and conflicting voices around intimacies are 
publicly discussed and our collective rights and responsibilities are, 
therefore, being constantly negotiated (Plummer, 2003: 68). 
In practice, however, the question of how we can collectively 
arrive at a consensus on those intimate issues, which is being 
increasingly contested in late modern society and often crystallised 
in terms of essential differences through identity politics, still needs 
to be answered. Here He echoes the importance of dialogue, 
communication, and trust put forward by Giddens as a way to 
democratise our citizenship practices (Giddens, 1999). From the 
reframed intimacy based on dialogue in late modem life, Giddens 
sees the potential for deepening democracy in our society as a whole. 
Plummer goes further, claiming that we need to learn how to do 
dialogue to actualise this potential. Indeed, we need another 
invention beside 'intimate citizenship', and this, according to 
Plummer, is 'dialogic citizenship'. 
'Storytelling' lies at the heart of Plummer's idea of dialogic 
citizenship (Plummer, 1994; 1995; 1996; 2001; 2003). Through story 
telling/ listening we can recognise differences, understand and 
sympathise with the position of others, and create a moral path to 
settle our conflicts. For our storytelling to work this way, however, 
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we need to qearn' ethics of dialogue that involve the following: 
mutual recognition based on respect for others; understanding of 
emotional and situational basis of storytelling; and finally 
continuous efforts to find something in common out of differences 
(Plummer, 2003: 86-9 1). Here, being a good intimate citizen means 
becoming a good dialogic citizen who, according to Plummer, 'does 
not speak in monologues but inhabits a world where people are 
interrelated and able to communicate with one another' (Plummer, 
2003: 87). 
One of the problems that immediately appear in this 
perspective, which Plummer also seems to recognise well, is that our 
searches for a common ground through good dialogue based on 
storytelling does not necessarily mean that we will always reach an 
Inclusive' sense of good. On the contrary, it is also very likely that 
we may end up with a position in which we all agree on creating a 
world of relativism and celebrating our differences with little regard 
for any universal values. This, what others often call, 'the politics of 
difference', is far from what Plummer advocates. In the idea of 
citizenship, Plummer finds boundaries that are always and 
unavoidably drawn between who is and who is not a member or 
citizen. Although he suggests that the boundaries are not 
permanently fixed, but always being 'reworked' and 'shifted', they 
nevertheless provide 'a recurrent site for debates about what is good 
and what is not' (Plummer, 2003: 55). Seen in this way, the idea of 
intimate citizenship also embraces a kind of moral standard for 
inclusion that we all perhaps need to agree as 'a basic precondition' 
for our dialogue (Plummer, 2003: 110). In other words, our 
recognition of differences needs to be followed by the recognition of 
basic moral standards upon which our dialogue can search for 
further common ground. Plummer outlines the following lists of 
universal values on which our ethical dialogue is to be grounded. 
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They are: the need 'to promote democratic policies'; 'to enlarge areas 
of autonomy, choice, and freedom'; 'to extend the spheres of justice 
and equality to all'; 'to designate a common program of human 
rights'; 'to minimize harm'; 'to acknowledge minimal human 
functional capabilities'; 'to recognize others; 'to promote daily caring 
for others'; and 'to sponsor an ethic of love' (2003: 111-114). 
These are some basic values that constitute what Plummer 
calls 'thin universals', or what is alternatively called, 'minimal 
consensus' (Plummer 2001: 246; 2003: 95). It is on this minimalist 
morality Plummer sees the possibility of building further common 
values if we practice his suggested way of doing ethical dialogues in 
our social lives. Indeed, intimate citizenship is all about developing 
these moral standards of inclusion through our common efforts to 
understand others based on ethics and storytelling. The boundaries 
are drawn in which we define who is and who is not included among 
intimate citizens, but they are, in essence, 'moral' boundaries. They 
are constantly redrawn and shifting, but firmly grounded on the 
ethics of love', ýrespect% 'understanding', 'freedom, 'choice', Justice', 
and 'equality. As long as we are all willing to 'sit and talk', to tell and 
listen to stories, the ways in which these moral boundaries are 
drawn are therefore, in principle, inclusive. Indeed, Plummer 
concludes his book, Intimate Citizenship with optimism and argues: 
'if we can learn how to talk and how to listen, we may begin to sense 
that in the end there are some common values that hold humanity 
together' (2003: 146). 
From what we have discussed so far, we know where his 
optimism fundamentally comes from. Both Giddens'and Plummer's 
overemphasis on heightened individual choices in late modem 
society leaves them blind to the fact that we are still making choices 
in the context of persistent structural inequalities. According to 
Jamieson, for example, Giddens ignores the ways in which intimacy 
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and gender inequality coexist in many heterosexual couple relations 
today Pamieson, 1999: 49 1). This is because, contrary to what 
Giddens argues, contemporary heterosexual intimate relations are 
shaped not only by our 'desire to feel equal and intimate', but also 
by other material and social circumstances that condition the way 
we make choices in our personal relationships. Gender gaps in 
employment, earnings and career progression, for instance, give men 
more choices to control domestic financial matters, as well as 
choices around opting in and out of domestic work and child care 
(1999: 484). This, in turn, often generates gender different ways in 
which the sense of caring, intimacy and love are constructed in 
many heterosexual relationships: men's caring is often expressed 
through their generous income support in the household, whereas 
womenys love and caring are measured greatly through their 
devotion to housework as well as to their mothering role (1999: 485). 
In this context, heterosexual couples still sustain the sense of good 
and intimacy 'despite unequal sacrifice for their common good', 
which, however, considerably challenges the heart of Giddens notion 
of pure relationship based on gender equality (1999: 484). 
For Jamieson, when our unequal structural relations condition 
the way in which we make choices, our search for common good 
based on our different personal choices can also be bounded by this 
structural inequality. Unlike Giddens, Plummer overtly 
acknowledges that intimacies in late modern society are very much 
located In worldwide inequalities of class, gender, age, race and the 
like' (Plummer, 2003: 145). In the context of inequalities structuring 
our daily lives, he also admits that intimate citizens working towards 
common good may, in practice, generate 'intimate inequalities'upon 
which new patterns of exclusion and marginalization can emerge in 
the intimate citizenship project (Young, 1990: 259). Nevertheless, 
Plummer unconvincingly translates these problems related with 
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inequality into the troubles around depoliticised 'differences', 
producing largely a liberal and pluralistic framework for his intimate 
citizenship project. As a result, a number of theoretical reductions 
follow. 
Grounded in differences rather than inequalities, Plummer first 
reduces various intimate troubles into moral troubles. Here, we find 
Plummer defines conflicts 'embedded in cultures of class and 
income, ethnicity, and race, gender and sexual orientation, age 
group, and religion'- the conflicts that might have emerged from 
existing patterns of inequality and discrimination - as 'Moral 
conflicts of our time'which fundamentally concern 'the ways in 
which other people should live' (Plummer 2003: 34). These moral 
troubles found in public spheres are then individualised. They are, 
according to Plummer, the product of proliferated individual choices 
and increased individual life politics which have emerged in our late 
modern society. Here, individual choices are not treated as different 
(and perhaps unequal) social choices, carefully negotiated by 
individuals under certain material, and social conditions. Instead, 
Plummer re-moralises these choices. In other words, they are 
primarily moral choices exercised increasingly by free individuals in 
a society where absolute lines of virtue and vice have collapsed. This 
situation is then seen as having created what Bauman calls the 
'ethical paradox'in our society: 
The ethical paradox of the post-modem condition is that it 
restores to agents the fullness of moral choice and 
responsibility while simultaneously depriving them of the 
universal guidance that modern self-confidence once 
promised .... Moral responsibility comes together with the loneliness of moral choice (Bauman, 1992: x6i). 
Our intimate life, seen as being caught in this ethical paradox, 
requires some sorts of collective moral responsibilities. Here we find 
the model of citizenship becomes increasingly useful for Plummer. 
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By reframing its traditional language of rights and responsibilities on 
ethics and dialogue, Plummer invents ways in which the standards 
of inclusion for intimate citizens, fundamentally lacking in our late 
modem society, can be envisaged (Weeks 1995). However, as we 
have briefly noted already, this is largely done through a number of 
reductive conceptualisations in which his confusion between 
inequality and difference lies at the heart of this optimism. What 
would happen to the story of intimate citizenship if we take the 
question of inequality more seriously than Plummer did? It is to this 
we now turn. 
3.6 InequaliolDifference 
The emergent trend within the social sciences in recent times 
has increasingly drawn its attention to 'the problem of difference', 
and the 'problem' of difference is often perceived in terms of the 
'difficulty' that it brings into the notion of social unity and cohesion 
(Seidman, 1997: 2). 
Giddens, in The Transformation ofIntimacy, pointed to the late- 
modem condition under which lived sexual difference termed 'Plastic 
sexuality' emerged. According to Giddens, sexuality and intimacy, 
freed from their intrinsic relation to reproduction, have become a site 
of individual life-styles/ choices and an autonomous value sphere - 
the source of what Plummer calls 'intimate troubles' in late modem 
society. As we have noted already, Giddens suggested that we need 
to develop a kind of new institutionalised sexual ethics that could 
guide our choice maldng, to which Plummer responds in terms of his 
intimate citizenship project. Based on a communicative ethics built 
into his conception of intimate citizenship, Plummer saw the 
problem of inclusion of sexual-intimate difference in late modern 
society as one that could be optimistically addressed. Here, Plummer 
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asks us to be good intimate citizens - respectable and self-reflexive 
citizens who, by morally empowering ourselves through our 
experiences and shared democratic principles, can perform an 
ethical dialogue with others, and therefore successfully deliver 
common good out of our differences. 
But what would such optimism be like if we approach the 
problem of difference 'differently'? As we have noted already, 
Plummer, in developing his idea of intimate citizenship, partially 
recognises the fact that e. Nisting structural inequalities in late- 
modern society can generate conditions under which his intimate 
citizenship project that works for a common good may reproduce 
'intimate inequalities' (see Plummer, 2003: 31,57). Nevertheless, 
Plummer does not investigate this issue further, and the problem of 
intimate inequality largely remained, in fact, in the background in 
his theory of intimate citizenship. Instead, we found the problem of 
difference, the conflicts around different moral values and the search 
for dialogue among them, was the main issue dealt with in his 
project for intimate citizenship. Here, we are simply interested in 
knowing why this was the case. 
To answer this question, we need to know a particularly way 
Plummer understands the problem of inequality in our society. We 
noted two things already, that is: (1) Plummer reduces the problem 
of inequality to the problem of difference, while (2) difference is 
fundamentally conceived as 'diversity' being rooted in increased 
individual life-styles/ choices in late modem society. Together, these 
arguments largely depoliticize the problem of inequality and 
difference, and open a space for Plummer to search for a kind of 
ideal of 'power-free' but 'choice-negotiating' dialogue among plurality 
upon which discursive democracy above 'politics'is envisaged. 
We, however, are going to put issues around inequality and 
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difference differently from the way Plummer did. And to do this, it 
might be helpful to us to attend to the story of 'differentiated 
citizenship' proposed by Iris Marion Young here (Young, 1989). Like 
Plummer's intimate citizenship project, Young's conception of 
'differentiated citizenship'is based on Habermas's model of 
communicative ethics that finds in dialogue an effective means for 
recognition of social differences and their inclusion in democratic 
society. Contrary to Plummer, however, Young does not simply 
reduce the problem of inequalities to the problem of differences and 
depoliticized/individualised diversities. Rather, in her attempt to find 
a political and democratic condition for the possibility of a just 
political citizenship based on communication, Young attends 
seriously to the problem of unequal social differences that 
structurally hamper a just political dialogue among differences. 
From this point of view, Young develops her theory of differentiated 
citizenship that aims to offer a way of synthesizing a politics of 
difference with equality under what she calls 'a communicative 
democracy' (Young, 1996b). Our main question is, then, whether her 
way of synthesization of difference and equality provides a 
convincingly different space to rethink sexual citizenship from that 
being presented by Ken Plummer. 
3.7 Paradox of Difference 
Although Young does not directly approach the question of 
citizenship through the lens of sexuality, her general argument takes 
the case of sexual minorities as one example of 'group differences', 
being excluded and marginalised in the modem politics of 
citizenship founded on 'the ideal of universal citizenship'. For Young, 
this is a kind of paradox: for the ideal of 'universal' citizenship in the 
sense of 'citizenship for everyone, and everyone the same qua citizen' 
-73- 
runs counter to the very politics of modern citizenship that excludes 
certain groups defined as 'different' (Young, 1989: 251). How does 
she explain this paradox? 
In the ideal of universal citizenship, Young finds a troubling 
logic inherent in modem political thought that uncritically associates 
the meaning of universality with 'generality' on the one hand, and 
with 'equal treatment' on the other. According to Young, this 
approach is problematic: it stands directly opposed to the democratic 
meaning of universality embedded in the idea of citizenship that 
assumes 'the inclusion and participation of everyone' as citizens in a 
polity (Young, 1989). This is for the following reasons. 
To begin with, universality seen as the expression of 'generality', 
Young argues, tends to impose a 'homogeneity' of citizens in practice 
that excludes those who are not able to take up 'the general point of 
view' (251-2). To be able to adopt the general point of view, the point 
of view that we, as citizens, have in common, we are asked to 
transcend our particular interests, values, affiliations and feelings 
that differentiate/ divide us, and to instead impartially search for a 
general interest or common good (see Barber, 1984). For Young, 
however, such a view that we can take up an impartially general point 
of view is a 'myth' (Young, 1989: 257); for it is impossible for us to 
'adopt a point of view that is completely impersonal and 
dispassionate, completely separated from any particular context and 
commitment' (Young, 1990: 103). Perhaps, it is just a political fiction 
that mythically promises a desirable goal of our politics - the creation 
of a general will as the expression of our unity. However, in the 
context of social inequality, this political fiction serves an important 
ideological function. According to Young, where there are significant 
differences of power and resources among social groups with their 
ethnic, sexual, gender, racial, and class differences, the ideal of 
universality as generality tends to universalise the particular - the 
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particular point of view of the privileged (Young, 1990: 115). As Young 
puts it: 
In a society where some groups are privileged while others are 
oppressed, insisting that as citizens persons should leave 
behind their particular affiliations and experiences to adopt a 
general point of view serves only to reinforce that privilege; for 
the perspectives and interests of the privileged will tend to 
dominate this unified public, marginalizing or silencing those 
of other groups (Young, 1989: 257). 
Framed in this context, Young argues that universalism as 
(equal treatment' is just as problematic. Rather than increasing 
political equality, it politically systematises and legitimises the 
marginalization or exclusion of underprivileged social groups who 
are particularised in relation to generality in citizenship politics. The 
ideal of 'equal treatment' assumes that we, as citizens, are all treated 
in the same way - the same rules and principles apply to everyone 
without discrimination. Nevertheless, when the particular point of 
view of the privileged is universalised as generality, universally 
applying its rules and principles to everyone with the ideal of 'equal 
treatment' means that 'differences' of those underprivileged groups 
derived from their particular histories, situated experiences, 
interests and affiliations has to be, in practice, constantly 'Measured 
according to norms derived from and defined by privileged groups' 
(Young, 1989: 255). For Young, this is a politics of assimilation. It 
requires us to transcend our underprivileged differences in order to 
be treated as the same. Nevertheless, as long as real group 
differences remain that makes one not the same as 'everyone', it 
leaves particularised group differences at a permanent 
disadvantage - the disadvantage that Young theorised in terms of 'a 
dilemma of difference' (Young, 1989: 268). 
Here, in the context of their 'differences' conditioning their 
exclusion, underprivileged groups have to prove their sameness as 
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citizens in order to participate in the citizenship politics. At the same 
time, however, 'to participate means to accept and adopt an identity 
one is not, and to try to participate means to be reminded by oneself 
and others of the identity one is' (Young, 1990: 165). This, according 
to Young, then constructs an irresolvable dilemma that those 
oppressed and underprivileged groups face in citizenship politics: 
that is, their efforts to prove their sameness through participation is 
precisely what confirms their very difference resulting in their 
exclusion. 
From this point of view, Young argues that in order for 
citizenship politics to be truly universalistic in the sense of 'inclusion 
and participation of everyone', we need a politics of 'differentiated 
citizenship' based on two principles: (1) instead of pressing for 
'generality', we need a politics of difference that affirms group 
differences; (2) and for this to be possible, we need 'different 
treatment' rather than 'equal treatment'in citizenship politics. 
For many theorists of citizenship, the emphasis on group 
differences rather than their commonness as citizens is a source of 
their fear of social fragmentation and division (see Elshtain, 1995; 
Gitlin, 1995; Miller, 1995). For Young, however, the existence of 
group difference is not only a given condition of our differentiated 
societies on which our political theory of citizenship should be 
usefully based, it is also a 'desirable' condition. At the heart of this 
claim lies the notion of 'mediated social relations' that, Young 
argues, structures our modem social life (see also Tebble, 2003). 
According to Young, our social life is ever-more mediated by vast 
networks of the market economy with its highly complicated division 
of labour and webs of social administration that characterise our 
multifaceted institutional relations. This has a specific effect on our 
lives. It produces profound socio-economic dependencies among us 
to the extent that 'nearly everyone depends on the activities of seen 
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and unseen strangers' (Young, 1990: 237). At the same time, 
however, our different structural locations in these socio-economic 
networks generate a relational sense of our affinity or differences 
through which we encounter each other. As a form of social 
relations, Young defines such a lived sense of connections or 
differentiations through which we live our life in our plural and 
structurally differentiated societies as social groups. 
Since our structural locations differently condition our 
experience and knowledge of the society, Young argues that the 
different perspectives we derive from our group differences constitute 
each of our partialities in society. For Young, this means that 'no one 
can claim to speak in the general interest, because no one of the 
groups can speak for another, and certainly no one can speak for 
them all' (Young, 1989: 263). Only when we attend to all of our 
group particularities being 'voiced, heard and taken account of in 
the communication and decision making process, can we arrive at a 
political judgement which is legitimate as well as objective. Seen in 
this way, our political problem, Young argues, is not the existence of 
real group differences that makes one not the same as everyone. 
Rather than being an obstacle, politically recognised group 
differentiation is an important 'resource' for the working of a 
democratic public -a resource with which we can 'correct biases' 
arising from the dominance of partial perspective as generality 
(Young, 2000: 83). However, to the degree that our society is 
differentiated by unequal structural relations in which some of our 
groups 'have significantly greater ability to use democratic processes 
for their own ends', social group differentiation increases the 
likelihood of marginalization and exclusion of disadvantaged group 
perspectives (Young, 2000: 17). For Young, our political problem is 
then this unequal group differentiation that hampers a just political 
communication and decision making across our differences. 
-77- 
From this point of view, Young argues that a truly inclusive 
citizenship politics that attends to group differentiation needs a 
reconceptualised meaning of equality that rests on differences rather 
than sameness; for equality that facilitates 'the participation and 
inclusion of all groups'in a democratic public often requires 
'different treatment'for oppressed and disadvantaged groups that 
have no equal voice in public (Young, 1990: 158). Here, different 
treatment, seen as an important political means to undermine 
unequal social group differentiation, should involve institutionalised 
mechanisms that support the following three things: (1) 'self- 
organisation of group members' so that group members can obtain a 
sense of collective empowerment based on their shared experiences; 
(2) 'group generation of policy proposals' so that group perspectives 
can be taken seriously into account in the decision making 
processes; (3) 'group veto power'in relation to certain policies that 
affect a specific group directly (Young, 1990: 184). In this 
articulation of special rights with group representation that attend to 
unequal group differentiation, Young finds a democratic space in 
which distinctive voices and social perspectives of oppressed groups 
can be properly heard and respected. And this., according to Young, 
rightly promotes a truly universal citizenship in the sense of full 
inclusion and participation of everyone as citizens in our democratic 
processes. 
At this moment, it would be interesting for us to compare 
Young's idea of democratic citizenship to that of Ken Plummer. Both 
of their democratic citizenship projects accommodate matters of 
difference within the communicative terrain as articulated by Jurgen 
Habermas upon which we are expected to build a truly inclusive 
universal citizenship. Plummer, in the face of increased differences 
in our society, emphasises the needs for inclusive citizenship politics 
in which we, as citizens, are expected to resolve problems arising 
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from our differences collectively through a supportive and 
democratic dialogue. In a similar way, Young recognises the 
importance of democratic communication across our differences as a 
way of broadening and deepening democracy beyond assimilatory 
citizenship politics. For the inclusion based on communicative 
democracy to be truly possible, however, there are conditions to be 
fulfilled. 
For Habermas, the conditions required to arrive at democratic 
agreement and understanding based on communication are 
represented in his conception of 'the ideal speech situation', which 
has following characteristics: (1) 'nobody who could make a relevant 
contribution may be excluded; (2) 'all participants are granted an 
equal opportunity to make contributions'; (3) 'the participants must 
mean what they say'; and finally (4) 'communication must be freed 
from external and internal coercion" (Habermas, Cronin, & De Greiff, 
1998: 44). In Habermas's scheme of things, this symmetrical 
condition of the ideal speech situation, which allows all persons the 
same chance to participate in discourse, promotes a democratic 
potential for a shared process of collective deliberation. On the other 
hand, however, they only reflect an 'ideal' context rather than a 
practical reality; as Young has repeatedly argued, we are not 
communicating under ideal conditions of equal power, free from any 
kinds of distortion and forms of coercion (Young, 2000: 17). This 
means that if this ideal speech situation and its promise for 
communicative democracy are to have any practical significance, the 
gap existing between the ideal and the actual contexts in which we 
communicate each other should be bridged. 
Plummer, by theoretically reducing the problem of social 
inequality to the problem of plural differences and diversities, 
bridges the gap between the Ideal' and the 'actual' dialogic situation. 
Here, the Ideal context' is unsoundly compounded with 'the actual 
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context' to the extent that we are 'actually' seen as communicating 
more or less under 'ideal' conditions of equal power. In contrast, 
Young's way of bridging the gap is different. Young acknowledges 
that our social differences, structured in the context of economic, 
social and cultural power imbalances, give rise to the problem of 
communicative power imbalances among different groups. Here, 
with the resulting prejudices and biases, we have a problem of 
misrecognition of difference that seriously hampers a just political 
dialogue among differences. The solution is to promote 
'institutionalized means for the explicit recognition and 
representation of oppressed groups'so as to open an ideal 
democratic space where inclusive political communication across 
differences becomes possible (Young, 1989: 259). 
By presenting how *hat is ideally thinkable'is politically 
possible in our actual context of unequal social differentiation, 
Young seem to have bridged the gap not only between 'the ideal' and 
'the actual'dialogic situation, but also between the theory and the 
politics of inclusive universal citizenship. Yet it is not without its 
problems or its critics. One of the most common criticisms directed 
at Young's idea of group differentiated citizenship is its essentialist 
tendencies toward difference (Phillips, 1993; Wilson, 1993b; Yuval- 
Davis, 1997; Phelan, 2001). Young makes it clear that her definition 
of social group is anti-essentialist; social groups do not arise from 
some essential or substantive set of shared attributes,, but from 'a 
sense of identity' relationally,, contextually and fluidly constructed 
out of social relations and processes (Young, 1990: 48). 
Nevertheless, the allocation of group rights through institutionalised 
forms of group representation, Phillips argues, may run the risks of 
freezing group identities at the political level, effecting,, in turn, the 
ontological reification of the group that represses group difference 
within the group on the one hand and impedes wider solidarity 
od% 
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across differences on the other hand (Phillips, 1993: 96). 
Behind this charge of essentialisation of the group, however, 
looms another, closely linked problem. And this arises from an 
apparent paradox inherent in the idea of differentiated citizenship, 
or what I might call, the paradox of differentiation. It is well to be 
clear what this paradox is. 
3.8 Paradox of Differentiation 
In her latest book, Inclusion and Democracy, Young openly 
rejects the charge of essentialism by distinguishing her politics of 
difference from identity politics that implicitly or explicitly present a 
static, singular and essential conception of group identity and 
difference. Young is keen to emphasise that her conception of group 
difference is based on a 'relational logic' rather than a logic of 
substance (Young 2000: 86); groups are not distinguished from one 
another by virtue of some specific attributes that constitute their 
distinctive identities, but by structural relations or structural 
inequality in which 'they stand to others' (Young 2000: 90). In other 
words, group difference for Young exists only in and through the 
relational context of structural group differentiation, and this is, in 
fact, repeatedly and unambiguously affirmed throughout her book. 
If this relational conception of social groups enables Young to 
avoid the charge of essentialism, her politics of difference does not 
easily escape the problem. When the relations between groups are 
constituted as relations of power, disadvantaged and underprivileged 
groups suffer from social injustice that, according to Young, takes 
two forms: 'oppression, institutional constraint on self-development' 
on the one hand, and 'domination, institutional constraint on self- 
determination' on the other (Young 2000: 29-3 1). Social justice, 
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which underpins her account of inclusive democracy, is then defined 
in terms of social and institutional conditions that promote self- 
organisation and self-determination of oppressed and dominated 
groups, expressed in terms of special rights associated with specific 
group representation for oppressed groups. 
Here, we find Fraser's criticism of what she calls 'the identity 
politics model of recognition' becomes useful, for I think her 
criticism is equally applicable to Young's politics model of difference 
presented above. It is worth quoting Fraser at length: 
Having begun by assuming that identity is dialogical, 
constructed via interaction with another subject, it ends by 
valorizing monologism - supposing that misrecognised people 
can and should construct their identity on their own. It 
supposes, further, that a group has the right to be understood 
solely in its own terms - that no one is ever justified in viewing 
another subject from an external perspective or in dissenting 
from another's self-interpretation. But again, this runs counter 
to dialogical view, making cultural identity an autogenerated 
auto-description, which one presents to others as an obiter 
dictum. Seeking to exempt 'authentic' collective self- 
representation from all possible challenges in the public 
sphere, this sort of identity politics scarcely fosters social 
interaction across differences: on the contrary, it encourages 
separatism and group enclaves' (Fraser, 2000: 113). 
A question arises here is: what would happen to Young's 
politics of difference if we take her relational logic of group 
differentiation more seriously, and apply it to her own model of 
politics? The answer might be: 'a paradox of differentiation' arises. 
When the relations between groups are constituted as relations 
of power and subordination, we can demand rights to self- 
determination and self-development for all of our disadvantaged and 
underprivileged groups in the name of our 'difference' being 
disadvantaged. Since our differences are constituted within, not 
outside, the relational context of unequal group differentiation, 
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however, underprivileged groups face an irresolvable dilemma in 
relation to the context that constitutes their differences. Laclau 
describes powerfully and persuasively what this dilemma is: 
The basic point is this: I cannot assert a differential identity 
without distinguishing it from a context, and in the process of 
making the distinction, I am asserting the context at the same 
time. And the opposite is also true: I cannot destroy a context 
without destroying at the same time the identity of the 
particular subject who carries out the destruction. It is a very 
well known historical fact that an oppositionist force whose 
identity is constructed within a certain system of power is 
ambiguous vis-&-vis that system, because the latter is what 
prevents the constitution of the identity and it is, at the same 
time, its condition of existence. And any victory against the 
system destabilises also the identity of the victorious force 
(Laclau, 1995: 100). 
What Laclau is pointing out here is a paradox of differentiation. 
The paradox of differentiation arises from ambiguities inherent in 
any differences constructed in the context of unequal differentiation. 
Here, the right to difference of misrecognised groups has to be 
asserted within a system of power that constitutes and (at the same 
time) excludes their differential identities. According to Laclau, this 
entails the radically disturbing fact that the possibility of retaining a 
fully achieved difference depends on its very 'failures in the full 
constitution of a differential identity' (Laclau, 1995: 100). This is 
because of the following reason. If a differential identity is fully 
achieved, this can only be so within a context in which it is 
differentiated. The context whereby it is differentiated, however, 
constitutes its difference as it is and at the same time it is not. Its 
fully achieved identity within that context, therefore, means that 
either it is fully integrated to the context that denies its identity, or it 
supersedes the context that recognises its identity. In either case, 
however, it fails to fully constitute its differential identity. In the 
formal case, there remains missed fullness in relation to its identity. 
In the latter case, it inevitably destabilises its own identity. What 
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does this paradox leave us with? Is there a way around this 
dilemma? 
So far, I pointed out two problems with regard to Young's idea 
of 'differentiated citizenship': its essentialist tendencies toward 
difference on the one hand; and the paradox of differentiation it 
generates on the other. In Chapter 4,1 discuss how Young, by 
integrating her model of 'differentiated citizenship' into the 
framework of a communicative democracy based on 'storytelling', 
goes someway towards overcoming these dilemmas, especially, the 
criticism that her model encourages a sort of identity politics - 
'separatism and group enclaves' (Fraser, 2000: 113) - which 'impede 
wider solidarity across differences' (Phillips, 1993: 96). 
Young distinguishes her model of 'communicative' democracy 
from the ideal of 'deliberative' democracy: while the latter is seen to 
privilege rational, dispassionate, and logical arguments, the former, 
which attends to the problem of inequality and social differences, 
extends political forms of communicative interactions to include 
storytelling (Young, 1996b; 1997a; 2000). This is because of three 
reasons: (1) storytelling, Young argues, is a mode of expression that 
is 'equally' applicable to everyone; (2) it promotes mutual 
understanding across our differences by revealing the context of our 
differentiation; and, therefore, (3) aids in constituting 'a total social 
knowledge'(see Section 4.2). 
Yet, as I shall argue in Chapter 4, Young's attempt to 
incorporate the normative force of 'storytelling' into her model of 
citizenship politics is problematic: to the extent that the idea of 
storytelling, upon which the notion of intimate/ sexual citizenship is 
currently mobilised in U. K, is disconnected from the sociological/ 
political analysis of power relations, its use as an inclusive strategy 
largely results in a de-politicisation of citizenship politics. In Part II, 
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Sexual Stories go to Westminster, I take up this issue in more detail, 
and discuss the political implications of storytelling for sexual 
citizenship making in Britain, analysing in particular, problematic 
ways in which storytelling has been deployed in the political debates 
on the homosexual/ity. 
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Part III 
Sexual Stories go to Westminster 
ac - lzpqg - 
Chapter 4 
Politics of Storytelling 
1 Introduction 
From the partial decriminalisation of adult homosexual acts in 
private by the Sexual Offences Act (1967) to the most recent Civil 
Partnership Act (2004), a series of Parliamentary debates about 
same sex sexualities provides a distinctive source in which we can 
identify a range of official sexual stories told in Britain. Several in- 
depth, content-related studies that analyse various ways in which 
homosexuality has been discursively constructed in the 
parliamentary debate exist (see Reinhold, 1994; Smith, 1994; 
Stychin, 2003; Rahman, 2004; Waites, 2005; McGhee, 2001; 
Moran, 1996). Most of these studies employ Foucauldian discourse 
analysis, tracing and identifying particular ways in which the 'truth' 
of homosexuality has been spoken of, and with what regulative 
knowledge/power effects. 
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Foucauldian discourse analysis, it is argued, is useful in 
analysing changed or continual ways in which various ideas and 
knowledge, called upon in the Parliamentary debate on a specific 
homosexuality issue, produce a location for a collective 
'(dis)identification' and 'subjectification' (Epstein, Johnson, 
Steinberg, 2000: 8). And this is because the 'truth' of 
homosexuality, discursively established in the official debate, works 
as a boundary marker, often separating those who are sexually 
acceptable members of the community from those who are not, and, 
therefore, associates ideas/practices of eligibility for'community 
belonging'with notions of normative sexuality. " 
12. In her discourse analysis of a Parliamentary debate on Section 28 
Local Goverrument Act during the late 1980s, Susan Reinhold, for 
example, investigates the ways in which the idealized notion of nuclear 
family form based on a naturalized conception ofhuman sexuality as 
heterosexual' constructs homosexuals as 'threats' to the family as well as 
to the state/nation that upholds family values, thereby invoking fear 
around the homosexual 'Other. Anna Marie Smith's analysis shows how 
such fear, deployed in the Section 28 Parliamentary debate, further 
constructs homosexual identity in opposing binary terms, that is 'good' 
and 'bad' homosexuals, establishing boundaries of who are acceptable 
homosexuals and who are not: good (safe) homosexuals are those who are 
closeted, self-limiting and self-disciplining homosexuals, while bad 
(dangerous) homosexuals are those who constantly attempt to cross their 
closeted frontiers by proselytizing and 'promoting' their homosexuality 
(Smith, 1994: 204-5). Stychin, who analyzes the recent Parliamentary 
debate on Repeal of section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988, 
however, finds that 'somewhat different good homosexuals' are 
discursively promoted under New Labour government (Stychin, 2003: 40). 
Ideas and knowledge about homosexuality as biologically fixed rather than 
a matter of choice are increasingly deployed in the debate, and 
homosexuality, for this reason, is no longer seen as being 'dangerous' 
because 'it is not contagious' (Stychin, 2003: 36). This discursive switch 
found in the Repeal of section 28 constructs 'new' good homosexuals: 
rather than being completely closeted, new good homosexuals are those 
who, like good heterosexuals, channel their relationships into long-term, 
monogamous, and desexualized romantic relationships, fully conforming 
to good heterosexual family values. In other words, homosexuals, in order 
to be good members of the conununity, must now become hkegood' 
heterosexuals. 
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The truth'of homosexuality and homosexual identity spoken of 
in the parliamentary debate is, however, contested '(moral) truth', 
situated in what Smith calls the 'evidence game' (Smith, 1994: 192). 
Parliament is an agonistically organized national, political institution 
whereby argumentative contests over truth'/rightness' often 
involve, as in court proceedings, the practice of telling supporting or 
contesting evidence - evidence used as a source to support or 
contest political '(moral) truth'claims. And it is here, in this evidence 
game which involves the practice of presenting evidence, that we 
find, as I shall show later, a complex set of narrative strategies 
becoming prominent in parliamentary debate (see Section 4.3). 
In the next three chapters that follow, I examine continued or 
changed ways in which politicians tell stories about (or of) sexual 
minorities as an important way of telling supporting or contesting 
evidence about the specific (or general) issue-related '(moral) truth' of 
homosexuality in Britain (Chapter 5,6, and 7). What I am 
particularly interested in discussing is a gradual coming-out of what 
Scott calls, 'the evidence of experience' (the evidence of same-sex 
experience) in the debate, which, (re)presented in the form of 
personal 'true' stories of same-sex experiences, become an important 
way of (re)presenting/telling the evidence about the 'truth' of 
homosexual identities, linked, in turn, to the idea of their rights/ 
rightness (Scott, 1991). 
To this end, I pay specific attention to the recent debates on 
Civil Partnership in the British Parliament (Chapter 7). My prime 
focus will be stories of same-sex experience told during the debates, 
which, as they comprise a significant part of the debates, enter the 
political spectacle, and become the very grounds and warrants for 
political claims for recognition (or misrecognition) of rights/ rightness 
of same-sex relationships. Bearing this in mind, however, I first want 
to give a critical overview of some of the theoretical approaches to 
'personal experience stories around the sexuar relevant for this 
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chapter (Plununer, 1995). This, taken up in the next section (Section 
4.2), will help me to ground a methodological question that I plan to 
address in this chapter, that is: what may happen to personal 
experience stories around the sexual when they enter the 
representational public/political arena, the parliament? (Section 4.3) 
It is also this question the later three chapters that follow hopes to 
illustrate in more detail (Chapter 5,6, and 7), This chapter finishes 
with some brief comments about story data, selected and 
represented for the analysis in Part II. 
4.2 On Sexual Stories of Cili. Zensbo 
In her critical assessment of the ideal of deliberative democracy 
that privileges the 'force of the better argument' in the democratic 
decision making processes, Iris Marion Young argues that a truly 
inclusive democratic process in our highly differentiated 
multicultural societies should accommodate storytelling that 
complements arguments. And this is for the following reasons. 
Firstly, storytelling, Young argues, is a more democratic and 
egalitarian mode of political communication than rational 
arguments. Here, the main problem with deliberative practises that 
demand rational, dispassionate, and logical arguments is that, as 
Sanders points out, 'some citizens are better than others at 
articulating their arguments in rational, reasoned terms' (Sanders, 
1997: 348). Rather than being universally applicable, the proposed 
procedures of deliberative argumentation, Sanders argues, tend to 
universalise the interests of those who can make good, reasoned 
arguments - those who can make use of a white, western, and 
middle class male standard of reasoning and objectivity. This results 
in what Young calls a'communicative exclusion: many people who 
would be affected by political decisions are excluded from the 
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political decision making process simply because they express their 
thoughts and needs in styles and languages different from rational 
argumentative forms. Storytelling, according to Young, weakens 
such exclusive tendencies inherent in the deliberative approach to 
democratic politics. This is because storytelling, contrary to rational 
arguments, is not exclusive; it is a mode of expression that is both 
universally and equally applicable to everyone. As Young remarks: 
'Because everyone has stories to tell, with different styles and 
meanings, and because each can tell her story with equal authority, 
the stories have equal value in the communicative situation' (Young, 
1997b: 73). 
Secondly, telling and listening to stories of one's experience, 
unlike conflicting arguments, facilitates understanding across our 
differences; for it 'reveals the particular experience of those in social 
locations, experience that cannot be shared by those situated 
differently but that they must understand in order to do justice to 
the others' (Young, 1997b: 72). Here, understanding across 
difference means more than a simple recognition of our experiential 
differences, however. A true understanding involves, to borrow a 
term from Hannah Arendt, an 'enlarged mentality', that is, the 
capacity to imagine oneself in the place of the other, and to think 
from the perspectives of differently situated others (Arendt, 1982: 
42-3). For Young, storytelling makes this act of situated thinking 
possible, for stories reveal not only experience but also how those 
differently situated others understand the meaning and values of 
their particular experience, thereby serving to explain to outsiders 
what experiential practises 'mean to the people who hold them' and 
'why they are valuable' (Young, 2000: 75). 
Thirdly, stories are not only steps in arguments, revealing 
particular experiences and their meanings, and thereby promoting 
understanding across our differences, they also aid in constituting 'a 
-91- 
total social knowledge' (Young, 2000: 76). Stories are the 
expressions of social relations, in the sense that, in one's story of 
self-experience, we, in fact, find the story of one's related-experience 
with others who affect one's experience. In listening to variously 
situated others' stories, one can, therefore, learn about how their 
own position, actions, and values appear to others from the stories 
they tell', which, according to Young, helps listeners to develop fully 
reflexive thinking about an issue in a way that 'takes account of the 
perspectives of others' (ibid. ). In sharing and combining stories 
expressed in public, we can, Young argues, then form what she 
calls, 'a collective social wisdom'- an enlarged social knowledge 
which plays an indispensable function in our inclusive democratic 
political decision making process. 13 As Young, summarising her 
argument thus far, argues: 
There are two general conclusions to draw from this account of 
the role of narrative communication in which people aim to 
solve collective problems through discussion. First, narrative 
can often play an important role in argument in democratic 
discussion. Where arguments about policy or action depend on 
appeals to need or entitlement, narrative provides an important 
way to demonstrate need or entitlement. Narrative also 
contributes to political argument by the social knowledge it 
offers of how social segments view one another's actions and 
what are the likely effects of policies and actions on people in 
different social locations (Young, 1997b: 73). 
Yet, if Young discusses the reasons why the use of personal 
experience stories in political communication is fundamental to 
13. Young's ideas here resemble those of Arendt. According to Arendt, 
stories enable what she calls, ýrepresentative'thinking (similar to Young's 
notion of ýrefleNive'thinking), which is vitally important for ethical 
judgement: The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind 
while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I 
would think and feel if I were in their place, the stronger will be my 
capacity for representative thinking' (Arendt, 1977: 220- 1). 
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restorative justice, Plummer, in his Telling Sexual Stories, highlights 
the fact that personal stories, in order to perform such political/ 
public tasks, first need to come into their time: stories, in other 
words, need to establish social worlds waiting and willing to hear 
them. 
Stories, according to Plummer, 'have their times' (Plummer, 
1995: 126). Some stories, which were not told in the past, may now 
be widely told and heard with much bearing on our contemporary 
lives. Equally, stories with which we were familiar in the past may 
no longer be felt to have significance or to be appropriate for today, 
becoming alien to our own present culture. It is also possible to 
think here, however, of stories whose time, Plummer argues, has not 
yet come to be told by those who live them, and, therefore, still 
remain largely 'hidden from sight' or stories that have not yet even 
been imagined, let alone been told (Plummer, 1995: 114). Why is this 
so? How do silenced stories come into their time for telling? These 
questions, which Plummer asks in his Telling Sexual Stories, are 
closely linked to relations between the realm of private and public in 
which stories live and travel. Let me discuss Plummer's argument in 
more detail. 
A personal life of a great suffering often leads to a situation 
where facts, events, or experiences remain unnarratable; for it 
exceeds normalised., intelligible life patterns and, therefore, creates a 
deep sense of incommunicability (see Jackson, 2002: 92). Such 
facts, events, or experiences that often find no social context to be 
told are without meanings or 'do not convey meanings'. They are, at 
most, what Hannah Arendt calls, 'an unbearable sequence of sheer 
happenings' in which story often Tails' (Arendt, 1973: 106, quoted 
from Jackson, 2002: 92). In what conditions is one then able to tell 
one)s story about 'an unbearable sequence of sheer happenings? 
In analysing the coming-out of silenced sexual stories that 
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Plummer finds in the Western world, both old and new sexual 
stories such as gay/lesbian stories, rape stories, survival stories, the 
cross-dressing stories, transvestite stories, and transsexual stories, 
Plummer proposes what he calls, 'the generic process of telling 
sexual stories', a rough sequence through which sexual stories come 
out from the silence into their time. The sequence is: '1 Imagining - 
visualising - empathising; 2 Articulating - vocalising - announcing; 3 
Inventing identities - becoming story tellers; 4 Creating social 
worlds/ communities of support'; and finally, '5 Creating a culture of 
public problems' (Plummer, 1995: 126). He further explains the 
process as follows: 
The process can be pictured as a move from an 'inner world' of 
telling stories to the self privately to an increasingly public one 
where the circle of discourse becomes wider and wider. In the 
earliest moments, the story can hardly be imagined: it may be 
told privately as a tale to oneself. Later it gets told to a few 
people -a lover, a friend, a psychiatrist. Slowly it can move out 
into a public domain where it comes to take on a life of its own. 
It becomes part of public discourse (Plummer 1995: 126). 
From this point of view, storytelling, one may say, is like a 
journey (Plummer, 1995: 83). It has both its own temporal and 
spatial dimensions -a passage from the private to the public, 
structured, in turn, temporally with a beginning (its departure from 
one's isolated monologue), a middle (becoming an intersubjective 
story told and listened to) and an end (arriving at the wider social 
world). Certainly, not every story enters and has equal consequences 
in the public domain or community in which one belongs. A story's 
journey from the private to the public, according to Plummer, is 
often broken, especially when there are no visible others who identify 
the story as theirs or give it value and claim its legitimacy; or when 
these supportive visible others/ audiences do not possess resources 
or social power to facilitate the telling of the story, and to make it 
significant for wider public attention (Plummer 1995: 129). By 
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contrast, stories whose times have come for their telling, Plummer 
argues, are those which attract a wider interpretative community of 
support and comparison, and, therefore, become not only personal 
matters but also issues of public concern. And it is in this successful 
story's journey from the private to the public that we, Plummer 
argues, also find a political and academic discourse on public 
issues/problems starting to emerge. 
A particular way in which sexual problems are currently 
framed in political terms in Western societies is found in the 
emerging political discourse around sexual/intimate citizenship. 
According to Plummer, notions of sexual rights and responsibilities 
ultimately emerge out of this gradual generic process of sexual 
telling that involves: (1) the process that puts sexual stories into 
public circulation; (2) the process in which sexual stories invite 
others to take part in creating and discovering commonalities and 
identities; (3) the process whereby communication among different 
sexual stories is enabled; (4) the process whereby the act of sharing, 
affirming, and recognising stories helps us to create a new political 
understanding around our sexual lives; (5) and, therefore, to shape 
the rights and responsibilities developed within. As Plummer puts it: 
Rights and responsibilities are not 'natural' or 'inalienable' but 
have to be invented through human activities, and built into 
the notions of communities, citizenship and identities. Rights 
and responsibilities depend upon a community of stories which 
make those same rights plausible and possible. They accrue to 
people whose identities flow out of the self-same communities. 
Thus it is only as lesbian and gay communities started to 
develop and women's movements gathered strength that stories 
around a new kind of citizenship became more and more 
plausible. The nature of our communities - the languages they 
use, the stories they harbour, the identities they construct, the 
moral/political codes they champion - move to the centre stage 
of political thinIdng (Plummer 1995: 150). 
For Plummer, personal stories of sexual needs and sufferings, 
circulated in and through sexual communities and movements, and 
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now entering the wider political/ public communities of discourse in 
a 'new' language of sexual rights, are key to the understanding of 
current politics of sexual/intimate citizenship making found in many 
western countries (see Plummer, 2003: 10 1). In analysing the recent 
political debates on the 'Civil Partnership' in the British parliament, 
it is possible to illustrate the usefulness of such claims, of seeing 
sexual citizenship as, in effect, shaped by and through the sexual 
stories people tell about their needs and rights. 
Here, in the parliamentary debates on civil partnership in 
2004, personal stories enter the debates by becoming the very 
grounds and warrants for political claims for legal recognition of 
same-sex relationships. For example, a story of an old man in 
Yorkshire who 'had devoted his life to his partner' and yet 'Was 
denied hospital visiting rights'when his partner was seriously ill, 
and could only hear of his partner's death through his ftiends is told 
as a case that typifies 'the indignity, heartbreak and humiliation' 
that is unjustly suffered by members of same-sex couples in Britain 
(HL 22 April 2004, col. 403). Another story of a person called Chris, 
who has recently discovered that he has a cancer, and also found 
that In the event of his death, his partner would be forced to sell the 
home that they had shared for 25 years to pay death duties'is told 
by MP Charles Hendry who argues that the situation is 'barbaric' 
and 'inhumane' (HC, 12 October 2004, col. 233). It is also notable 
that Jackie Smith, the Deputy Minister for Women and Equality, 
opens the second reading debates on the Civil Partnership Bill in the 
Commons by telling 'the personal stories of difficulties faced by 
same-sex couples', which she heard during the consultation on the 
Bill. These include: a story about a gay man who, on the death of his 
partner, was 'thrown out of his home by relatives of his partner who 
had had no contact with him for many years'; a story of another 
person who 'had to buy the couple's joint possessions from the 
parents of his deceased partner'; and a story of a woman who was 
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even 'kept away from her partner's funeral' (HC 2004, October 12, 
col. 174). These personal stories of difficulties, presented as cases 
that demonstrate 'the inhumane consequences of the invisibility of 
same-sex relationships' in Britain, Jackie Smith argues, evidently 
tell us why the society needs Civil Partnership to provide the same 
rights of legal recognition for same-sex couples as those currently 
available for heterosexual couples through marriage (HC 2004, 
October 12, col. 174-5,179). 
These are stories around gay/lesbian lives, heard in the 
parliamentary debates on Civil Partnership in 2004. They exemplify, 
if we follow Plummer's scheme of things, the ways in which stories of 
gay and lesbian lives, brought out of the private world into a public 
one, succeed in getting (hitherto regarded as) private sexual issues 
and troubles firmly on the moral/political agenda. Telling/hearing 
the story of someone's sufferings and needs in public realms not 
only raises a range of contested ethical and political issues for the 
public to recognise, but also provides ways in which such problems 
can be collectively dealt with. For stories, as Young also emphasises, 
have transformative power not only because (1) they can cross the 
boundary that separates our lives into the sphere of the private and 
the public, but also because (2) they, through their acts of 
transgressing, bring into conjunction different (and even opposing) 
standpoints and arguments, thereby enable democratic and 
inclusive communication. 
Central to this process of telling sexual stories is, then, the 
emergence of politics around sexual/intimate citizenship - politics 
around recognition and respect of intimate/sexual rights and 
responsibilities. According to Plummer, this politics, emerging in and 
through concrete experiential stories people are telling about their 
sexual lives, bridges personal troubles with public issues, and is 
likely to make it possible for us to find (if any) common grounds or a 
common cause that may exist across our differences (Plummer, 
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2003: 146; Mills, 1959). Here, as I see it, the process in which 
private same-sex issues/problems become public sexual citizenship 
issues/problems is a result of the process of storytelling that 
involves the transformation of the personal into public. And at the 
heart of this process is the importance of dialogue among stories 
that creates 'webs of interconnected narratives', and which, in turn, 
makes 'grounded' moral /political project of intimate/sexual 
citizenship possible (Plummer, 2003: 98). 
However, I argue that it is precisely at this point that this 
'generic process of sexual storytelling, seen as being closely 
associated with the current emergence of intimate/sexual 
citizenship, may lose its analytical usefulness if we do not, at the 
same time, consider its relationship with what Foucault calls 'the 
process of problematization' (Foucault, 1985). Here, the process of 
problematization I am interested in is the process by which certain 
sexual behaviours or relationships become public problems (objects 
of social and political regulation and control), and certain personal 
stories of experience, in this process of problematization, are utilised 
into becoming problematized public/general facts and evidences 
upon which indisputable political arguments or incontestable 
factual/moral points are made at a given historical moment. " 
14. From a methodological point of view, Foucault's conception of 'the 
process of problematization' is concerned with the question of 'how and 
why certain things (behavior, phenemena, processes) became a problem' 
and 'the target of social regulation at a given moment' (Foucault, 1985: 
115). According to Foucault, this question, at the same time, is closely 
linked to the practice of truth-telling operative within the power-relations, 
which organises, defines, treats 'something real'as a ýproblem'at a given 
social and historical moment. Foucault writes: 
When I say that I am studying the 'problematization'of madness, 
crime., or sexuality, it is not a way of denying the reality of such 
phenomena. On the contrary, I have tried to show that it was 
precisely some real existent in the word which was the target of 
social regulation at a given moment. The question I raise is this: 
How and why were very different things in the world gathered 
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Young also recognizes that storytelling, in the political process 
of problematization, can often be manipulative and even deceitful. 
She argues that: 
Too often in politics, people wrongly generalize from stories. A 
congressperson tells the story of one welfare mother who 
spends her days watching television and drinking beer, thereby 
suggesting that such behavior is common. Narratives can 
create stereotypes as well as challenge them (Young, 2000: 78). 
Expressing her concern over sexual storytelling, which has now 
become an important political strategy in accomplishing 'progressive 
legal change' regarding gay/lesbian issues in Western societies, 
Ruthann Robson, a leading lesbian legal theorist, adds further 
complexities and contradictions inherent in storytelling (Robson, 
1997). While personal sexual stories, which reveal the particularity 
and complexity involved in personal sexual experience, can 
effectively undermine certain stereotypes constructed around sexual 
otherness, they can also, Robson argues, be equally oppressive and 
essentializing (Robson, 1997: 1416). For example, personal stories 
of being in a long-term, committed, and monogamous same-sex 
relationship, as used in political argument for same-sex marriage 
and/or registered partnerships, may effectively challenge the 
stereotypes of gays/lesbians of being essentially promiscuous or 
lacking responsibility. But stories that perform such political tasks 
as combating 'the "sex as lifestyle" stereotype' can, at the same time, 
have the effect of 'desexualizing' gays/ lesbians/ queers, and can be 
together, characterized, analyzed, and treated as, for example, 
gmental illness? What are the elements which are relevant for a 
given 'problematization? And even if I won't say that what is 
characterized as 'schizophrenia' corresponds to something real in 
the world, this has nothing to do with idealism. For I think there is a 
relation between the thing which is problematized and the process of 
problematization. The problematization is an 'answer' to a concrete 
situation which is real (Foucault, 1985: 115). 
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used as an effective means of problematizing and othering those who 
do not fit into the norms built upon the institution of marriage 
(Robson 1997: 1422-3). 
Other writers have sought to expand the paradoxical effects 
that narratives perform in political communication further, and to 
develop arguments about the relationship that stories have with 
issues of 'power', Ideology' and 'exclusions' (McNay, 2003: 11). For 
instance, Peter Ehrenhaus's study of stories of Vietnam veterans' 
post-war experience in America demonstrates the extent to which 
stories'journeys from the private to the public are far from 
straightforward in as much as the relation between the two 
experiential domains is articulated by power relations. Ehrenhaus's 
discussion is centred around the ways in which Vietnam veteran's 
stories, once repressed and shunned in America as symbols of a 
nation's failure and humiliation, have now been re-storied into the 
public narrative, which is organized in terms of what Ehrenhaus 
calls, the 'therapeutic motif' - the motif that 'casts all issues and 
questions of relationship in matters related to Vietnam - be they 
personal, cultural, or political - in terms of healing and recovery' 
(Ehrenhaus, 1993: 8 1). To be sure, the construction of public 
therapeutic narrative into which personal stories of post-war 
experience are fed or translated provides a context whereby pains 
and traumas linked to Vietnam veterans'war experience are now 
being publicly recognised (see also McNay, 2003: 10-11). Yet, at the 
same time, this effectively disempowers the voice of Vietnam 
veterans as 'a voice of political opposition'. By positioning Vietnam 
veterans in terms of the language of ýpsychological dysfunction, 
emotional fragility, healing, and personal redemption', the 
therapeutic public narrative, Ehrenhaus argues, 'creates a context 
that defines the warrior as cripple and muzzles the warrior as 
witness'; in other words, the therapeutic public narrative, which 
portrays Vietnam veterans as emotionally unstable and defective, 
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works to discount the voice of the veteran 'as a source of legitimate 
knowledge about the nature of contemporary warfare' (88,89). And 
as a result, it subverts the possibility that stories of Vietnam 
veterans, reduced to stories of the recovery of the self, can effectively 
challenge the dominant American foreign policy rhetoric - the policy 
that advocates and mobilizes the use of state-sanctioned violence 
and destruction in the name of democracy and justice (78,89). 
Parado3dcally, then, as Ehrenhaus notes: 
Vietnam veterans now have a voice in the public space that 
they were once denied. The question, however, concerns the 
sanctioned nature of that voice and the circumstances of 
access to the public space. Marginalized voices often can and 
will be heard. But these public expressions occur in ways that 
defuse those voices, often by integrating them into the broader 
system of social relations from which they have been excluded. 
And integration involves locating those marginalized within the 
symbolic, social formations by which power makes (i. e., 
creates, imposes) sense (Ehrenhaus 1993: 88). 
It is precisely this controversy over stories that brings me to 
the point that Young's attempt to incorporate the normative force of 
storytelling into her conception of 'communicative democracy' is 
problematic unless, as Young herself recognizes, we consider the 
underlying power relations that may conditions and limit story's 
representation (or representability) and interpretation (or 
interpretability) of what exists as real or meaningful for members of 
political communities. Stories, as Young argues, may enable political 
communication among differently situated personal/ private 
experience and perspectives, which, in turn, engender an enlarged 
public view of diverse, but interconnected human struggling and 
experience. Yet, stories are embedded in a complex social formation 
of both 'discursive' and 'non-discursive' conditions and power 
relations that structures the practice of storytelling and 
communication, and can, in effect, 'carry- like reasoned 
arguments -'silencing biases' against a plurality of perspectives or 
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reinforce the stereotypes they represent in maintaining their hold on 
truth (Nakagawa, 1993: 145; Young, 1993: 127). In such cases, 
stories reproduce and reconstruct the assumed social boundaries 
between us and them, or between private and public, often 
articulated as a conflict between truth and falsity. 
Plummer's sociological interest in stories, on the other hand, 
certainly invites us to situate the process of storytelling within the 
intersubjective relations that shape our social, political and ethical 
lives. Yet, his idea of the 'generic process of sexual storytelling', 
which implies a progressive, uni-directional dynamic of storytelling 
from private to public, (1) shares with the normative (or depoliticized) 
understanding of storytelling the assumption that stories are the 
vehicle through which enlarged, negotiated citizenry perspectives 
can be introduced into politics, and (2) is, therefore, too simplified a 
model with which to inquire problematic aspects of story's journey 
from private to public (or from public to private) in the sexual 
citizenship maldng process. As already noted, the passage of stories 
from private to public involves not just a transition from non- 
recognition to recognition but a process of exclusion and 
problematisation whereby private stories, brought out into the public 
or in the process of becoming 'public narrative', can be effectively 
distorted, stereotyped, manipulated, modified, or even reprivatized. 
From this point of view, the investigation, how sexual stories 
told in different social dimensions and levels are connected and 
constituted in the politics of sexual citizenship, is not simply about 
discerning how stories, in their generic process of sexual storytelling, 
constitute the part of the negotiated/ interactive public meaning of 
sexual citizenship. It is, at the same time, about finding: (a) the very 
conditions upon which a (sexual) story's access to the public is 
authorized (or rejected); (b) the ways they are articulated (or 
disarticulated) as stories sexual citizenship: (c) and with what 
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political effects at a given historical moment. 
In analysing the process by which stories of same-sex 
experience enter into a public and national political domain and 
make their case for the recognition of sexual/ social justice in 
Britain, my critical reading of sexual stories told during the 
parliamentary debates, therefore, explores the following two 
conditions. To begin with, I examine the conditions of inclusion in 
which certain personal stories of same-sex experience become the 
part of 'our' public stories, being recognized and represented in the 
parliament, and increasingly articulated in terms of the language of 
citizenship and justice. Here, the questions being asked are: what 
are the socio-political and ethical conditions in which personal 
stories of same-sex experience get into circulation, and enter the 
public/political debate in Britain? Who tells stories or whose stories 
are told? What 'problems' do stories importantly tell us about? How 
are personal sexual stories publicly represented and contested in 
parliament? What moral and political effects do these stories have on 
political claims being increasingly made about sexual rights and 
responsibilities? In exploring these questions, I also examine the 
opposite but closely linked tendency - the conditions of exclusion 
and problernatization. Here, I pay specific attention to the 
paradoxical condition whereby sexual stories may at once be 
Included'as stories of sexual citizens and, at the same time, 
'excluded' as stories of the sexual Other. But how are we to 
understand this seemingly paradoxical, ambivalent condition of 
sexual storytelling in the politics of sexual citizenship? 
The answer, I suggest, needs to be found in story's circulation 
process whereby certain sexual stories are, in effect, lost in the chain 
of signification of sexual citizenship into which they are included; or 
conversely, we will find it in the process in which sexual stories are, 
in effect, included in the chain of signification of sexual citizenship 
from which they are excluded. In what follows, I contrast these 
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paradoxical conditions upon which stories are included (through 
exclusion) or excluded (through inclusion) in the domain of sexual 
citizenship politics in the U. K by examining stories of sexual citizens 
(or sexual others) circulated and represented in parliament in three 
different moments in time - during debates about the Sexual 
Offences Act in the 1960s, about Section 28 in the 1980s and about 
the Civil Partnership Act in the 2000s. Before I survey these three 
different moments in which stories have been dis/articulated into 
sexual citizenship, I discuss some methodological and analytical 
issues involved in political storytelling in parliament. The issues that 
I shall address here are closely linked to the particular 
organizational features of the British Parliament that impacts on the 
nature and the role of storytelling, to which I shall now turn. 
4.3 Stogtelliq zin Parliament 
4.3.1 Merely Telling Stories? " 
Here, I ask the following questions: why do politicians, in their 
deliberative discussions in parliament, tell their own (or other's) 
personal experiential stories?; in what particular circumstances do 
they tell such stories, rather than make a non-storied form of causal 
argument?; in what ways do re/presented personal experiential 
stories in parliament shape the decision-making processes?; Or is 
storytelling relevant to the representational political practice at all? 
Personal stories recounted in the deliberative discussions in 
parliament have received little, if any, attention from political 
15. This heading is borrowed from Kreiswirth's article on this subject 
(Kreiswirth, 2000). 
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researchers. And if they have, they have often been treated only as a 
'digression, example, or rhetorical ornament, something 
supplementary to the guiding armature of rational ar-gument', rather 
than being seen as a crucial part of deliberative discussions in 
parliament (Kreiswirth, 2000: 295). Part of the reason for this may 
be due to some implicit theoretical and political assumptions about 
the nature of parliamentary debate. The defining features of 
parliamentary debate rhetorically (or ideally) include its emphasis on 
rational argumentation, unimpeded by emotions or personal 
interests, and on politicians (MPs) participating not as individuals, 
but as representative agents who speak for the common good or 
impartial values (Cohen, 1989). Personal narrative, on the other 
hand, is, by its common understanding, 'personal' and 'particular' 
(see Dryzek, 2000: 68). Its language, as opposed to the language of 
the public sphere, is private. And, moreover, stories, with their 
embodied and subjective expressions, work towards persuasion not 
through appeal to reason or facts but through the use of emotional 
identifications or manipulations Pryzek, 2000: 69; Miller, 2002: 
221). 
Such an assumed contrast between rational argumentation 
and storytelling is, however, mostly drawn without considering the 
institutional context within which political storytelling is situated - 
the 'argumentative context of criticism and justification' within 
which politicians engage in the business of telling/ listening to 
stories (Abell, Stokoe, & Billig, 2004: 182). Stories, as Polletta 
argues, 'are differently intelligible, salient, available, and 
authoritative depending on who tells them, when, for what purpose' 
and, more importantly for our discussion, In what institutional 
context' (Polletta, 1998: 425). For example, our experience of being 
mugged can be storied differently if told to our family at home than 
to a judge in a court of law (Polletta, 1998: 425; DiJk, 1975: 288; 
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Robinson, 1981: 64). " This is because in the case of the latter, 
there are real limits imposed by 'the structures of law' and 'the legal 
categories' within which the story (treated as a 'fact' or 'evidence' by 
the law) is to be heard and dealt with (Conklin, 1997: 245; Graycar, 
1996: 309). In other words, there are contextual or institutional 
rules governing storytelling, which limit (or enable) ways stories can 
be told, heard, and make sense (Ewick & Silbey, 1995: 210-211). 
Since the telliability and intelligibility of stories are largely 
context-dependent - the context often structured and enabled by 
specific institutional conditions - questions such as what stories 
gare) or 'do' need to be answered by considering, as Kreiswirth 
argues, 'where'and 'with what authority'the storytelling, as part of 
social actions, is performed (Kreiswirth, 2000: 304; Austin, 1975: 
139). And that being the case, the question involved in political 
storytelling is not, 'how far does storytelling depart from aims and 
criteria of political talk in the parliamentT, but rather, 'how 
responsive/ reflesdve is storytelling to its placing within the 
parliamentary argumentative context? 'This, of course, raises 
another question, that is: what is this 'debate'in parliament? 
Van Der Valk defines a parliamentary debate as 'a highly 
structured institutional and political speech-event whose main 
declared goal is to produce legal and policy instruments for the 
benefit of the nation' (Van Der Valk, 2003: 3 16). On the one hand, 
the debate is highly structured by the adversa-fial and partisan 
nature of parliament's structure, in which political actors, often 
depending on whether their parties are in opposition or in 
government, defend or oppose proposals of the government through 
16. As van Dijk, for example, remarks: '[In] telling about a bank robbery to 
our friends we do not usually give a precise description of the clothes or 
the car of the robber, information which we would give the police, if a 
description is required' (Dijk, 1975: 288). 
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argumentation and counter-argumentation processes. On the other 
hand, the debate is public in nature: being broadcasted nationally 
and officially recorded in Hansard, MPs speak not only 'to other 
politicians present in the debating chamber', but also 'to members of 
the public' (Blackledge, 2005: 94). And as the representatives of the 
public, MPs are expected to engage in political debates with well- 
informed facts and reasonable opinion, pursuing the collective 
interests of the public over and above their personal or partisan 
interests. 
The fact that parliamentary debate is highly confrontational/ 
partisan and at the same time is public means that politicians are 
often caught in what Jonathan Potter and Derek Edwards call 'a 
dilemma of stake or interest': any political argument that she or he 
makes in the debate may invite counter-arguments in which her or 
his claim can be discounted as merely 'a product of stake or interest' 
(Edwards, & Potter, 1992: 158). In contemporary multicultural (and 
perhaps also multi-sexual) western societies where humanitarian 
values such as tolerance, respect for diversity, and fairness have 
become the new norms governing political discourse, the dilemma, 
as Van Dijk argues, appears particularly acute when it comes to talk 
about society's minority groups. Blaminga minority group in a 
debate, for example, can be discounted as merely a product of 
personal or political prejudice, such as sexism, racism, homophobia, 
and etc; support, on the other hand, may be discounted as an 
attempt to promote partiality or 'special treatment' (see Dijk, 1997: 
35; Brickell, 200 1; Potter, 1996: 110) " 
17. For example, we find, in the debates on Section 28 during the late 
1980s, the arguments of supporters of Section 28 in which gays were 
frequently blamed for the AIDS crisis were frequently discounted as being 
motivated by homophobia; the arguments of opponent of Section 28, by 
contrast, were accused of intentionally promoting homosexuality. We find, 
in the debates on the Civil Partnership Act, a similar way in which 
arguments and counter-arguments are organized in terms of issues of 
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One of the most familiar and forceful ways in which politicians 
manage the 'dilemma of stake or interest' is by making an argument 
that provides an account, that is both real and true - an account 
that is factual. A factual account, according to Edwards and Potter, 
is an account that is 'constructed to appear external' to the speaker, 
to be 'representations of features of an "out-there" world', rather 
than 'reflections' of speaker's own 'desires or concerns' (Edwards, 
Potter, 1992: 160). Given that an account is successfully made and 
treated as 'factual', and, therefore, manages a politician's dilemma of 
stake, he or she accomplishes his or her individual and institutional 
accountability. 
Such factual accounts could be offered in a number of different 
ways. Quoting opinion polls, using statistical data, citing news 
reports, and representing objective, neutral expert's knowledge are 
the most commonly found devices with which factual political claims 
are made in political debates. And with these, I add the use of 
storytelling to a form of factual accounting, deployed and organized 
to rebut a potential challenge to speaker's accountability in the 
parliament. I also suggest that the moralizing effects that factual 
storytelling produce make storytelling distinctive from other 
discursive formsY explaining for its prominence in political 
argumentation. 
So let me ask the following questions, that is: in what ways do 
stories of personal experience appear to be factual in the political 
discourse - appear to be external to the storyteller?; and what 
interest: arguments made by those who supported the Government 
proposal for the introduction of registered civil partnership for same-sex 
couples were charged with having a compelling interest in weakening 
family values; the opponents' attempt to amend the Civil Partnership Bill, 
which would have extended the provisions of the Bill to include carers and 
family members, was discounted as an attempt to wreck the Bill. 
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moralizing effect do such factual stories produce? The discussion 
that follows answers these questions, to which I shall now turn. 
4.3.2 Telling a story: Telling (more than) a fact 
The uses of personal narratives in parliament are highly 
strategic. Personal narratives in the political discourse are mostly 
used to produce empirical evidence for arguments, and to establish 
tellers' credibility - credibility established through what Lisa Disch 
calls, 'the ontology of voice' (Disch, 2003). 
The voice here I am talking about is the voice that appears to 
pre-exist within narration by which a story appears to ten itself. Or 
to put it another way, it is the voice which, divorced from the acts of 
telling, appears to be directly governed by the presence of 'What is 
there' or 'what demands to be shown' or experienced (Genette, 1980: 
165). Here, the sequence of events, personally experienced or 
witnessed appear to be presented in the narrative form only because 
they happened: events, in other words, 'seem to speak for 
themselves' rather than being selected, configured, evaluated, or 
presented with interest by the storyteller (Ewick &. Silbey, 1995: 
213). The voice, constructed in such a way, can bring the listeners 
into the story by drawing attention 'away' from the telling of the 
story, and 'onto' the events being reported, managing issues of the 
storyteller's 'potentially problematic stake and interest in events' 
(Potter, 1996: 166). And it is in this separation between 'the story' 
and 'the telling' (or between 'the event' and 'the representationj that 
the voice within narration, Disch argues, 'seductively' achieves 
credibility (Disch, 2003): it gives the story what Chambers calls 'airs 
of objectivity' (Chambers, 1984: 128 cited in Disch 2003). 
In Chapter 6,1 discuss in detail various ways in which 
politicians, by separating 'the event' they recount from their own 
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personal/ partisan interest in 'storying, attempt to produce the voice 
that resists easy refutation. For the moment, however, I ponder more 
on the kind of this 'voice' produced through personal experiential 
narratives - the voice of experience. 
The separation between 'the story' and 'the telling' in personal 
narratives - one of the main features of 'factual' storytelling in 
political discourse - rests on (as well as reinforces) the realistic 
fantasy' about what Scott calls, 'the evidence of experience' (Scott, 
199 1). The separation presupposes the prior existence of the 'the 
speaker "behind" representation' (Disch 2003) -a speaker who, by 
means of his or her access to the real/event through 'experience', 
can, nevertheless, become the legitimate teller/bearer of the story/ 
voice. Regardless of its form, whether in first-person narration or 
third-person narration, such legitimate tellers found within 
narration, produce the factual effect in the political discourse 
beyond challenge or refutation: 'what could be truer', asks Scott, 
'than a subject's own account [or vision] of what he or she has lived 
through [or has witnessed]? ' (Scott 1991: 777). He or she, as Potter 
argues, 'can provide an impression of being there by sketching 
features which, although not substantial to the claim or argument, 
would have been apparent to someone who actually witnessed some 
event' (Potter 1996: 117, Italics are added). And to the extent that 
personal experience is storied in such a way that the story merely 
represents what was there (the real), seen, known, and felt 
(experienced) by the witness, it effectively avoids being subjected to 
validity testing or debate (Witten, 1993: 107). Or to put it another 
way, the storyteller effectively conceals his or her practice of 
narration behind the representation - the practice that selects, 
organizes, constructs and give meanings to experience through 
storytelling. 
According to Scott, such use of personal experience as 
'uncontestable evidence'and as the legitimate foundation for telling 
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'the' story generates another powerful evidence: it produces the 
'evidence for the fact of difference' (Scott 199 1: 777). In spelling out 
the process in which the 'evidence of experience' tends to become the 
'evidence for the fact of difference', Scott argues: 
When experience is taken as the origin of knowledge, the vision 
of the individual subject (the person who had the experience 
or ... [the politician] who recounts it) becomes the bedrock of 
evidence on which explanation is built. Questions about the 
constructed nature of experience, about how subjects are 
constituted as different in the first place, about how one's 
vision is structured ... are left aside. The evidence of experience 
then becomes evidence for the fact of difference, rather than a 
way of exploring how difference is established, how it operates, 
how and in what ways it constitutes subjects who see and act 
in the world (Scott 1991: 777). 
Standing in for the 'fact of difference', the story of 'personal' 
experience is often strategically used by politicians to speak for the 
experience of a larger category to which the 'person' is seen to self- 
evidently belong. Here, the questionable danger, as pointed out by 
Polletta, is that 'her' story of experience, taken as uncontestable 
evidence for the fact of difference, is 'too easily seen as that of 
"women", erasing difference within the group or experience; yet the 
story's such "representativeness", which is rarely problematized, is 
not often "specified" or "demonstrated"' (Polletta, 1998: 425). If not 
specified or demonstrated, however, we still find a particular way in 
which story's representativeness is customarily achieved in the 
political discourse - that is, generalization. In the positivistic 
narrative performance, generalization, Ewick and Silbey argue, 
'entails the presentation of specific events and characters as one of 
many similar cases which aggregate to some larger social reality (a 
reality which often destroys the particularity that constituted that 
narrative in the first place)' (Ewick and Silbey 1995: 219). Here, to 
represent is to generalize; whereas, to this end, 'the consensus 
across a range of different personal stories'is to be invoked as a 
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'warrant'for the evidence (Potter 1996: 117). This tens us that the 
process in which the 'evidence of experience' becomes the evidence 
of Experience/ Difference is not simply worked in isolation. Rather, 
story's evidentiality linked to its representitiveness is likely to be met 
conjointly and collaboratively. 
Later in this chapter, where I discuss the story data selected 
and analyzed for this Part 1,1 return to the issue of joint storytelling 
in more detail and discuss, in particular, the way in which cross- 
narrative repetition is elicited for fact/evidence construction during 
parliamentary debates (see the section titled Data). Before I move to 
this, however, I want to briefly touch on another important effect 
produced in political narrative talk in parliament, which is closely 
connected to story's factual effect - that is, its normalizing/ 
moralizing effect. 
The tendency of narratives of personal experience, presented as 
evidence, to naturalize socially constructed categories such as 
woman, man, white, black, disabled, heterosexual or homosexual 
hints at one efficacious way in which normality can be constituted 
through political storytelling. Being critical of the way in which 
appeals to women's personal experience tend to treat as 
'transparent' the identities of those whose experience are being told, 
Brady argues: 'an uncritical reliance on experience as evidence 
constructs a type of fixed subjectivity. The use of experience as 
evidence rests upon assumptions that universalize the experience of 
one instead of exploring differences within and between subjects. 
The universalizing effect is the result of the transparency of gender'- 
what a woman experienced is 'taken as evidence' of what women 
experienced (Brady, 1998: 39). Linked to the rhetorical power of 
(inevitable) causality found in positivistic narrativity, however, a 
story of what a woman has experienced presented as evidence can 
be worked powerfully to suggest, implicitly or explicitly, what women 
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ought to experience. But in what particular ways? 
Telling a story involves more than a representation of events. 
Stories are, in fact, distinguished from other discursive forms by the 
very way in which events are represented - events are represented in 
an 'orderly', 'consecutive' manner, providing the sense of 'a sequence 
of cause and effect' (Abbott, 2002: 37). Such features of narrativity 
can be strategically used in political storytelling to increase the 
credibility of the storyteller. The order of 'events' that appears to 
speak for themselves in factual storytelling can suggest an 
inevitability of causality before the narration (representation), giving 
listeners 'the impression that certain actions have consequences not 
only fitting but inevitable' (Leith, & Myerson, 1989: 30). Within such 
narratives, Steph Lawler argues: 
prior events seen inevitably to lead to later ones, and the end of 
the story is understood as the culmination and actualization of 
prior events. Significance is conferred on earlier events by what 
comes later. In this sense, narratives become naturalized as 
the episodes which make up the 'plot' appear inevitable, and 
even universal (Lawler, 2002: 246). 
Yet it is in this act of plotting, through which the experience of 
a sequence of events appears significant and yet, at the same time, 
inevitable and universal, that White finds story's 'moralizing effect' 
(Vv'hite, 1980). Hayden White writes: 'If every ... story, however we 
define that familiar but conceptually elusive entity ... endows events, 
whether real or imaginary, with a significance that they do not 
possess as a mere sequence, then it seems possible to conclude that 
every... narrative has as its latent or manifest purpose the desire to 
moralize the events of which it treats' (White 1980: 17-8). An event 
recounted in a story, as Ricoeur argues, is 'more than an 
occurance'- 'more than something that just happens' (Ricoeur, 
1991: 20). For, story has a plot which, by selecting/ organizing 
happenings, actions, and moments into a meaningful episode linked 
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to story's conclusion, gives 'to reality' a particular 'odor of the ideal' 
(White 1980: 24). In other words, narrative emplotment enables 
every (factual) story, which seems to merely describes 'the way 
things are', to bear, implicitly or explicitly, the moral vision of 'the 
way that things ought to be' Panangelo, 1999: 107). And in this 
way, story, as Hinchman and Hinchman argue, generally provides a 
Toundation'for legal/political discourse that concerns the question 
of legality, legitimacy, and authority' (Hinchman, & Hinchman, 
1997: xxvi). White writes: 
Story forms ... represent an armory of relational models by 
which what would otherwise be nothing but chains of 
mechanical cause and effects can be translated into moral 
terms... Story forms not only permit us to judge the moral 
significance of human projects, they also provide the means by 
which to judge them, even while we pretend to be merely 
describing them (White, 1981: 797). 
To this, it is also relevant to point out the 'narrative embedding' 
(Bal & Tavor, 1981: 776) through which stories of/about personal 
experience are implicitly and explicitly linked to overarching legal/ 
political discourse about the 'public' in parliament. In order to 
explain the term 'narrative embedding' that I am employing here, I 
also need to briefly discuss different 'levels'upon which 
narrativization occurs in the political discourse (Genette, 1980; 
Barthes & Duisit, 1975: 243). 
In analysing ways in which narratives of personal experience, 
presented as evidence in political debates, reflect as well as 
construct overarching legal/political discourse about society in 
parliament, Epstein et al. (2000) find three different, yet closely 
interconnected, levels within which argumentation unfolds in story 
forms. There are: 
[Ilittle narratives about particular persons or episodes. 
Characters are named and acquire exemplary status: as 
notorious sexual monsters, for instance, or as victims; as 
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sexual abusers and pedophiles in positions of trust in 
institutions; or as young gay men forced to take their own lives 
or'go on the game'. Stories of a medium level tell of typical 
legal consequences: failing to reform the law or failing to draw 
'a line in the moral sand' will destabilize society, or increase 
inequality, or make us uncompetitive in the global economy, for 
example. Such stories, in turn, anchor and draw meanings 
from narratives that are truly grand. These third level stories 
typically take the moral/ social state and history of the nation 
as their object and explore dystopian or utopian futures and 
pasts. Here change or stasis in the law serves competing 
definitions of civilization or social progress (Epstein, Johnson, 
& Steinberg, 2000: 9). 
What we find in political debates in parliament is the 
argumentation that unfolds in a complex story forms in which 
different story levels'become interwoven to produce embedded and 
embedding narratives. Politicians who undertake public- 
representational acts in parliament typically engage in constructing 
this what Gergen and Gergen caH 'narratives within narratives'- 
narratives that unfold 'within an overarching narrative that include 
nonnarrative [argumentative] parts' (Gergen & Gergen, 2001: 171; 
Riessman, 1993: 5 1). According to Gergen and Gergen, the 
construction of 'narratives within narratives'is possible because 
there are 'no temporal parameters within which events must be 
related through narratives' (Gergen & Gergen, 2001: 171). They 
write: 
[O]ne may attempt to relate events occurring over vast periods 
of time, or determine the relationship among events within a 
brief period ... We may use the terms 'macro' and 'micro' to refer 
to the hypothetical or idealized ends of the temporal continuum 
within which events are related. Macronarratives refer to those 
events spanning broad periods of time while micronarratives 
relate events within brief durations... Given the capacity to 
relate events within different temporal perspectives, it becomes 
apparent that people often engage in the construction of nested 
narratives, or narratives within narratives ... To the extent that 
consistency [or consensus] among [nested] narratives is 
sought, macronarratives acquire preeminent importance. Such 
narratives seem to lay the foundations within which other 
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narratives are constructed (Gergen & Gergen, 2001: 171-2). 
Here, macronarratives (or overarching narratives), Gergen and 
Gergen argue, can act as 'frame narratives'- narratives that perform 
as frames for embedded narratives by offering foundations for them 
(Prince, 2003: 33). In political storytelling, this often means that: as 
much as narratives of personal experience, presented as 
incontestable evidence, provide foundations for the construction and 
evaluation of overarching political/legal narratives., these little 
narratives are themselves constructed and fashioned into evidence 
by those overarching political/legal narratives that embed (or 
emplot) them. 
In Chapter 7 where I discuss parliamentary debates on the 
Civil Partnership Act in Britain, I take up this issue of 'narrative 
embedding'and discuss ways in which narratives of personal 
experience of same-sex relationships are told (embedded or 
emplotted) within some cultural narratives of marriage/ citizenship 
prevailing in Britain. Here, the focus of my analysis is: (1) the ways 
in which dominant cultural/ political stories of (heterosexual) 
marriage/ citizenship provide resources and frameworks for 'storying' 
and 'evidencing' personal experience around same-sex relationships, 
and (2) how these 'storied' experience of same-sex relationships, 
presented as uncontestable evidence in political debates, appear to 
factually speak for the values of (homosexual) partnership/ 
citizenship. 
I make a final comment on the notion of 'narrative embedding'. 
As I have already pointed out, I employ the term, 'narrative 
embedding'to refer to the process in which narratives of personal 
experience are told within other narratives. And this embedding - 
the emplottment of a narrative within a narrative - can occur within 
a single narrative introduced by an individual storyteller, or be 
jointly performed by multiple storytellers who, implicitly or explicitly, 
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embed others' narratives within their own narratives. Joint- 
storytelling is, indeed, one of the main features of storytelling found 
in political debates in parliament, and it produces, as I shall argue 
in the chapters that follow, its own particular political effect. In 
Section 4.4, where I demonstrate the data selected, analysed and 
represented for this thesis, I introduce the notion, joint-storytelling, 
and discuss it in terms of 'narrative repetition' evoked in political 
debates in parliament. In Chapter 7,1 mainly discuss the features of 
joint-storytelling found in parliamentary debates in relation to the 
practice of 'narrative embedding. 
In general, this Section 4.3 is written to provide the ground for 
more systematic analysis of political storytelling in the three 
chapters that follow. I shall now add a brief comment on the story on 
which this thesis is based, and explain the reason they demand a 
particular analytical attention. 
4.4 Data 
4.4.1 Data Source 
My primary data source for this study is drawn from the 
following three parliamentary debates on homo/same-sex 
sexualities: the discussion of the Wolfenden report, and Sexual 
Offences Bill (December 1957 - July 1967); of the so-called Section 
28 of the Local Government Bill (December 1986 - March 1988); and 
of the Civil Partnership Bill Pan 2002 - Nov 2004). From these 
three series of parliamentary debates recorded in Hansard, I selected 
politicians' speeches that involve storytelling for a detailed narrative 
analysis. 
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4.4.2 Data Selection 
Forms of narrative identified, analysed and represented in this 
chapter are sequences of past events being: (1) experienced, or 
witnessed by tellers themselves (MPs); or (2) represented or reported 
by speakers (MPs) who, though not participants to the events they 
are narrating, have heard of the events from others who have 
experienced or witnessed them. Such forms of narrative, which I 
identified and selected for analysis, range from (relatively) complete 
narratives to fragmented narratives - that is, from stories that 
connect events in a sequential order with a fairly clear beginning, 
middle, and end, to stories in which the 'perceived sequence of 
connected events'are rather unclaborated, incomplete, or 
unevaluated (Toolan, 1988: 8). 
As a matter of fact, it should be pointed out from the outset 
that parliamentary debates, as Epstein argues, 'rarely elaborate full- 
blown narratives in the ways that literary or cinematic texts 
frequently do' (Epstein, Johnson, & Steinberg, 2000: 9). Stories told 
in parliament, when compared with literary kinds of narrative, are 
fragmented by virtue of being situated in the ongoing argumentative 
context whereby politicians' speeches are routinely interrupted, 
questioned, challenged or supported. My representation of the data 
considers this particular 'contextual' feature of storytelling in 
parliament, which is briefly explained as below. 
4.4.3 Data re/presentation 
Argumentative stories identified in parliamentary debates share 
an important feature found in conversational stories: stories are 
'authored' not only 'by those who introduce them', but also by the 
many participants in the debates who 'ask questions, comment and 
otherwise overtly contribute to an evolving tale' (Ochs, 1997: 185). 
This feature of joint-storytelling has received considerable scholarly 
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attention (Tannen, 1989; Goodwin, 1981; Dijk, 1987; Fludernik, 
1996). 'Interactionally', van Dijk argues, such stories 'come about 
not just within a single turn of a single speaker'. As a form of 
situated discourse produced in interactive (argumentative) context, 
they rather 'tend to be constructed dialogically': when one speaker 
tells a story, the interlocutors 'may routinely interrupt to ask 
questions, to show surprise, to challenge the interestingness or 
relevance of the story, or to interpolate fragments of a story about 
his or her own experience' (Dijk, 1987: 63-4). 
On the part of the storytellers, their act of telling occurring in 
adversarial, argumentative context means that they are subject to 
considerable restraints 'to meet'their story's ýreportability' and 
'tellability' demands (Fludernik, 1996: 63): in other words, they need 
to successfully avoid opponent's potentially confrontational 
questions such as, Is it true? or 'So what? (Labov, 1972: 366). Yet, 
the fact that they should deliver the needed point of narrative within 
the ongoing dialogical dynamic (as well as within the given time 
limits) also means that their stories could often result in having an 
apparently 'fragmented' structure (Harris, 200 1), or lacking 
necessary 'narrative information' (Genette, 1980: 162), necessitating 
listeners - especially empathetic listeners - to Ul in the blanks' and 
'complete the story'(Epstein, Johnson, & Steinberg, 2000: 9). 
Indeed, as I shall illustrate below, argumentative stories told in 
parliamentary debates, which distinctively consist of partisan/ 
political interaction, generally involve multiple tellers. In other 
words, they, by shifting the role fi7om being listeners to tellers/ 
knowers, tend to jointly meet the demands for story's reportability 
and tellability. Consider, for example, the following two extracts of 
Example A presented below. They both come from the House of 
Commons Debate on the Sexual Offences Act in 1967. 
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Example A 
Extracts from June 23,1967 House of Commons Debates on the 
Sexual Offences Act 
(Extract 1) 
Mr. Grant-FerHs- Those of us who go about the West End of 
London and look occasionally in the windows where lists of 
this and that are publicly shown people wanting domestic help 
or flats or something of that kind know that there in many 
instances people are trying to promote homosexuality. I have 
watched the types of people who go and read these notices. It is 
not too dffficult to see what lies behind them (HC, 23 June 
1967, col. 2146). 
(Extract 2) 
Sir C. Osborne- This is a matter of procuring and publishing 
lists ... I have one here listed as G. 80 in the publication. It says: "Likable young man, 24, would like to meet executives having 
premises in West End. Available mid-day, evenings" - he 
cannot be very hard working and producing much 
economically "Give address, phone number. All answered. " 
If it is circulated it gets from hand to hand, and what is to 
prevent its being sent among young people and young men? It 
is the kind of thing that leads to social evils and is tending to 
corrupt our national life (HC, 23 June 1967, col. 2149). 
Here, what is lacking in Grant-Ferris's story is a detailed 
'narrative representation' or 'narrative information' of what he sees 
(Genette, 1980: 162). The point of what he sees is rather vague. The 
lack of detail given about what 'these notices' say, or 'the types of 
people who go and read these notices'make it hard for listeners to 
accept the perceived vision he provides: contrary to what he claims, 
it is 'difficult'to find 'what hes behind'the 'types of people'who are 
interested in 'these notices'. 
What makes Grant-Ferris a witness (rather than a mere 
speculator) to the event is Sir C. Osborne's description of an 
advertisement found in a publication. Here, Osborne, more or less, 
sees the same thing -a small advertisement that, he claims, 
promotes homosexuality, and the types of people who advertise or 
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read it. By explicitly stating what the advertisement says and what it 
means for the person who advertises or reads, however, Osborne 
provides an added context to the event Grant-Ferris witnessed, 
manufacturing consensus between what he read and what Grant- 
Ferris saw. His report, in other words, makes Grant-Ferris's telling 
of the event understandable and believable. 
Example A shows a typical way in which Joint-storytelling'in 
the parliament is performed through Yepetition'. The cross-narrative 
repetition performed in the parliament ranges from the same (or 
similar) event being (re)told by multiple tellers with different level of 
details to the tellers' repetition of a particular plot through which 
their varied storied events are configured into a series of resembled 
(meaningful) happenings. I shall take just one more example to 
indicate briefly something of this patterned narrative interaction - 
repetition - found in the House of Commons/ Lords. 
Example B 
Extracts from June 24,2004 House of Lords debates on Civil 
Partnership Bill (Extract 1,2,3) and from November 9,2004 House of 
Commons debates on Civil Partnership (Extract 4). 
(Extract 1) 
Baroness O'Cathain: The Bill [Civil Partnership Bill] sends out 
the message that long-term caring family relationships do not 
matter as much as same-sex relationships, irrespective of their 
duration. Ministers have argued that same-sex couples in long- 
term relationships ... were 
discriminated against in law and 
suffered serious hardship. However, the cases ... applying to 
same-sex couples also apply for the most part to family 
members who live together. Their position in terms of 
inheritance tax, joint assessment for income-related benefit 
and tenancy succession rights is essentially the same as for 
single-sex couples. The Bill provides legal remedy for same-sex 
couples, but not family members. A son caring for his widowed 
father who has Alzheimer's disease has to pay tax on his 
inheritance, despite the fact that he has given up his job to 
care for his father and could well be regarded as unemployable 
as a result. That could mean being forced to sell the family 
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house to pay the tax. Most of us will know of family members 
who share a house on a long-term basis - sons or daughters 
who live with their elderly parents, providing care and 
companionship; sisters who move in together after they are 
widowed and live out their old age together; nieces and 
nephews who give up well paid jobs to move in with aunts or 
uncles, to nurse them in long-term illnesses; and so on (HL, 24 
June 2004, col. 1364, Italics added). 
(Extract 2) 
Lord St John of Fawsley. I know of a case in your Lordships' 
House, for example, involving siblings. For many years a Peer 
had lived happily with his brother and sister, but on the death 
of his brother, he and his sister were obliged to sell the family 
home, which they did not want to do, and move into other 
accommodation which was not as satisfactory. This is a 
problem that should concern us and be seen as such (HL, 24 
June 2004, col. 1373, Italics added). 
(Extract 3) 
Lord Kilcolooney- I recently received a letter from a 
constituent in Killyleagh in County Down. That lady looked 
after a handicapped child for 14 years. She then went back to 
work. She then had to look after her mother for another 16 
years. She then reached pension age and, instead of receiving a 
pension of 977.45 a week, she was reduced to 961.47 per week 
because she had failed to apply for attendance allowance while 
she cared for her handicapped child. She did so at her own 
time and expense; she applied for no grants or allowances. She 
was then discriminated against when she reached pension age 
(HL, 24 June 2004, col. 1377-8). 
(Extract 4) 
Mr. Leigh- I have one [letter] here. The original was sent by a 
lady whose name and address I shall not reveal to the House, 
as she is an elderly spinster who wants to remain anonymous. 
The letter states: 'I live with my single brother and have done 
so since my mother died in ... 1983. He had lived with her all his life. I retired from (work) to look after her as she was 85 
and had cancer. She died within .... months of my leaving. 
Stephen - that is [my] brother - really needed me to run the 
home ... when my mother 
died I felt I should continue to live 
with him. I am now 79 and (Stephen) is 75'. That is a real case 
involving real people suffering real injustice [... ] 'Stephen'and 
the elderly spinster will not be able to pass their advantage 
down the generations, so inheritance tax will be paid pretty 
soon for that 75-year-old man and 79-year-old woman (HC. 9 
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November 2004, col. 728-729). 
The first extract of Example B comes from a speech made by 
the Conservative peer Baroness O'Cathain. In proposing an 
amendment to the Civil Partnership Bill on 24 June 2004 
(Amendment No. 3), she argued that the Bill, unless it was extended 
to include birth family members who had have lived together as 
adults on a long-term basis, was discriminatory: for 'family 
members', unlike same-sex couples, would be denied access to 
various tax-related advantages and benefits hitherto enjoyed only by 
married couples. The second and the third extracts are from the 
same parliamentary debate: they are stories that were told shortly 
after Baroness O'Cathain moved Amendment No. 3. The fourth is an 
extract from the House of Commons debate held on the same subject 
on 9 November 2004. 
Here, I am not going to analyse in detail the content of stories 
of this kind told during the debates on the Civil Partnership Bill - 
this subject will be fully discussed in Chapter 7 (See Section 7.6). In 
terms of our discussion of the practice of joint-storytelling in 
parliament, my point of interest is rather the importance of narrative 
repetition for what Antaki and Leudar call 'claim backing' (Antaki 
Leudar, 1990). To back a claim', Antaki and Leudar argue, is to 
show how what one has said is tenable', which, in turn, usually 
means to show how what one has said is 'true' or 'true as described' 
(Antalk-i & Leudar, 1990: 280). And Example B shows how this 
practice of 'backing up'is achieved in the political discourse through 
narrative repetition. 
Stories (extract 2,3,4) presented in Example B tell of events 
which are independently witnessed by each storyteller. Yet, what 
brings these seemingly separate stories together is their shared 
plot - the plot that is, in effect, introduced by Baroness O'Cathain 
when she says: '[M]ost of us will know of family members'who, 'by 
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sharing a house on a long-term basis', are 'discriminated against in 
law'. Here, Baroness O'Cathain invites others to collaborate in 
(factual) consensus building, and her invitation is followed by a 
series of stories that repetitively and cumulatively add evidence, 
reinforcing Baroness O'Cathain's argumentative position. 
I discussed examples where stories, thrown into the 
adversarial, argumentative context, display a distinctive feature such 
as narrative repetition. Indeed, as narrative repetition is so common 
in political storytelling in the parliament, and being worked up to 
have its own important political effect, I paid particular attention to 
this group of repeated stories for my analysis. Repeated events or 
descriptions recounted by multiple tellers in the parliament invite 
counter-factual joint-storytelling and constitute an identifiable 
argumentative theme (or terrain). The kinds of stories I selectively 
re/present in this thesis are all part of a multiplicity of repeated 
stories I identified, and involve, therefore, multiple tellers. In other 
words, a story re/presented in this thesis is not a story, but a part of 
(repeated) stories told during the debates concerned. 
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Chapter 5 
Stories of Sexual Strangers 
1 The context of Silence 
The use of personal stories around same-sex experience in 
political debate is a recent phenomenon. During the 1950s and 
1960s when the Sexual Offences Act was debated in Britain,, 
personal stories of homosexual experience seldom appeared in 
parliamentary debate. Then homosexual acts between men were still 
a criminal offence; homosexual acts between women were regarded 
as almost non-existent. It was simply unlikely that homosexuals, 
during this period, could have their stories to tell (let alone their 
stories being heard and considered). Either they were not allowed to 
speak of their experience, or they (formally) did not exist. 
Silenced stories of (male) homosexual experience, if not told, 
were sold, however". What Moran calls 'sale of silence'was 
18. The 'homosexual/ ity' is subsequently referred to in this chapter as the 
male homosexual/ity. See Section 5.7 of this chapter for the discussion of 
lesbian/ism absently presented during the debates on the Sexual Offences 
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frequently practised in the form of blackmailing homosexuals in 
which the blackmailers 'would offer to remain silent upon payment 
of money' (Moran 1996: 52). According to the Wolfenden Committee 
reports, there were 71 cases of blackmail reported to the police in 
England and Wales in the years 1950 to 1953', of which 32 were 
connected to homosexual offences (Wolfenden Report, para. 110). 
Perhaps more problematically, Lord Jowett states that nearly 95 per 
cent of the blackmail cases that he, as Attorney General, had to deal 
with during the 1950s were buggery-related cases (HL, vol. 187, 
1953-4, col. 745). The extent of such blackmail was, then, generally 
seen as being closely linked to the state of the law that criminalised 
adult homosexual acts during this period. The Lord Archbishop of 
York, in a debate on homosexual offences in the House of Lords, for 
example, suggests that: 'the present law has positive evil effects in 
the particular opportunities for blackmail'- the opportunities to use 
silence for the purpose of obtaining money (HL, 12 May 1965, col. 
122). Mr. Abse, in his introduction to the legislation to decriminalise 
adult homosexual acts in the House of Commons in 1962, also tells 
us the following story: 
[T]his week I received a communication from a university 
lecturer who is doing sociological work. As seems to be the 
wont of so many who are doing this sort of work, he was 
cultivating local cafe society, in making a sociological study of 
cafe-delinquency. This study seems to have been fashionable 
recently. He found there a young man who had not done a 
stroke of work for seven years since leaving school, apart from 
a few months as a builders' labourer, but who was possessed of 
an expensive car in which, the investigator found, he was 
taking suitable good-looking young people to the West End 
with the specific object of ensnaring homosexual victims. 
Together with this group of apprentice blackmailers, this 
contemporary Fagin had lived for some years on the 
proceedings of his lamentable activities. Fortunately, the 
information supplied by the lecturer to the police led to the 
Act. 
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main blaclkmailer being imprisoned (HC, 9 March 1962, col. 
846) 
The story draws attention to the ways in which the commercial 
blackmail of homosexuals, the sale of silence, easily generates 
significant as well as regular income for blackmailers. While the 
main goal of the story is to provide the evidence of the prevalence of 
blackmailers who are specialised in extorting money from potential 
homosexuality-related victims, we also find that the story features a 
somewhat typical resolution of a crime story: an action taken 
directly against blackmailers (villains) by the lecturer (the 
protagonist) is successfully followed by the imprisonment of the 
main blackmailer. Some untold complications to this story, however, 
need to be mentioned, which the following example will illustrate: 
A., aged 49, met B., aged 35, in a cinema. Afterwards they went 
to A's flat and committed buggery. For a period of about seven 
years B. visited A's flat regularly, and the men committed 
buggery together on each occasion. B. then commenced to 
demand money from A., from whom, in the course of about 
three months, he obtained some iM. A finally complained to 
the police. The facts were reported to the Director of Public 
Prosecutionsl who advised that no action should be taken 
against B. for demanding money by menaces, but that both 
men should be charged with buggery. Both men were 
thereupon charged with two offences of buggery committed 
with each other, and, after pleading guilty, were sentenced to 
nine month's imprisonment. Neither man had any previous 
convictions, nor were any other offences taken into 
consideration (Wolfenden 1957: 40, para. 112). 
The above case, extracted from police reports and presented in 
the Wolfenden report exemplifies the extent to which the detention of 
blackmailers was, for many buggery-related blackmail victims, not 
the end of the problem, but often only the beginning. Given that 
'buggery'was criminalised, the police, rather than protecting the 
blackmail victim, frequently re-appropriated 'the blackmailer's 
accusation into their own', thereby maldng 'the blackmail victim a 
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victim twice over: once as the victim of blackmail and once as the 
victim of the law' (Moran 1996: 54). Often the police themselves, by 
(acting as decoys or agents provocateurs' used blackmail as a means 
to entrap male homosexuals (HL, 23 May 1966, col. 1192). Plain 
clothed 'pretty policemen', loitering in public lavatories and preying 
upon homosexuals, were one of the well known policing techniques 
used to entrap homosexuals during this period (see Bartlett, 1998: 
109). Successful entrapment, then, often ended up with a mass of 
prosecutions: those who were engaged in the crime, such as 
buggery, were being blackmailed by the police into naming other 
homosexuals with whom they were acquainted, and the series of 
accusations continued until no related, responsible party could be 
found (see HL, 12 May 1965, col. 77). 
The close relationship found between the law and blackmail 
that criminalised and commercialised homosexual practices shows a 
particular way in which the expression of lived (male) homosexual 
experience was silenced during this period. Not only must one's 
homosexual experience, defined and instituted as 'buggery' or 'gross 
indecency', be closeted in order to avoid the law's punishment, but 
also its closeted silence, being potentially sellable and therefore 
punishable, should remain unspoken and unstoried. This, however, 
did not mean that silence, constituted through legitimate and 
commercial use of the law that criminalised homosexual practices, 
imposed absolute limits on 'storyingthe homosexual and 
homosexuality during this period. Rather, it imposed limits on who 
could tell stories of the homosexual/ homosexuality and how, 
thereby producing a particular politics of its representation. In what 
follows, I address the effects of silence of the homosexual/ 
homosexuality during this period in more detail, paying particular 
attention to the ways in which stories of the homosexual/ 
homosexuality are made to appear in the representational political 
practices of post-war Britain. 
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5.2 The Context of Uncertainty 
The silenced body, the homosexual, did not posses the capacity 
to speak of itself: its experience of homosexuality, which was 
criminalised and sellable, could not (and should not) be claimed as 
oneys own 'real' experience. But, if homosexual experience was a 
taboo in the sense that it could not be claimed by someone as his/ 
her own ýreal' experience during this period, homosexuality, as the 
subject of knowledge, was not. Defined as a medical condition or a 
symptom of social deviance, the subject, homosexuality, was largely 
debated in parliament using terms and knowledge borrowed from a 
body of professions, who, as psychiatrists, doctors, judges, 
academics, politicians, or government officers, had worked on the 
problem of the homosexual/homosexuality during this period. 
In order to understand how the homosexual/ homosexuality 
was publicly spoken of and represented in parliament in such a 
silenced but, nevertheless, problematised context, it is necessary 
first to consider some of the difficulties encountered by those duly 
authorised speakers in addressing 'the truth' of homosexuality. 
Here, I am particularly interested in analysing some of the ways in 
which the practical difficulty (or even impossibility) of assuring facts 
regarding the truth/problem of the homosexual/ homosexuality 
during this period encouraged some of those speaking subjects to 
use storytelling as a tactical means to validate their political claim. 
Political storytelling, according to Iris Young, differs from other 
forms of storytelling by, first and foremost, its purpose: politicians 
tell a story not simply to reveal or share their experience with others, 
but to justify an argument they are making in an ongoing political 
discussion (Young, 2000: 72). But in what ways does storytelling 
help one to validate and justify one's political claim? Here, I shall 
attempt to answer this question by considering a specific contextual 
condition within which storytelling serves an important 
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argumentative function - the context of uncertainty. 
A particular feature of the parliamentary debates on male 
homosexuality generated and informed by the Wolfenden report is of 
interest here. The Wolfenden Committee (the Home Office 
Departmental Committee on Prostitution and Homosexuality) was 
one of the official bodies authorised to speak of homosexuality 
during this period. Appointed by the British government in 1954 to 
investigate the law relating to homosexual offences in Britain, the 
committee published its recommendations in September 1957, and 
numerous debates on male homosexuality soon followed in both 
Houses of Parliament. For those who were authorised to speak of the 
problem of homosexual /homosexuality during this period, however, 
their task to seek 'the truth' was not easy, and rather encountered a 
number of dffficulties - difficulties, in particular, in producing 'facts' 
or 'evidences' through which the homosexual/ homosexuality could 
be rationally represented. The Earl of Huntingdon, for example, 
expresses his anxiety over uncertainty that surrounds the 
discussion on homosexuality in the parliament as follows: 
My Lords, at this hour I do not intend to keep your Lordships 
long. Many speakers have exhausted the subject, which I feel is 
an extremely dffficult and complicated one; and particularly is 
it difficult to get hold of the facts. I always think that before one 
attempts to base either an argument or a judgement one 
should try to be sure of one's facts. I have talked with doctors 
who have been concerned with the treatment of homosexual 
patients, and also to psychologists who, understandably, do 
not want their names advertised, or to be quoted, and one still 
seems to be in a sort of morass when one tries to understand 
this subject. Take, for instance, the question of statistics. No 
one really knows how many male or female homosexuals there 
are (HL, 12 May 1965, col. 141). 
For those who were authorised to speak of the homosexual/ 
homosexuality, the practical impossibility of assuring facts regarding 
the homosexual/ homosexuality was a frequently acknowledged 'fact' 
(see HC, 26 Nov. 1958, col. 371). Even numbers that could 
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illuminate the extent of the 'problem' of homosexuality in Britain 
were unknown. The Wolfenden Committee carefully abstained from 
quantifying the prevalence of homosexuality or homosexual 
behaviour in Britain, and only referred to some estimated figures 
constructed abroad: Dr. Kinsey's research estimated that 4 per cent. 
of adult white males in the United States of America were exclusively 
homosexual, while 37 per cent of total male population were 
behaviourally bisexual; official statistical sources in Sweden, by 
contrast, suggested that 1 per cent of the male population could be 
estimated as homosexual, and 4 per cent. had bisexual tendencies 
(Wolfenden Report, para 38-9). Often these figures were then 
arbitrarily used by individual members engaged in the parliamentary 
debate on homosexuality in Britain to estimate the British figure of 
homosexual incidence, which, nevertheless, generated no agreement 
about the size of the 'problern'that appeared to exist (Higgins, 
1997: 19). 
The principle of discussion rhetorically embodied in parliament 
requires the speaking subject to meet certain standards of rational 
argumentation from which truth and justice are believed to emerge. 
A speaking subject, for example, must have a common interest in 
'truth' and justice' and the expression of an opinion must be 
supported by reasoned argument, presumably based on good 
evidence presented as 'facts'. The absence of enough facts upon 
which to discuss the matter of homosexuality during 1950s and 
1960s, however, meant that such norms of reasonableness were 
often challenged, and the technical avoidance of ambiguity around 
the homosexual /homosexuality was particularly dffficult. Frustrated 
with uncertainties that structured the debates on the subject of 
homosexuality in parliament, though this did not prevent him from 
defining homosexuality as an abnormality requiring treatment, Lord 
James of Rusholme, for example, states that: 
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One of the difficulties, of course, in discussing it rationally is 
that we still know so little of the causes and treatment of 
homosexuality ... We are still uncertain whether this is a 
condition which can be successfully treated in all cases or even 
in some or even in any (HL, 12 May, 1965, col. 108). 
For those who were authorised to speak publicly of the 
homosexual/ homosexuality, the problem arising from its 
unintelligibility and unpredictability, indeed, generated more 
questions than answers. Calling attention to the Wolfenden 
recommendation that homosexual behaviour between consenting 
adults in private should be removed from the sphere of criminal law, 
the Earl of Arran, for example, asks various questions that were 
frequently raised during the debates on homosexuality in 
parliament, reiterating his own answer, that is: 'no one knows'. 
Can we accept that recommendation? Is it right or is it wrong 
that grown-up men with abnormal sexual desires who indulge 
their tastes together should be regarded as criminals and sent 
to prison? Let me put these questions, and attempt to answers. 
What is homosexuality? What causes it? Answer: No one 
knows. Many have theories, but no one knows. Some people 
call it a disease; some people call it a diversion from biological 
norm, others a weakness; others, quite simply, a vice. What is 
the cure? Again, my Lords no one knows. Some even doubt 
whether a cure exists, at least in the extreme cases .... How 
many homosexuals are there in Britain? Again, no-one knows, 
but the best guess is somewhere between 500,000 and 1 
million men (HL, 12 May 1965). 
Statements such as this one illustrate the ways in which 
debates of homosexual/ homosexuality in the parliament proceeded 
within the context of uncertainty, imposing a limit on the possibility 
of its representation through the criminal law. What is of particular 
interest here is the many strategic considerations that go into their 
attempts to counter this uncertainty. On the one hand, the problem 
of 'not knowingthe homosexual/ homosexuality - which made it 
difficult to bring the homosexual bodies into the proper purview of 
the law - was, for many, the precise reason for supporting the 
-132- 
Wolfenden recommendations on homosexual law reform. It was 
largely believed that decriminalisation of adult homosexual acts in 
private would result in more homosexuals seeking help and 
treatment, enabling 'us' to find the solution for settling the problem 
of homosexuality (see, HC, 19 Dec. 1966, col. 1096; HL, 10 May 
1966, col. 637; HC, 19 Dec. 1966, col. ). As Labour Party MP, Mr. 
Eric Moonman, stated: 
From this debate and the previous one it is clear that there is a 
lack of information on the subject. Theories have been put 
forward as to whether homosexuality is a disease, a weakness 
or a vice. There is no consistent view. Similarly, we are not 
even sure of the exact figures for this country. We do not know 
how many men are afflicted in this way. In the debate in 
another place Lord Arran put the figure between 500,000 and 
one million, and other figures have been given tonight. There is 
a great uncertainty on the subject, running throughout our 
whole discussion, and that uncertainty makes it difficult to 
attempt any real understanding of a possible cure, or of a 
prevention of the problem. We are not even sure whether 
homosexuals are born or made. Lord Arran argued that they 
are born, but a distinguished doctor, Dr. West " said that this 
condition was the result of environment. It is vital to remove 
the criminal stigma if we are to obtain co-operation in research. 
It is legitimate to expect something worthwhile in terms of a 
possible cure or a prevention of the problem if we can channel 
the information - information which we do not have at the 
moment - but until we remove the criminal stigma it will not be 
possible to engage in worthwhile research (HC, 19 Dec 1966, 
col. 1126). 
On the other hand, the difficulties of representing homosexual 
bodies (the problem of unintelligibility) and of finding scientifically 
agreed way of settling the problem of homosexuality (the problem of 
unpredictability) have another important significance. The context of 
uncertainty associated with the law that silenced homosexuality 
provided a condition whereby storytelling, as a political practice, 
permeated and ordered the representation of the homosexual/ 
homosexuality during this period, producing particular visions of the 
truth and certainty regarding its e. Nistence and effects. In the 
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following section, the analysis will focus in more detail upon the way 
in which the practices Of Political storytelling in parliament during 
1950s and 1960s both bring that context of uncertainty/ silence into 
play, and, at the same time, challenge it, maintaining authority over 
the representation of the homosexual/homosexuality. 
5.3 Stories of ForeiTn Homosexuals 
Often the justification of one's political claims require one to be 
able to demonstrate and explain foreseeable effects of the particular 
legislative change or policy-making that one supports or opposes. 
And it is precisely here, as Epstein et al argue, that we find political 
argument that takes a narrative form such as 'if A, then B, where B 
is a host of hopes or horrors' gaining important currency in the 
political debates (Epstein, Johnson, & Steinberg, 2000: 9). Political 
storytelling in which the consequences of a particular legislative 
decision are narrativized has an important argumentative function. 
As a form of discourse that configures and organises events in a 
temporal/causal sequence, story provides a chronological and 
causal explanation of how a particular legislative decision is 
expected to turn out in the future, thereby enabling one to display 
reasoning for or against particular political decisions. Such a 
function of political storytelling is particularly pertinent to an 
argumentative schema that situates itself and is situated within the 
context of uncertainty/ silence. Here, storytelling, as I shall show 
below, both serves as a means of making sense of 'the unintelligible' 
and renders its effects predictable. 
To illustrate the matter under discussion, let us start with 
some examples of 'homosexual' stories told during the parliamentary 
debates on homosexual law reform in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Consider, for example, the following story told by MP. William 
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Shepherd (Conservative) during the second reading debate on the 
Sexual Offences Bill in 1966. In offering his reason for opposing the 
Bill that, if passed, would decriminalise homosexual activities 
between two adults in private, Mr. Shepherd tells us his own 
personal experience of encountering homosexuals abroad: 
I like to see an occasional British victory and so I follow British 
grand prix motor racing, and for this purpose I went last year 
to Amsterdam. On the night before the race, with an architect 
friend of mine I went to a club in the centre of Amsterdam. 
Amsterdam is cited to the House as being one of those places 
where, as a result of a more generous and liberal outlook, there 
is a new and entirely acceptable pattern. In the club we were 
shown to a table where two people were already sitting. One 
was a rather odd looking man, but the other was even odder 
because he looked like a retired professional heavy-weight but 
he had on women's clothes, with plenty of furs and rings and 
powder, and he spoke in a terribly heavy voice. The show 
consisted, of course, of men impersonating women. It is an odd 
thing that homosexuals are supposed to dislike women yet they 
prefer entertainment where there is this impersonation. It 
always seems remarkable to me. When a new customer came 
in and sat a table or so away, he had with him a very young 
boy. I assure the House that when the young boy came in and 
sat down with the older man, the whole of the attention of 
audience in my immediate vicinity was deflected from the stage 
to assess the merits of the young boy. This is what happens in 
that enlightened city of Amsterdam and I say to the House right 
away that I do not want to see that sort of thing happening in 
this country (HC 11 February 1966, vol. 724. col. 818). 
When personal stories of homosexuality, in the context of their 
silence, entered political debate, they often entered not as the 
personal stories of those who lived same-sex experience, but as 
stories of heterosexual MPs who accidentally encountered those who 
practiced homosexuality, and pictured the homosexual through their 
heterosexual lens. Mr. Shepherd's story is one such example. 
For Mr. Shepherd, encountering homosexuals was a purely 
'accidental' experience; he went to Holland only to see a British 
victory in grand prix motor racing, but accidentally encountered 
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sexual strangers who inhabit this foreign land. Such a way of telling 
a personal story, whereby the narratorial voice seeks to attain a 
clear distance from the event it experiences needs some comment. 
From a point of silence, telling personal stories of 
encountering/ knowing the homosexual/homosexuality involves, 
even for those who are in a position of authority, the danger 
associated with transgressing the boundaries of the (normalised) 
sexual order - the order that 'average', 'normal', and 'decent' people 
seldom experience crossing (HL, 10 May 1966, col. 633). As a 
response to such a danger, Mr. Shepherd, in breaking the silence 
regarding the homosexual /homosexuality, creates a clear distance 
between himself and the homosexual Other: his 'accidental' 
experience taken place in a 'mundane"ordinary' situation proves 
that his involvement in the problematic situation is nothing but a 
result of his 'average', 'normal', 'decent' masculine activity, serving 
as a demarcating identifier between himself and the problematic 
homosexual Other (see Dijk, 1987: 69). 
From a point of uncertainty, Mr. Shepherd, through the 
distance he creates between the self and the homosexual Other, 
attains a degree of objectivity in the story he tells. His covert 
presence and non-involvement in the event produces a narratorial 
voice that is observant, investigative, and informative. Each sentence 
of his story seems to merely describe what is going on, presenting 
'facts' about the homosexualised male body and its surface 
movement - its 'gestures', 'utterances', Interactions, and 'social 
space' (Moran, 1996: 136). In this way, his story, like the police 
practice of covert surveillance that effectively produces homosexuals 
in the context of their invisibility, builds a type of subject who 
performs homosexual acts. 
(1) Here, homosexuality appears to mean, first and foremost, 
the role-playing (impersonation) that involves a violation of the 
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natural gender/ sexual code, which is strictly associated with one's 
biological sex. This mysterious man with a ridiculously odd 
appearance and manner - e. g., the way he dresses, wears 
accessories and speaks - is anything but natural: he, like the man 
who plays a role of a woman in the show, is a performer with the 
visible, but nevertheless superficial, appearance of a woman. (2) 
Surrounding this odd man who impersonates a woman is the equally 
odd presence of those homosexuals who are fascinated by this queer 
performance of male homosexuality. Homosexuals, to Mr. 
Shepherd's examining gaze, now appear to be ultimately 
meaningless and absurd. They simply do not make sense: 
homosexuals are 'supposed to dislike women', and yet they express 
their bizarre interests in superficial/ unnatural women as their 
sexual objects. (3) Yet, within their seemingly meaningless and 
unreasonable display of homosexual bodies, there, Mr. Shepherd 
finds, the sign of their moral wickedness. They are malign sexual 
others, containing within themselves a monstrous element, which, to 
his horror, is evidently shown by their mischievous bodily signs and 
gestures towards a young pretty boy. 
The story ends by dramatising the option faced by Mr. 
Shepherd. Confronting the moral terror of sexual strangers, Mr 
Shepherd portrays those homosexuals he encountered as exotic 
'others', and wishes keep them at a permanent physical, spatial, and 
psychological distance from the Self, defined as British. After all, 
these sexual strangers remain foreign strangers, and here, in 
Britain, he does not yet see such strangers in sight. Or more 
correctly, he does not 'want to see that sort of thing happening in 
this country, expressing his wish not to recognise or acknowledge 
the sexual stranger before him as Self-as-Other. For many, however, 
the fact that homosexuals are 'foreign' sexual strangers does not 
neutralise their fear of homosexual others: they may well, by made 
being seen or heard, spill over the boundary that demarcates the 
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native and the foreign and become a threat to the natural national 
SelL As Dance, the Conservative MP, tells the story: 
Here is an example, of which I know, which happened some 
years ago in the South of France, with disastrous effect on the 
lives of two young men. There were two old homosexuals living 
in the South of France, in oriental magnificence in a beautiful 
villa. For several years, although they were a bit of a joke, they 
caused no particular harm. Then they began to get tired of one 
another, and they sought for someone younger, more juvenile 
and fresh. As a result, they imported two unfortunate youths 
down to the South of France from London. These two youths 
led a life ... to which they were entirely unaccustomed, a life of 
great luxury the like of which they had never been seen before. 
Time went on and, just as the two old "queers" had got bored 
with each other, they got bored with the two youths whom they 
had imported. So the youths had to go ... What was the result? I know., because the case has been followed through, that they 
returned to London, to a drab life which they just could not 
tolerate because of the extravagance of the life which they had 
led the previous year, and so they became male prostitutes. 
From that they became drug addicts (HC 23 June 1967, 
2188-2189). 
Dance's story illustrates the disastrous consequences for those 
British youths who, as a result of coming into contact with 'foreign' 
homosexuals and having a relationship with them as a result, were 
afflicted with the serious moral and psychological damage. Similar to 
Shepherd's story, Dance's narrative links homosexuality to notions 
of 'externality': the homosexual represents a threatening outsider, an 
alien power, that, through the acts of seduction, can effectively turn 
insiders into 'strangers-to-ourselves'(Kristeva, 1991). Once again, 
homosexuality is portrayed as the antithesis of Britishness -a threat 
to the national We' defined against the foreign 'Other'. 
Here, homosexuality is primarily seen as a matter of personal/ 
social interaction that involves the acts of 'seducing' and 'being 
seduced'. In spite of the radical externality of sexual strangeness, the 
story, therefore, invokes two things: fear and guilt. On the one hand, 
the story invokes fear around the capacity of the foreign homosexual 
- 138 - 
body, which, with its overwhelming force of seduction, can 
contaminate the British body politic (Phelan, 2001: 4). 'Foreign' 
homosexuals who are somewhere out there, simply following their 
strange nature and keeping it to themselves, cause 'no particular 
harm'. What really frightens 'us' is that they, through acts of 
seduction, are able to transgress what Rorty calls the 'natural cutý- a 
cut that naturally demarcates between us and them (Rorty, 1989: 
192). The fear of foreign homosexuals is then reinforced by our own 
sense of inner weakness and guilt that the story exposes, which is 
contemporaneous with the acts of seduction itself. That is to say, 
there are those among 'us'Who, by being morally weak and lacking 
self-control, may positively respond to the external force of 
seduction, thereby being subjected to homosexuality. 
This one story, therefore, actually tells us two different stories 
of male homosexuals: the story of foreign homosexuals on the one 
hand, and British homosexuals (who are not homosexuals) on the 
other. The story splits the figure of foreign homosexuals into two: 
those who are ridiculous in their own alien home., but cause no 
particular harm to 'us'; and those who are threatening corr-upters 
who, like evil aliens, can invade our society to destroy us. The story, 
by contrast, portrays British homosexuals as largely victims, who 
suffer from the tragic effects of their contacts with 'evil' foreign 
homosexuals. Telling about two 'unfortunate' British youths who are 
Imported' and 'led' a Iffe which they did not expect to have., the story 
describes their homosexual experience as something passively 
endured rather than actively pursued. We can, at most, blame them 
for their inaction against evil -a sign of their moral defect or a lack 
that amounts to their physical and mental contamination and 
addiction - which led to 'their ultimate downfall' (HL 10 May 1966, 
col. 63 1). Nevertheless, they are not fully responsible for their 
downfall. Rather homosexuality is something that can unfortunately 
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befall some of 'us'- heterosexual 'us'. 19 
What representative work do the stories of foreign homosexuals 
perform for the problem of British homosexuals being in question in 
the parliament here? The stories of foreign homosexuals are 
figuratively performative in the sense of Butler's notion of 
performativity: by what it 'appears' to represent, it constitutes 'as an 
effect' the very boundaries among sexual aliens and sexual citizens 
within the British nation (Butler, 1991: 24). In other words, the story 
performs a symbolic /regulative work in imagining/ defining the 
'moral'boundary between those whom we can cast as sexual aliens 
and those whom we can accept as members of the British 
community - the distinction that I shall discuss in more detail in the 
next section. 
19. Stories of the fall of the individual body were often told in relation to 
stories of the fall of the civility of national body. Stories go back as far as 
the myth of the decline and the fall of the Roman Empire. For many, the 
danger of homosexuality to the national body, similar to its danger to the 
individual body, lies in its awesome power of seductiveness. For example, 
the Romans, it was argued, were increasingly seduced to prefer unnatural 
homosexual acts to the procreative heterosexual intercourse, which 
directly contributed to the society's collapse. Lord Saltoun struck a 
typically apocalyptic note on this score when he told the following story in 
the parliament: The Roman Empire ... has fallen because Roman families 
ceased to produce children. At the end of the Republic it was a problem, 
and it went on in the Empire. The only people who had children were 
slaves: so much so that later on one man of no particular parts, who 
happened to be the only man that they could find of the Julian family, 
was made Emperor simply because he was a Julian. That fact shows that 
the Roman Empire fell because it ceased to produce Romans. I think it 
ceased to produce Romans, as anyone who has read Horace or Juvenal 
will know, because it ceased to be interested in the production of Romans' 
(HL, 10 May 1966, col. 625). This story, which was told during the debates 
on the Sexual Offences Act, was a familiar one. More than a century 
earlier, Edward Gibbon, in his History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman 
Empire, put a similar spin on the story of the Roman Emperors. According 
to Gibbon, homosexuality was so common in Rome that it was integrated 
wholly into the life of Roman Emperors: 'of the first fifteen emperors' 
Gibbon argues, 'Claudius was the only one whose taste in love was 
entirely correct, ' that is being heterosexual (Gibbon, 2004: 12 1). 
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5.4 The Paradox of Etil 
Here, I begin with a 'moral'fact which, unlike scientific facts, 
was not questioned, challenged or contested during the debates on 
the Sexual Offences Act: that is, a homosexual act is an evil act that 
brings in 'a radical reversal of the "natural" relationship' (Zizek, 
Wright, &. Wright, 1999: 273). The Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, 
for example, argues that: 'I believe that homosexual acts are always 
wrong in the sense that they use in a wrong way human organs for 
which the right use is intercourse between men and women within 
marriage' (12 May 1965, col. 80). The 'evil'of the homosexual act is 
so self-evident in the fact that it is 'a perversion of a natural 
function', that we require no further proof or knowledge to validate 
our revulsion against it. As Sir C. Osborne comments: 'I know 
nothing or very little about what is called buggery, but from what I 
do know about it, I hate it and I dislike it' (HC, 11 Feb 1966, vol. 
726, col. 829). 
Yet, from Dance's story that tells two different stories of male 
homosexuality, one finds a familiar western narrative that is 
concerned with the ýparadox' of evil. According to Ricoeur, the 
history of western thought has incorporated two heterogeneous 
notions of evil: evil as suffering on the one hand, and evil as 
wrongdoing on the other; or to put it another way, evil that 'befalls 
us' versus evil that we actively commit and are, therefore, 
responsible for (Ricoeur, 1985: 636). While the former, Ricoeur 
argues, belongs to the category of lament, the latter is the subject of 
blame and is what makes us'culprits'. As Ricoeur puts it: 
There is blame where a human action held to be a violation of 
the prevailing code of conduct is declared guilty and worthy of 
being punished. There is lament where some suffering is 
undergone. We do not make it happen, it befalls us. Being an 
effect, it may be related to a variety of causes - the adversity of 
physical nature, illness, the loved ones, the perspective of our 
own mortality, aff-ronts to our dignity, and so on. Lament, 
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therefore occurs as the opposite of blame; whereas blame make 
culprits of us, lament reveals us as victims (Ricoeur 1985: 
636). 
In spite of this stark moral dualism of lament/blame, Ricoeur, 
however, notes that these two categories of evil are, as a matter of 
fact, deeply 'intertwined' (Ricoeur 1985: 636). Their point of 
intersection can be found in the fact that we, as Kearney argues, 
'can feel guilty for committing an evil act while simultaneously 
experiencing seduction, or invasion, by an overwhelming force 
outside of us' (Kearney, 2000: 107). In other words, there is a 
strange element of passivity in evildoing, which, Ricoeur argues, 
'makes us feel ourselves to be victims in the very act that makes us 
guilty' (Ricoeur 1985: 636-7). Indeed, we find in the debates on the 
Sexual Offences Act, where the homosexual/homosexuality was 
frequently referred to as 'evil', a number of stories that plot 
'passivity'into the experience of homosexuality, blurring the 
boundaries between lament/victim and blame/culprit. The stories 
that follow further reveal this boundary-blurring. 
5.5 Tragedy: HomosexuallHeterosexual Victims 
On close scrutiny, one can find two different ways in which 
passivity in relation to homosexual experience is emplotted in the 
stories told during the debates on the Sexual Offences Act. On the 
one pole, we find stories of 'heterosexual' victims who are being 
'picked up'and seduced by evill homosexuals. On the other, there 
are stories of 'homosexual' victims who are being 'cursed' by evill 
homosexuality. The story I am considering first is a case of the latter 
case. It is told by MP. Montgomery Hyde (Belfast, North) during the 
first Commons debate on the Wolfenden Repot in 1958. 
This is a man who was a consenting adult. He was convicted 
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some years ago on the evidence of his accomplice for an act 
committed in private and he received and underwent a 
sentence of imprisonment. On his release from prison he got a 
job as a clerk in a solicitor's office. He held that job for two or 
three years and then someone wrote to his employers, sending 
a cutting of the trial at which he was convicted, and the result 
was that he lost his job. This is what he wrote to me: 'I don't 
wish to pretend I'm good - but I am like many of the 
homosexuals, cursed with the thing from the beginning. God in 
heaven only knows the fights I have put up against it - and I'm 
sure I'm one of many - and have lost each time. It seems so 
utterly ridiculous for two men, who wish to live together in 
their own home, to be classed as criminals and 'sex maniacs'. I 
know men and women who have committed far, far worse acts 
than homosexuals look upon us as worse than if we were 
murderers. I do so want to try and make you people look upon 
this coming debate with kindness and sympathetic 
consideration and think There but for the grace of God go 1'. It 
is all right for people to condemn us so much, but they have no 
idea of the life of fear and dread we live all the time, in case our 
friends find out or we are caught. I know I did, and I know the 
hell I lived in when the police came to me, and I'm still living in 
hell now! You seem to be 'cut offfrom everything, and can get 
no employment. Just because I was cursed with the 
homosexual trait, I was no more able to get rid of it than a man 
could get rid of cancer. It's in you from birth -I feel sure of 
that. I have studied so many cases and men I have met. When 
you understand you feel terribly sorry' (HC, 26 Nov 1958, col. 
394). 
Let us consider a particular way in which homosexual suffering 
is emplotted in this story. The story emplots; the source of 
homosexual suffering as 'being cursed', found to be present in an 
almost incomprehensible and inescapable twist of fate: from the 
story of the person who was 'cursed'with homosexuality 'from the 
beginning', and has 'lost each time'his fights against the enigma of 
homosexuality, we are left with the feeling that the problem of evil/ 
homosexuality is not located in one's bad will, but in the violence of 
nature, which is beyond our control. And in this regard, the story 
reveals one distinctive aspect of the experience of homosexuality - 
the experience of utter passivity. 
His sheer passivity in the face of 'being cursed' reveals the most 
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terrifýing problem raised by evil/homosexuality, namely, the 
introduction of ambiguity into the principle of responsibility. He does 
not 'pretend' to be 'good', and yet he rejects being classed as a 
criminal (a subject of blame): It seems to be utterly ridiculous for 
two men, who wish to live together in their own home, to be classed 
as criminals'. He says he is condemnable, yet he demands that we 
acknowledge his homosexual experience -'the life of fear and 
dread'- as suffering. The point of intersection between blame and 
lament within the evil/ homosexuality here invites us to question the 
simple principle of responsibility - the principle based on the notion 
that 'to the doer belong his deeds' (Harris, 1881: 222). For if evil/ 
homosexuality 'is something we as humans do, it is also done to us: 
something we inherit, something already there' (Kearney 2000: 108). 
The paradox of evil/homosexuality, the story tells us, is: if he 
bears the guilt for being a fallen man, he, as a cursed 'Victim' (and 
whose condition of existence, like those with cancer, is not yet 
curable in the present state of medical knowledge), does not bear the 
responsibility for his congenital fault. In other words, the story, by 
shifting the blame and responsibility away from the condition of 
being 'cursed', attempts to locate homosexuality 'beyond the realm of 
culpability' (Whisman, 1996: 15). 
Yet, as I argue below, the passivity in relation to homosexuality 
can be emplotted in a number of different ways, so as to endow it 
with different meanings and to bring about different legal 
consequences. Speaý: ing from clinical experience, Dr. Benett, for 
example, tells a story about those 'picked-up'homosexuals for whom 
homosexuality is bound to remain curable: 
[In] my attempts at practice in aid of the courts I have seen a 
fairly a number of homosexuals and I have been struck by the 
proportion of them who were adolescents who had been picked 
up. They were late developers, slow in maturing, uncertain of 
their sexual direction and they had been pushed into that 
direction. I found that it was remarkably easy to cure these 
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people with the aid of hormone treatment which has been 
already mentioned today. By reducing sexual tension of the 
individual, provided he is under suitable treatment, this 
treatment can so suppress it that a reorientation of ideas has 
time to take place so that when sexual desires are allowed on 
the cessation of treatment they take a more natural form. I am 
happy to say that if patients are suitably selected it seems that 
there is a good prospect of curing these men. That shows that 
we cannot regard homosexuals as hard and fast incurables nor 
as hereditary, congenital or even environmentally produced 
people who must have a separate way of life (HC, 26 Nov 1958, 
col. 448). 
This story, as is the case with Dance's story, locates the 
problem of passivity regarding homosexual experience in the sphere 
of intersubjective human relationships within which homosexual 
suffering takes place: by telling of those adolescents who have been 
'picked up' and 'pushed' into the condition of homosexuality by other 
homosexuals, the story places the blame for their suffering not on 
the violence of nature, but on the homosexual Other. And it is at this 
point we find the passivity, which leads to the paradox of evil/ 
homosexuality, becomes the source of complaint against evil/ 
homosexuals who commit a terror of homosexual 'defilement'. 
According to Ricoeur, complaints of 'defilement' come with 'the 
demand for just punishment' (Ricoeur, 1967: 42). Here, just 
punishment in relation to homosexual defilement calls for two 
things: the recognition of the homosexual Other as guilty on the one 
hand, and the 'restoring the wronged body'to the state of normality 
on the other (Ricoeur, 1967: 29; Simms, 2003: 22). Those who are 
being approached and corrupted by the homosexual Other, in 
particular, have responsibilities to 'reorient' their sexual desire 
through seeking treatment. After all, for these passive homosexuals, 
who 'actively' participate in the process of decontamination and 
renormalisation, the treatment, Dr. Benett says, is 'remarkably 
easy'. 
From these two stories, we find that the paradox of evil does 
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not result in the collapse of narrative coherency regarding evil/ 
homosexuality. Quite the opposite. The power of these stories lies in 
their moral force, which, through the rhetorical effect of the paradox 
of evil/ homosexuality, creates new sets of oppositions within evil/ 
homosexuality, reordering (rather than deconstructing) the dualism 
between the subject of lament and that of blame. Hence we can 
imagine, in the story of a cursed, self-contained, suffering 
homosexual, its ontological and behavioral opposite, a pleasure 
seeking and flaunting homosexual monster. In Dr. Benett's story of 
the 'picked up' (heterosexual) homosexual, we find its relational 
opposite, the corrupting and cursing homosexual Other. Here, in 
their different ways, stories of passive homosexuals/ heterosexuals, 
who create the paradox of evil/ homosexuality, resolves the paradox 
by reconstructing and reconstituting the subject of blame - that is, 
the homosexual Other who is cursing, flaunting, contagious, 
seductive and corrupting. 
What this brief analysis of stories told during the Sexual 
Offences Act debates reveals is a particular effect that storytelling 
produces in parliament -the ýmorahzing effect' (White, 1980). In what 
follows, I briefly discuss how these stories, which, in their different 
ways, work to construct the subject of 'moral'blame intersect with a 
'penal'view of homosexuality offered by the Wolfenden Report. We 
find in the Wolfenden recommendations, which ultimately led to the 
passage of the Sexual Offences Act in 1967, the language of evil/ sin 
permeating through its practical reasoning on the problem of the 
homosexual/ homosexuality. After all, the strength of the Wolfenden 
Report does not lie in the 'scientific facts'it discovered or 
represented regarding the homosexual/ homosexuality - an 
impossible task to accomplish in the context of uncertainty - but in 
finding 'moral facts'that provide a foundation for the il/legality of 
the homosexual/homosexuality. As the Lord Archbishop of 
Canterbury clearly states: 
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I would uphold the belief that just as fornication is always 
wrong so homosexual acts are always wrong. At the same time, 
wrong acts in this case as in others can have various degrees of 
culpability attached to them. In this case, there are not only 
degrees of culpability but also varieties of causes of the trouble 
and categories of the trouble, psychological and sociological. 
[ ... I It is the strength of the Wolfenden Report, I believe, that it 
emphasises the variety of states and causes, and refuses to 
label them all with a single clinical formula ... There is a region 
where moral responsibility must certainly enter into the matter 
(HL 12 May 1965). 
5.6 The Stog of (Heterosexual) Vicfim-Cifi. Zen 
A modern discursive response to the question of evil/ 
homosexuality eradicates (or, at least, attempts to eradicate) the 
problematic ambivalence (paradox) arising from its boundary- 
crossing between nativeness/ foreignness, passivity/ activity, 
lamentation/ blame, and victimness/criminality. And here I discuss 
ways in which the Wolfenden Report, by making a clear distinction 
within evil/ homosexuality between private-sin and public-evil 
attempts to eliminate the very conditions upon which the problem 
arises. 
Dance's story, which positions (foreign) homosexuals as the 
personification of both being safe and dangerous (to us) - perhaps 
they are undecidedly both - discloses the problem of uncertainty 
that surrounds homosexuals' unsettling foreignness (to us). At the 
same time, the story reveals conditions in which such a problem of 
uncertainty arises: it arises not from the existence of (foreign) 
homosexuals per se, but from the non-existence of policed borders 
that could effectively separate sexual aliens from us. Indeed, this 
lack of control over sexual borders, as I shall briefly show below, was 
the main concern of the Wolfenden committee, which, with the 
distinctions it made between the privately closeted and publicly 
flaunting homosexual on the one hand, and between the seductive 
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homosexual and the seduced heterosexual on the other, attempted 
to introduce a machinery of policing into British sexual politics. 
In the Wolfenden Report, we find interesting ways in which 
policing techniques in relation to homosexual behaviours were 
organised, producing multiple homosexual bodies differently 
articulated in the law. Here, two strategies pursued by the 
Committee can be identified. The first followed the representation of 
male homosexual bodies divided into two types: privately closeted 
versus publicly flaunting homosexual bodies. The second strategy 
was to link the publicly flaunting homosexual body to the identity of 
homosexual seducer and to find its other half in the identity of 
heterosexual victim. While the figure of privately closeted 
homosexuals found in the first strategic division helps the 
Wolfenden Committee to construct the figure of the homosexual 
seducer, it is the latter figure that is used as a device to mark 
opposingly what 'we' are not. 
A particular way in which male homosexual acts are linked to 
the notion of criminal offence is of some interest here. Homosexual 
offences, in the Wolfenden Report, are defined as acts that involve 
homosexual seduction - homosexual acts that entail either a direct 
'exploitation and corruption of others' or a display of homosexual 
affection in a space 'where members of the public may be likely to 
see and be offended by it' (Wolfenden Report, para. 13,64). By 
exploiting, corrupting and offending, the homosexual seducer is the 
figure of a criminal offender: he, through the active acts of 
seduction, produces victims - seduced or offended male -heterosexual 
victims. 
To be seduced means to exist in relation to (as much as in 
opposition to) the seducer. In the Wolfenden Report, the victim and 
criminal, seduced and seducer, are unveiled as mutually dependent 
and exclusive. Defined as mutually dependent, the seduced victims 
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experience homosexuality only through the homosexual criminal- 
other. Defined as mutually exclusive, the seducer cannot be, at the 
same time, the seduced. Thus, the Wolfenden Committee, for 
example, rejects the possibility that homosexual seducers could be 
once victims themselves - the possibility that the victimness of the 
seduced becomes indistinguishable from its otherness: the 
criminality of the seducer. The Committee states: "We have, it is 
true, found that men charged with homosexual offences frequently 
plead that they were seduced in their youth, but we think that this 
plea is a rationalisation or an excuse, and that the offender was 
predisposed to homosexual behaviour before the 'seduction'took 
place" (Wolfenden Report, para. 99). At the same time, the 
Wolfenden Committee offers the following intriguing remarks on the 
implications of homosexual seduction on seduced young men. The 
passage in question reads: 
One consequence of homosexual behaviour with young persons 
can .... be serious and detrimental. Even where no resistance is 
offered or no physical harm ensues, there may be considerable 
damage to the moral and emotional development of the victim. 
For example, a boy or youth who is induced by means of gifts, 
whether in money or in kind, to participate in homosexual 
behaviour, may come to regard such behaviour as a source of 
easy money or as a means of enjoying material comforts or 
other pleasures beyond those which he could expect by decent 
behaviour, and we have encountered cases where this has 
happened. Indeed, it is our opinion that this sort of corruption 
is a more likely consequence than the possible conversion of 
the victim to a condition of homosexuality (Wolfenden Report, 
para. 97). 
By telling of the possible cause and the effect of homosexual 
seduction on its victim, the Wolfenden Committee here explicates 
the conditions in which a person can be identified as a victim. He is 
a victim if he was a heterosexual, and is not a homosexual. Not only 
are the homosexual offender (the seducer) and the victim (the 
seduced) declared as mutually exclusive, we also find that this 
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binary opposition works to define the state of being a victim as 
mutually exclusive from the state of being a homosexual. The victims 
of homosexual crime, in other words, are those who are seduced to 
homosexuality not because of their condition of homosexuality, but 
because of a variety of other human conditions (for example, the 
infirmities of young age, economic dependence and so on) that could 
affect heterosexual-us. And it is this 'us, the vulnerable non- 
homosexual victims defined as the public, whom, the Committee 
claims, the British law should be concerned to protect. As the 
Wolfenden Report puts it: 
[The] function of the criminal law... as we see it, is to preserve 
public order and decency, to protect the citizen from what is 
offensive or injurious, and to provide sufficient safeguards 
against exploitation and corruption of others, particularly those 
who are specially vulnerable because they are young, weak in 
body or mind, inexperienced, or in a state of special physical, 
official or economic dependence (Wolfenden Report, para. 13). 
In finding the victim whose principle cause of suffering and 
corruption is the violence done to its body and mind by other 
seductive homosexuals, the Wolfenden Report reveals a structure of 
crime implicated in homosexual acts whereby a homosexual act 
committed by 'them' finds its other half in the homosexual acts 
suffered by 'us' (see Ricoeur, 636). At the same time, by finding 
reasons for being seduced homosexuals not in our innate 
homosexuality but in other human conditions that could affect 'us', 
the Wolfenden Report posits the problem of victims as the problem of 
the community -a community that is founded upon a shared risk of 
victimisation. 
LinIdng the notion of crime-victimisation to that of citizenship, 
Allison Young argues that being a victim of a crime is being a citizen 
(Young, 1996a: 55). According to Young, crime provides a sense of 
belonging to the social body, which comes 'not from the fact that we 
are all criminals, but rather from the shared fact of victimization' 
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(ibid. ). In other words, crime-victimization, when posited as our 
communal injury, constitutes the sense of 'we'- 'we, brought 
together through shared risk and trauma of the crime. 
Not only does crime-victimisation, represented along the axis of 
sameness, bring 'us'together, it, Young argues, also assigns duties 
and responsibilities to 'us': if any of us could be a victim of a crime, 
then 'everyone has a part to play in the struggle against crime' 
(Young 1996: 56). In other words, everyone has a citizenry duty to 
resist the alienation of victimisation: to move from a position of 
passivity to an active agency striving for a self-recovery. As Young 
writes: 
Passivity, for the victim, is initially unavoidable in that crime... 
happens to the individual, with all the force and randomness of 
circumstance. Agency can be regained, however, if the 
individual rejects such passivity and takes up a role in the 
prevention of crime. In this way, citizenship is acquired. As an 
active social agent ... the citizen must participate 
in his de- 
victimization (Young 1996: 56). 
Being an outlaw, however, the drama of 'his' de-victimisation 
turned instead to anguish and disheartenment. In pointing how an 
immanent threat of criminalisation dashes victims'hope of 
normalization, Lord Bishop of Southwark, for example, tells the 
following long story: 
As a parish priest for many years, I have been compelled to 
recognise that the existing law is unhelpful and defeats its own 
ends. The pastor has always to try to help people in all sorts of 
conditions - the sad, the bereaved, the depressives, the 
alcoholics, those who cannot face life, those who have lost their 
way, and of course the people who have got themselves into 
sexual difficulty, and among them homosexuals, men and 
women. As I have listened to their problems I have tried to help 
them, as any pastor does, to come to grips with life and to 
adjust themselves to society. In the case of women 
homosexuals, Lesbians, we have been able to talk to one 
another without the threat of the law hanging over us. With 
male homosexuals it has been different. In the first place, they 
have often been hesitant in coming forward, because they have 
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been afraid to disclose themselves, not quite sure what the 
reaction would be. Secondly, they have wondered what would 
happen if I was called upon to give evidence against them; and, 
in passing, I would say that this has only once happened to 
me, and I refused, of course, and would refuse in all 
circumstances. Even so I think it is most unfortunate that any 
attempt should ever be made to get a priest to break confidence 
on matters like this, when a homosexual comes to him with 
some great problem and wants the priest to help him face life. 
Thirdly, they worry because they inevitably wonder whether a 
careless word from myself or from somebody who may have 
seen them coming to my house might provide a clue, quite 
unintentionally, which could land them into difficulties with 
the police. In other words, the situation which confronts a 
pastor when dealing with male homosexuals - not female - is 
just about as difficult as it could be. He wants to help. He 
wants the man to face his problem reasonably and 
constructively. He wants to give him the confidence to 
contribute usefully to society: but the atmosphere is vitiated by 
a sense of fear. 
Let me give two examples very shortly. The first, a very few 
years ago, was of a student, aged 19, when I was vicar of the 
University Church at Cambridge. He had a homosexual 
experience, I think probably only one, and regretted it. He came 
to see me. I was satisfied it was a passing phase, just part of 
the business of growing up, and I was certain he would 
overcome it and shortly find a girl and eventually get married. 
Unfortunately, just when everything seemed settled the police 
got to hear of his adventure. And this boy, who really was a 
brilliant physicist and perhaps could have done much for our 
country, committed suicide. The second was of a middle-aged 
man who had had homosexual experiences twenty years 
before. He had, I know, overcome his weaknesses and was 
doing most valuable social work on a housing estate. Alas! An 
unscrupulous blackmailer learned of his past and threatened 
to report him to the police. On the table of the room in which 
he gassed himself he left a note to the effect that, although he 
had done nothing in recent years of which he was ashamed or 
which could get him into trouble, he just could not face 
another inquisition. 
These two examples from one's pastoral experience - and I 
could give several more - will explain why a pastor must want 
the law to be changed. No matter how distasteful sexual 
irregularities may be, the person concerned, if he is to alter his 
ways, needs what? - compassion, understanding and help. A 
priest, as you would expect, has to deal with every sort of 
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domestic sorrow, failure and sin - fornication, adultery, 
sadism, Lesbianism, broken homes, homosexuality. His task is 
made more dffficult and sometimes impossible if he has to 
work under the shadow of the criminal law (HL, 12 May 1965, 
col. 153-155, Italics added). 
Here, the Lord Bishop of Southwark tells the story of two male 
heterosexuals who, by being caught up in a regrettable past which 
has no future, commit suicide. It is clear from the story that their 
longing for acceptance and inclusion was bound to fail. Their quest 
for de-victimisation, in the face of an immanent and constant threat 
of criminalisation, was an impossibility. In the eyes of the e. Ndsting 
law, homosexual acts, regardless of the contexts in which they 
occur, are all criminal acts, and those who actively pursue or are 
passively seduced to homosexuality are all simply the same - 
homosexual criminals. 
Being fallen into 'the they - criminals' by the law that is 
concerned only with the presence of the their 'past', they are unable 
to be/act, and find that the only resolution possible is their death by 
suicide -a complete loss of their ýpresent/ future' selves. Hence, we 
hear the story of this boy who would 'shortly find a girl and 
eventually get married', and 'could have done much for our country' 
found himself in a permanent homosexual trial of guilt and 
punishment -a trial that ultimately led him to commit suicide. The 
'married'middle-aged man who overcame his *eakness'and became 
an otherwise law-abiding citizen, realised his unrealisable dream of 
acceptance. He could never overcome his weakness. 
The priest, an agent of conversion who constantly seeks to 
restore and normalise the wronged (heterosexual) bodies that fall 
prey to (homosexual) corruption, felt equally powerless before the 
force of the law. The law that fails to differentiate the subject of 
lament'from the subject of 'blame'hinders his ability to function as 
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the community's normalising/ disciplinary agent. And his failure 
symbolises the failure of the law. Too preyed upon by unclassiflable 
and undefinable powers of sexual strangeness to be able to act, the 
law fails to reach its own positive objective: 'designing-engineering- 
gardening'a homogeneous national body (Bauman, 1991: 69). It fails 
to turn natives-turned-strangers to natives again, and to motivate 
'us'to join in a collective fight against evil/othemess. Unable to act, 
the existing law, as Lord Bishop of Southwark states, 'defeats its 
own aims': instead of designing and gardening, it paralyses the 
national body, making double-victims of us all. 
Here, the story that features the failed relationship between the 
priest (the agency for moral regulation) and his wronged, suffering 
hetero-homosexual sons, is, therefore, the story that tells of the 
failed relation between the state (the public agency of legal 
regulation) and its victimised-citizens. The priest's project of 
normalising, in order to be successful, must be coextensive with 
changing forms of the relationship between the state and its 
vulnerable citizens. In order words, it demands the state to re- 
articulate a role in its relationship to victimised/victimisable 
citizens, which is not dissimilar to the protective legal stance taken 
by the Wolfenden Report. 
Two things should be noted here. On the one hand, the 
connection between the overall intent of this story and the idea of 
collective 'risk-sharing, which according to Giddens, lies behind the 
welfare thinking of the post-war British 'social' citizenship, is clear 
(Giddens, 1994b). Crucial to the development of the post-war British 
welfare state, Giddens argues, is a view of victim as citizen, and the 
recognition of the collective responsibility for the increased range of 
risks (including threats to body) to which citizens are exposed and 
by which they are victimized. Here, risk, being approached as a 
shared human condition rather than as fate, was something that 
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needed to be collectively dealt with and fought by members of 
society. It also demanded a role for the state in meeting risks 
encountered by victimised/victimisable citizens, by fostering 
institutional forms of prevention against risk-victimisation (Edwards, 
&. Glover, 2001). 
On the other hand, we are mindful here that the notion of 
victim as citizen operates as the boundary marker of inclusion and 
exclusion. It separates the risk-victims as citizens from the risk- 
producers as others/ criminals. It sets the conditions upon which 
victims' inclusion is based: they are charged with the moral 
responsibilities and obligations of becoming active citizens; of 
participating in the process of their de-victimisation, and of engaging 
in the collective fight against harmful risk. 
Indeed, the protective legal stance presented by the Wolfenden 
Report made this boundary of victim-citizenship coded in its moral/ 
legal principle clear. It, as Hall argues, 'identiflies] and separate[s] 
more sharply two areas of legal and moral practice - those of sin and 
crime, of immorality and illegality' (Hall, 1980: 11). By creating an 
opposition between these two areas, it 'clearly staked out a new 
relation between the two modes of moral regulation - the modalities 
of legal compulsion and of self-regulation'(HaR, 1980: 11-12; see 
also Weeks, 1986: 102-3) 
At the heart of this distinction lies., as I discussed earlier, the 
binary opposition drawn between passive victims (who are seduced 
to homosexuality) and un-deserving active criminals (who publicly 
flaunt homosexuality): the former is defined as the object of moral 
regulation, while the latter is seen as that of legal regulation. And it 
is at this point that we find that the story told by the Lord Bishop of 
Southwark adds an important dimension to these two modalities of 
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regulation presented by the Wolfenden Report. 
Here, his project of normalising is not represented as an 
opposing force to the regulative practice in a legal form. After all, his 
moralising project, the story suggests, is selectively aimed at those 
who are suffering or have suffered (heterosexual) victims (those who 
are, at the same time, striving for assimilation and normalisation), 
and its success, therefore, ultimately depends on a tightened form of 
legal/public control and penalty imposed against exploitive and 
corruptive homosexuals. In other words, the story is telling us that 
what Hall calls a 'double taxonomy'- that is, the legal compulsion 
and the self-regulation - is not, in effect, articulating contradictory 
forces, but is articulated in what Foucault calls 'a single strategy'; 
that is, 'a strategy for the rearrangement of power to punish, 
according to modalities that render it more regular, more effective, 
more constant and more detailed in its effect' (Foucault, 1978: 80 
cited in Hall., 1980: 14, italics added). As MP Norman St. John- 
Stevas, in the Commons debate held in 19 December 1966, also 
acknowledges: 
There are strong arguments in favour of the Bill [Sexual 
Offences Bill] on the ground that in fact it would promote 
public morality ... By condemning and punishing effectively, as 
the Bill does, the corruption of minors, the exploitation of the 
weak, and those who abuse their positions of trust, far from 
weakening public morality, the Bill would strengthen it. There 
are those who oppose this change in the law because they fear 
that it would give approval to homosexuality. We have heard 
that argument from my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford 
North. But, of course, it does nothing of the kind... If the Bill 
were passed, homosexuality would remain unlawful, although 
not criminal. The Bill would create no recognized status of 
homosexuality. It would remain contrary to public policy. 
Homosexual relations would give rise to rights nor to duties (HC, 
19 Dec 1966, col. 1120-21, Italics are added). 
As stated by John-Stevas, the Sexual Offences Act, which 
narrowly decriminalised consenting adult homosexual acts in private 
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in 1968 did not create 'the recognized status of homosexuality'. For 
example, ruling against a magazine called IT (International Times) 
for publishing homosexual contact ads in 1972, the Lords decision 
made it very clear that '[tlhe 1967 Act merely exempted from 
criminal penalties but did not make it [homosexuality] legal in the 
full sense' (Weeks 1981: 274-5). What was recognized instead was: 
(1) the status of (male) homosexuality as immoral, which, in turn, 
enabled a tighter form of legal regulation of homosexuals; and (2) an 
ambiguous citizenship status for heterosexual-victim citizens - 
ambiguous in the sense that their citizenship status is conditioned 
upon their becoming de-victimised/de-victimisable heterosexual 
citizens. In the next chapter where I analyse stories told during the 
debates on Section 28 of the Local Government Act, I discuss how 
this view of the 'victim as citizen'became prominent again in a 
changed British political context in the 1980s. But before I move on 
to this topic, I discuss untold stories of lesbian/ism, which were 
silenced/ represented in different ways from the stories of (male) 
homosexuality during this period. 
5.7 The Absent Presence of Lesbianl ism 
Why is the so-called 'the vice between women'- lesbianism - 
not framed in terms of a political discourse of illegality? Why did 
lesbianism, unlike (male) homosexuality, not emerge as a question of 
crime and punishment? Surely, there were a few occasions on which 
the question of the criminalisation of 'acts of gross indecency 
between women' surfaced in the British parliament (Faraday, 1988: 
12-3). Yet, female homosexual acts have constantly escaped 
criminalisation by British law (see Waites, 2002: 326-7) But why? 
Lesbianism was rarely discussed during the debates on the 
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Sexual Offences Act. But, when it was discussed, it was with regard 
to this question, 'why not lesbianism? ', the word, lesbianism', was 
spoken of in relation to 'homosexuality', and entered the debates 
during the 1950s and 1960s. In questioning the law's underlying 
logic' or 'ethic' by which male homosexual/ity is marked as the 
object of criminalisation but lesbianism is not, MP. Douglas Jay 
(Labour), for example, asks: 
If anyone really seriously contends that private acts of this kind 
[homosexual acts] between consenting adults in private do 
harm to society .... how can one possibly argue that these acts do so while .... lesbianism do not? Surely there cannot be any logic or any ethic in that distinction (FIC 29 June 1960, col. 
1489). 
Jay's seemingly 'logical' question presupposes his belief that 
the law needs to be amended to give a parity of treatment to male 
and female homosexual acts. While the question was not subject to 
extended discussion during the debate, the problem of the law's 
illogicality was, nevertheless, acknowledged by MP. Roy Jenkins 
(Labour). In providing his own answer to Jay's question, Jenkins 
argues: 
The difficulty, as I understand it, and a certain genuine 
difficulty which arises in the minds of some hon. members is 
that we wish that the Labouchere amendment was not there. 
Of course, it creates an illogical position between 
homosexuality and Lesbianism. We wish that it was not there, 
but it is there and there is a difficulty about removing it lest it 
be thought that in doing so this House was proclaiming that 
homosexuality is a good thing (HC, 29 June 1960, col. 1508). '0 
20. The Labourchere Amendment was introduced by Henry Labouchere 
and was inserted into the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1885 as 
Section 11. The Act reads: 'Any male person who, in public or private, 
commits, or is a party to the commission of, or procures, or attempts to 
procure the commission by any male person of, any act of gross indecency 
shall be guilty of misdemeanour, and being convicted shall be liable at the 
discretion of the Court to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two 
years, with or without hard labour. 'The law, which made nearly all male 
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His response at best opens up rather than answers to the 
question, however. At best, it calls attention to the fact that the 
representation of male homosexual acts through the practices of the 
criminal law is, as Moran points out, 'neither necessary nor 
inevitable, but more a contingent and idiosyncratic practice' (Moran, 
1996: 13). However, the illogic unfolding here is not, I argue, simply 
the states of contingency and idiosyncracy. Another important 
legislative event, which took place in 192 1, makes clear that this 
what Jenkins calls Illogical position between male homosexuality 
and lesbianism'is actively sought and promoted in Britain rather 
than a result of a mere contingency. 
During the report stage of the Criminal law Amendment Bill in 
192 1, a Scottish Tory MP, Frederick Macquisten, introduced a new 
clause into the Criminal Law Amendment Bill which states that: 'Any 
act of gross indecency between female persons shall be a 
misdemeanour and punishable in the same manner as any such act 
committed by male persons under-the Criminal Law Amendment 
Act, 1885' (HC, 4 Augst 192 1, col. 1799). While the supporters of the 
clause argued that it would equalise treatment of male and female 
homosexuals, the clause was, nevertheless, rejected on the grounds 
that it would only serve to spread lesbianism by publicly 
acknowledging and advertising it. For example, Lieutenant Moore- 
Brabazon suggests that: 
There are only three ways of dealing with perverts. The first is 
the death sentence. That has been tried in old times, and, 
though drastic, it does do what is required - that is, stamp 
them out. The second is to look upon them frankly as lunatics, 
and lock them up for the rest of their lives. This is a very 
satisfactory way also. It gets rid of them. The third way is to 
leave them entirely alone, not notice them, not advertise them. 
homosexual acts illegal under the term, 'acts of gross indecency', 
remained unaltered until 1967. 
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That is the method that has been adopted in England for many 
hundred years, and I believe that it is the best method now, 
because these cases are self-exterminating ...... and 
consequently they do not spread or do very much harm to 
society at large. There is this last reason why I would urge the 
House to leave this question alone and drop this Clause. To 
adopt a Clause of this kind would do harm by introducing into 
the minds of perfectly innocent people the most revolting 
thoughts and because of that I ask the introducers of this 
Clause to withdraw it (HC, 4 August 192 1, col. 1805-6). 21 
Here, it is important to note a way in which silence was 
distinctively imposed on 'lesbianism'. In the case of (male) 
homosexuality, silence was imposed as a form of oppression during 
this period, which, as Butler similarly finds in the context of U. S. 
politics, worked through 'acts of overt prohibition' (Butler, 1991: 20). 
Yet, if (male) homosexuality was overtly marked as an 'objects of 
prohibition'and silenced by the law, the lesbian/ism was 'not even 
produced .... as a prohibited object'; lesbians were '(un)subjects'of 
silence, who were to be 'neither named nor prohibited within the 
economy of the law' (Butler 1991: 20) . 
2' Butler writes: 
2 1. The Earl of Desart, in the House of Lords debate, expresses a similar 
concern with regard to the Clause. According to Desart, the Clause, if 
enacted, would bring the most 'appalling' consequences, because: 
It would be made public to thousands of people that there was this 
offence; that there was such a horror. It would be widely read .... I am 
sure that a prosecution would really be a very great public danger. 
Is there any necessity for it? How many people does one suppose 
really are so vile, so unbalanced, so neurotic, so decadent as to this? 
You may say there are a number of them, but it would be, at most, 
an extremely small minority, and you are going to ten the whole 
world that there is such an offence, to bring it to the notice of 
women who have never heard of it, never thought of it, never 
dreamed of it (HL, 15 August 192 1, col. 573). 
22. It is also on this point that Rosi Braidotti, in her critique of Trevor 
Hope's essay, Melancholic modernity, points out an asymmetry between male 
homosexuality and lesbianism: 
I do not think the position of the lesbian and the gay man are .... in 
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Lesbianism is not explicitly prohibited in Part because it has 
not even made its way into the thinkable, the imaginable, the 
grid of cultural intelligibility that regulates the real and the 
nameable. How, then, to 'be' a lesbian in a political context in 
which the lesbian does not exist? That is, in a political 
discourse that wages its violence against lesbianism in part by 
excluding lesbianism from discourse itsen. (Butler 1991: 20). 
Yet, lesbianism, framed as being unheard, un-thought and 
undreamed, is an effect of particular discourse - the discourse that 
marks lesbianism' as 'self-exterminating'. Precisely because, 
Lieutenant Moore-Brabazon argues, it does not 'spread' as it is self- 
contained, it does not pose any danger to society. Or, to put it 
another way, it was precisely this way of thinking of and imagining 
lesbianism' (the way the lesbian/ism is), which promoted 
unthinkability and unimaginability of lesbianism (the way the 
lesbian/ism should be). Contrary to what Butler observes, I am, 
therefore, interested in this particular 'grid of cultural intelligibility' 
that regulates the unreal and the unnameable. 
The discourse that marks lesbianism as 'self-exterminating'is 
closely linked to the discourse of 'natural' sexual difference. 
Consider, for example, the following extract of a conversation 
between two Labour MPs during the debates on the Sexual Offences 
Act: 
Mr. Fred Bellenger: I believe that humanity would eventually 
revert to an animal existence if this cult [homosexuality] were 
so allowed to spread that, as in ancient Greece, it overwhelmed 
any way symmetrical, though they both may be equally involved in 
and committed to the task of redesigning sexuality. The 
invisibility 
of the lesbian as other of the other is of a different conceptual and 
qualitative order .... Whereas the gay man needs 
to deconstruct a 
representation of the homosexual as the phobic other, the 
lesbian 
must move, symbolically, from unreresentability 
into some sort of 
representation. The problems may appear analogous, 
but they are 
quite different (Braidotti, 1994: 203). 
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the community at large. 
Mr. WiHiam WeIlls: Does my right hon. Friend think that there 
is any difference in the respect between male and female 
homosexuality? If he thinks there is no difference, why is there 
difference in the law? 
Mr. Fred BeHenger: I will leave that to my hon. and learned 
Friend to explain. I know something about homosexuality, 
having served with the Army in two world wars, but I know 
nothing orpractically nothing-about lesbianism. My hon. and 
learned Friend can enlighten the House on that (HC, 26 Nov. 
1958, col. 417-418, italics added). 
If Bellenger, in (not)answering to Wells'question, tells the 
unthinkability and unimaginability of lesbianism - he says he knows 
'nothing or practically nothing .... about lesbianism'- Mr. Thomas 
Iremonger (Conservative), in another debate on the Sexual Offences 
Act, provides a 'sociological' answer to the question of why nobody 
knows or hears of the 'problem'with regard to lesbianism. 
There is ... a certain sociological logic in taking a different view of lesbianism. I would be prepared to accept the argument that 
the personality and nature of women are distinguishable from 
personality and nature of men - because of the strength of 
their sexual initiatives and drives - and that the effect in 
society of lesbian women is not so potent as that of homosexual 
men. Nobody knows or hears of women being corrupted on a 
large scale by lesbian women, where as I do not think that even 
the most doughty champion of the Bill would deny that many 
male homosexuals are of the proselytizing type (HC, 19 
December 1966, col. 1104-5). 
In his discovery of a socio-biological logic, which bounds 
'natural passivitywith women/femininity on the one hand, and 
erotic/ sexual agency with man/masculinity on the other, we find 
that lesbian'appears as un-subject of (homo) sexuality. Here, 
lesbianism appears, as Jagose argues, to fall 'outside sexuality's 
visual field', because her womannness/femininity, defined as 
natural passivity, 'cannot register, except as a negativity, within a 
model of desire imagined always as phallocentric' Pagose, 2002: 2). 
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In these 'phallocentric models of sexuality' Packson, 1995: 19), a 
lesbian's gendered specificity is set against her sexual specificity: 
Bellenger's socio-biological logic, in other words, is precisely the logic 
that works to erase lesbian sexuality. 
In this erasure of lesbian sexuality, which lies at the heart of 
the presence of lesbianism, we find that her 'legality' is parado. Ndcally 
ensured by her 'legal invisibility'. Another insight into the way this 
absent presence of lesbianism is expressed in the political discourse 
is to be found in the following two statements made by MP. 
Shepherd. In debates which took place on two different occasions (in 
1958 and 1966), Shepherd made sense of 'lesbianism' by way of its 
comparison with '(male) homosexuality' and argued: 
(Extract 1) 
Mr. Shepherd: Most homosexual associations are 
promiscuous. If I may add a word of explanation for the benefit 
of the hon. Member, that is one of the reasons why I would deal 
with lesbianism on a different basis... 
Mr. Ronald Bell: They are both homosexual. 
Mr. Shepherd: My hon. Friend says they are both homosexual, 
but it has been the custom to talk of the male association as 
homosexual and of the female as lesbian; and I think this 
makes for clarity. One of the dangers in homosexuality for a 
man is in his old age. It is true that one can survive with it 
when one is younger, but the constant search for new contacts 
is degrading and many men who start on this path of 
homosexuality end in their later years hanging about public 
lavatories, where they are apprehended by the police. If a man 
can be diverted from homosexual practices he - and there is a 
very wide field for diversion - will become a better and happier 
citizen (HC, 26 November 1958, col. 428). 
(Extract 2) 
I want now to turn to a second point and deal for a moment 
with lesbianism because many hon. members ask why there 
should be a law against male homosexual conduct and not 
against such conduct between females. There are very valid 
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reasons why that should be so. Nearly all the objections which 
I think that I can rightly bring against homosexual conduct, 
which I will deal with in a moment, are not applicable to 
lesbianism. Lesbians do not cause physical damage by their 
acts. They are not proselytisers as homosexuals are and, on the 
whole, they find it agreeable and acceptable to live together for 
long periods of time. I am not defending lesbianism, but I think 
that it is at any rate open to far less social ob ection than is j 
homosexuality (11 Feb, 1966, col. 816). 
Shepherd's statement is of particular interest, as lesbianism is 
made sense of through its non-proximity to 'homosexuality'. In fact, 
the positioning of lesbianism within Shepherd's argument is 
structured by reference to a series of binary oppositions that 
separate the lesbian/ism from the homosexual/ity: the private as 
opposed to the public, harmless versus dangerous, being closeted in 
contradiction to proselytising, and sexually passive rather than 
active. And it is by way of this comparison, Shepherd makes sense of 
homosexuality: homosexuality as criminality is what lesbianism is 
not. 
Such a way in which lesbian/ism is invoked in the debates on 
the Sexual Offences Act indicates that something more than 
'unthinkability' and 'unintelligibility' of the lesbian/ism was at hand. 
Let us bring this point into sharper focus. 
In a similar vein to Butler's reasoning, Moran (1996) argues 
that the discursive inclusion of the (male)homosexual body into the 
system of criminal law as against the law has had a significant 
political implication: by framing the (male) homosexual/ity as an 
'object of the law', it has played an important role in imagining and 
politicising the male (homosexual) body'as a subject in law with a 
capacity to act in law' (Moran, 1996: 13). By contrast, the discursive 
force in which lesbian/ism appears as un-object of law produces a 
condition in which the lesbian disappears as a subject in law. As 
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Moran argues: 
[TIhe homosexual as an embodied object of law is implicated in 
the production of the homosexual as an embodied subject of 
law. As an embodied subject of law it has been possible to 
resort to 'homosexual' in order to claim rights, to demand the 
recognition and enforcement of duties, to seek the recognition 
and respect of interests. Thus homosexual and gay rights are 
not only remote from but also have a certain proximity to those 
criminal practices through which this male body of law has 
been so obsessively produced. The silence and indifference of 
the criminal law to genital relations between women have 
produced a certain invisibility and thereby made it more 
difficult to achieve a presentation in law of the embodied 
genital female as an autonomous subject with a capacity to act 
in law. Thereby the recognition of legal subjectivity in general 
and the representation of their rights, interests and duties in 
particular has been made more problematic (Moran, 1996: 
13-4). 
True, lesbian/ism, as Moran argues, was, first and foremost, 
imagined by the law as the object of 'silence and indifference'. But 
more is at stake in this discursive silencing: it was presented as 
absence; its absence was spoken in order to be unspoken; and 
indifference paid to lesbianism in law produced its very difference 
from homosexuality. 
Here, neither present nor absent, lesbian/ism does not belong 
to the domain of ontology - something that simply to be or not-to-be. 
Rather, its rhetorical absence 'haunts' its presence (or its rhetorical 
presence 'haunts' its absence), producing a ghostly effect, which 
belongs to the dimension of what Derrida calls, 'performative 
interpretation'; that is, 'of an interpretation that transforms the very 
thing it interprets' (Derrida, 1994: 5 1). In this 'performative form of 
the call' (1994: 103), lesbian/ism, imagined and thought of as 'self- 
exterminating', explains what lesbian/ism is (or should be) - that is, 
of being unimaginable and unthinkable. Its unintelligibility, the effects 
of the 'the grid of cultural intelligibility' through which the passivity 
that claims to characterise female sexuality is naturalised, explains 
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why lesbian/ism is (to be) passive, de-sexualised, privatised, and 
closeted. And its (enforced) invisibility, framed in opposition to the 
problematic visibility linked to homosexuality is what, paradoxically, 
guarantees its invisibility (non-criminality) in law. 
Here, if, as Jagose argues, there has been a 'persistent 
configuration of the lesbian as an epistemological opacity'Pagose, 
2002), this epistemological opacity performatively constitutes the 
lesbian/ism as a figure -a figure that is marked by the logic of 
natural gender difference, and at the same time marks the boundary 
between the legal and illegal expression of homosexuality. What is at 
stake here is a double 'interpellation' (or performative interpellation): 
interpellated as a passive gendered subject, 'she'is interpellated as 
(and, at the same time, interpellating) a closeted/ private/ harmless/ 
docile homosexual subject (see Althusser, 1979). 
Both interpellations are important in understanding ways in 
which stories of 'gays and lesbians' have subsequently entered the 
public discourse in Britain. 
On the one hand, we find a continuing political rhetoric that 
renders lesbian sexuality invisible/ private and, therefore, non- 
threatening. On the other hand, the discourse of homosexuality that 
produced the non-criminal and criminal homosexual bodies in the 
1960s was itself in change, contributing, in part, to the construction 
of what Smith calls, the 'good homosexual' (closeted /invisible/ 
private homosexuals) against the 'dangerous queer' (seducing and 
flaunting homosexuals) (Smith, 1994: 297). Taken together, we find 
that lesbianism, presented in the 1960s as being invisible and 
private and were, therefore, made sense of through its non-pro3dmity 
to 'homosexuality', has become increasingly understood through its 
proximity to 'good-homosexuality. Speaking of the Bill he introduced 
in the House of Lords in December 1986, which later became Section 
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28 of the Local Government Act, the Earl of Halsbury, for example, 
stated that there are two different categories of homosexuals. First, 
there are 'responsible homosexuals' who, according to the Lord 
Halsbury 'would no more molest little boys than a responsible 
heterosexual would molest little girls, or go down the streets 
soliciting strangers, or reject stabilised relationships for 
promiscuity. ' The Bill 'does not concern itself with them'. What the 
Bill was aimed at are those 'sick' homosexuals who are 
exhibitionistic, promiscuous, proselytising homosexuals, acting as 
'reservoirs of venereal diseases of all Idnds'(HL, 18 December 1986, 
col. 3 10). His division of 'good' and 'bad' homosexuals is then 
followed by a familiar rhetoric of lesbian invisibility linked to its 
legitimacy. Lesbianism, according to Halsbury, is not a problem 
because: 
They do not molest little girls. They do not indulge in 
disgusting and unnatural practices like buggery. They are not 
wildly promiscuous and do not spread venereal disease (HL, 18 
December 1986, col. 310). 
During the parliamentary debates on Section 28 in which 
legitimate and illegitimate forms of homosexuality were extensively 
discussed, it was, Smith argues, usually this 'responsible 
homosexual category'within which lesbian-ness appeared and was 
located (Smith, 1992: 207). And it is this side of respectable 
homosexuals, gender-indifferent stories of good 'gays and lesbians', 
as I shall show in Chapter 6 and 7, are increasingly told. It is to 
these stories I shall now turn. 
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Chapter 6 
The Evidence Game 
6.1 Meefig 'straqers 2xitbin' 
Those who had had early encounters with homosexuals and 
whose stories of 'encountering' were told during the debates on the 
Sexual Offences Act were those who, as psychiatrists, doctors, 
judges, academics, priests, politicians, or government officers, had to 
work on the problem of the homosexual/ity. For those ordinary/ 
normal members of the society, however, their experiences of 
encountering homosexuals were (to be) extremely rare, as Lord 
Ferrier, during the House of Lords debates on the Sexual Offences 
Bill in 1966, tells the story: 
I think it is safe to say that this particular form of 
misdemeanour seldom crosses the path of the average man. 
Ordinary, decent people are not involved in this sort of thing. I 
have an old friend who served for more than thirty years in one 
of our largest industrial undertakings. For many years he was 
in the personnel department, managing upwards of 10,000 
persons. He tells me that only once in the years when he was 
in the personnel department, and indeed, in the years he was 
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in the company, did he ever come across trouble over a 
homosexual in the employment of the undertaking. I believe 
that the incidence of homosexuality in our society has hitherto 
been greatly exaggerated (HL, 10 May 1966, col. 634). 
For ordinary/decent "us'to see and meetthem', unless 
intended, are (to be) extremely limited and unwonted. Ferrier's story 
tells us that 'they' are not within our reach, and the chances of 'us' 
having an unsolicited encounter with 'them' are, henceforth, very 
slim. What also follows from the story is the implication that if any of 
ordinary and decent 'us'encounters with homosexuals, there must 
be some good Innocent' reasons - good enough to display the fact 
that there is no reasons 'we' meet 'them'. The meeting is (to be) 
neither planned nor intended, as there is no relational connection 
between us and them that can lead to the meeting. 
I discussed a story told by MP. Shepherd in chapter 5.1 
discussed., in particular, ways in which Shepherd, in telling his own 
story about coming across foreign homosexuals in Holland, sought 
to attain a clear distance between himself and the event - the 
encounter - he experienced. He began his story by describing the 
encounter as an unexpected and unnecessary encounter; he only 
encountered homosexuals by accident on his way to follow British 
grand prix motor racing held in Amsterdam. In seeking to describe 
the homosexuals he encountered, he carefully manipulated narrative 
distance/ detachment between himself and 'them'he described: they 
were seen., while he did not want to see them; their voices were 
heard, while he was not hearing them; their fixed gaze at a young 
boy made their true selves known to him, while he did not want to 
know them. After the encounter, he regretted the meeting itself: he 
hoped he would not see them again. The event (the encounter), in 
other words, remained (or should remain) insignificant and 
inconsequential for him. 
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Shepherd's story was not a story of 'meeting', but a story of 
what Bauman calls 'mismeeting' (Bauman, 1993: 156). According to 
Bauman, mismeeting is 'not quite a meeting'in the sense that the 
narrator's 'conscious contact'with the other - or 'a conduct'that 
could be recognised by the other as a conscious contact - is 
'studiously avoided' (Bauman, 1993: 154). Here, a mismeeting, 
Bauman argues, is a technique of 'non-engagement'- a technique 
that arises out of an effort to maintain a distance/ detachment 
between the self and the other. This effort to maintain a distance, 
associated with 'aversion and antipathy' against strangers, turns 
encounters to 'events without prehistory (no one anticipates that 
strangers will be there)' as well as to events without 'a cause of 
further events' (Bauman, 1993: 156-7). Mismeeting, in other words, 
leaves the event of meeting to remain 'outside the causal chain of 
[social] events', enabling us to dissociate ourselves from the meeting 
we experience (Bauman, 1993: 156). 
Yet, I also need to point out here that Shepherd's ýmismeeting' 
is, at the same time, more than an act of technique. For Shepherd, it 
was precisely a condition of meeting. On the one hand, they were not 
whom he should meet 'then': under the circumstances where 
homosexuality was defined as criminality during 1960s, 
disengagement was the only legally permissable form of engagement 
available to him. On the other hand, they were not whom he might 
encounter 'here' in Britain: they, as foreign' homosexuals who were 
'fixed within a certain spatial circle - or within a group whose 
boundaries are analogous to spatial boundaries'were outside of his 
physical/ cognitive/ social contact or engagement (Simmel, 197 1: 
143). Shepherd's mismeeting was then a particular mode of 
'meeting'. Rather than an incidental 'mis-meeting, it has its own 
temporal and spatial dimension of 'the'meeting, legally conditioned, 
socially structured, and interactionally de/situated. 
-170- 
If the meeting with homosexuals was (to be), as Ferrier states, 
initially novel to ordinary/ decent members of 'our' society, which, in 
turn, provided the conditions for a mismeeting, stories told during 
the parliamentary debates on Section 28 of the Local Government 
Act recount the event - the meeting - differently. 
Our encountering them has now become unavoidable; for the 
settings in which our encounters take place are our familiar/local 
domains. They include our children'bedroom, home, the school, the 
library, a local conference on the family, a public meeting, and the 
street. This is the sphere of engagement in which we could not mis- 
meet them. We no longer incidentally encounter them in a 'foreign' 
land. Instead we are faced with them here and everywhere. 
Since 'they' are here and now in 'our' present field of life 
experience, the 'meeting' has not only become surprisingly real, but 
also strangely familiar. And it is from this kind of meeting with the 
homosexual, described as real and familiar, that we find 'our' 
personal stories as 'evidence' to the event of 'meeting' emerge in the 
parliament. 
In this chapter, I discuss some important ways in which stories 
of 'meeting'with homosexuals were told during the debates on 
Section 28 of the Local Government Act 1986-8. My particular focus 
of analysis is on the ways stories of 'our' personal experience 
(whether the experience of storytellers themselves or others), told in 
the form of 'true' stories of 'meeting' and presented as supporting 
evidence in the parliamentary debate, elude epistemological 
challenge in certain ways: although a story of 'our'personal 
experience told in the debate invites a 'their' counter-story that 
challenges its truth-claim, it, at the same time, successfully pre- 
empts such a challenge. But how? 
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6.2 Stories ofjenny and Section 28 
Section 28 was originally proposed by Lord Harlsbury and 
tabled as a Private Member's Bill in the House of Lords in 1986. The 
measure, which was entitled 'An act to refrain local authorities from 
promoting homosexuality, aimed at preventing local authorities and 
maintained schools from promoting homosexuality 'as a pretended 
family relationship'. Harlsbury's Bill, which was favourably passed 
the House of Lords and went to the House of Commons, 
nevertheless, fell when the 1987 general election was called. 
Following Thatcher's third re-election, however, the Bill was 
reintroduced to the House of Commons by Conservative MP David 
Wilshire and Dame Jill Knight as an amendment to the Local 
Government Bill, and passed into law on 24 May 1988. The key 
provisions of Section 28 of the Local Government Act state that: 'A 
local authority shall not (a) intentionally promote homosexuality or 
publish material with the intention of promoting homosexuality; (b) 
promote the teaching in any maintained school of the acceptability of 
homosexuality as a pretended family relationship'. 
Section 28 was introduced following a political controversy in 
which local authorities, controlled by the so-called qoony left', were 
alleged to be spending 'taxpayers money' on promoting 
homosexuality. A great deal of controversy surrounded some gay 
literature made available in school libraries, which were run by the 
Labour-controled ILEA (Inner London Education Authority). One of 
them was The Milkman's On His Way, a story about a young boy, 
Ewan, who gradually comes to terms with his homosexuality 
through his social/sexual encounters (Meredith, 1992: 72). This 
'odious'book, according to Jill Knight, who introduced Section 28 in 
1987, 'explicitly described homosexual intercourse and, indeed, 
glorified it, encouraging youngsters to believe that it was better than 
any other sexual way of life' (HL, 1 Feb 1988, col. 931; HL, 6 Dec 
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1999, col. 1102). Much attention also focused on a photostory book 
called Jenny Lives with Eric and Martin, which depicts the daily life 
of a five-year-old named Jenny, who lives with her father and his 
male partner. Described by the newspapers as a 'vile book' (the Sun, 
6 May, 1986) and a 'gay pornbook' (Today, 7 May, 1986 ), as it 
contains 'pictures of Jenny on a bed with two queers' (Sunday 
Mirror, 4 May, 1986), the book galvanised a political action, and 
directly influenced the insertion of the wording, 'pretended family 
relationship' into Section 28 (b). 
Within the debate around Section 28, such books were used as 
the basis of the furore. For our encounters with 'them'now appear to 
involve more than the 'surprise' of being faced by 'them'; they rather 
involve the fear associated with the threat of violence proximate to 
us. Here, for example, is a book that begins a story about a child 
with two gay men: 'Jenny is a little girl. Martin is Jenny's dad and 
Eric is Martin's lover. They all live happily together'. It describes the 
'relationships' among them as happy relationships found in 
'togetherness', which is familiar to those of 'our' family life. The truth 
about Jenny, however, is to be found elsewhere - from a photograph 
of a scene in which Jenny is having a breakfast in bed with 'her 
naked father on one side and his naked lover on the other' (HL, 6 
Dec 1999, col. 1103). As Mars-Jones argues, 'in spite of evidence of 
their own eyes - the yawns, the tray, the dolls, the lack of physical 
contact', this picture of breakfast in bed was seen as nothing but an 
'orgy' (Mars-Jones,: 40). This image of breakfast, described as 
'pornographic, obscene or otherwise offensive' (Today, 18 September) 
involves, in Lord Campbell's words, 'a direct attack on the 
heterosexual family life'- an attack on our 'basic unit' of belonging 
upon which 'our'moral community is built (HL, 18 December 1986, 
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col. 313). " 
When an other is perceived as threatening', Angelika Bammer 
argues, 'it is precisely.. -for the degree to which this other seems not 
just "different" but - uncannily - strangely familiar, even, one might 
say "same". The resulting dilemma is how to respond to this threat 
in a way that removes this other(ness) without undoing one's self in 
the process' (Barnmer, 1995: 47). 1 find that the question is to be 
posed the other way around, however; for the 'threat'being perceived 
by the presence of the 'familiarity' of an other, is already an effect of 
recognition of the Tamiliarity'as otherness/ difference. Or to put it 
another way, if we are being threatened by the presence of the 
familiarity of an other, it is because we already know what this 
'familiarity' of an other is: at best, it is a imitation; at worst it is a 
dangerous pretension. 
For the supporters of Section 28, the immediate political 
question to be asked was not, therefore, how to meet the 
homosexual who appeared to be 'strangely familiar' or 'same'. The 
question was rather: why do we face with this familiarity of the 
sexual other here and now? If a mis-meeting was a mode of 'meeting 
the homosexual other'within the unfamiliar in the past, this new 
mode of 'meeting the homosexual other'within the familiar in the 
23. If a little girl who lives with two gay fathers is described as 
'phonographic' and 'obscene', a child who lives with two lesbian mothers is 
seen as lacking a role model within the family. As Baroness Faithfull, Lady 
Abernethy, in the debate on the Human Fertilization and Embryology Bill 
amendment in 1990 argues: 'Children learn primarily from example, by 
copying what they see. It is by example that a boy learns how to be a 
responsible husband and father and how to treat his own children in turn. 
It is by example that a girl learns how to be a wife, from seeing how her 
mother cares for her father. So the father is enormously important, if only 
as a role model ... It 
is for [these] reasons that the Committee may consider 
that lesbian couples should not be eligible to receive AID or in vitro 
fertilization services' (HL, 6 February 1990, col. 788-9). 
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present, in other words, raises a political question that is: what 
made this new culture of encounter possible? Certainly, the very 
notion of the 'promotioW of homosexuality, which entered and 
haunted the debates on Section 28 during the late 1980s in Britain 
is partly about answering this question, which I shall discuss in 
Section 6.5. 
6.3 Stratý, r , ger-daiý,: ger 
I Confronting the 'familiarity' of an other is dangerous and 
threatening, not because 'they' are, as Bauman argues, 
'undecidables'who militate against the 'either/or', but because 
'some of us' may misrecognise 'them' as 'us'. At least, this was what 
lay behind the thinIdng of those who introduced and supported 
Section 28 (Bauman, 1991: 56). 24 
Here, the notion 'stranger danger' offers interesting insights 
2 4. Bauman's figure of 'the stranger', I find, can be differentiated into two 
distinct categories. On the one hand, Bauman argues that the stranger is 
neither Triend'(us) nor 'enemy'(them), but ýmay be both': 'we do not know, 
and have no way of knowing, which is the case'(Bauman, 1991: 55). Here, 
the danger associated with the stranger is the terror of 'indetermination' 
the stranger brings into us - that is, the horror of unknowing the stranger 
who is, in principle, the unfamiliar or undecidable. On the other hand, 
Bauman, in another passage, suggests that it is precisely in the way the 
stranger is known to us as other, but is known to refuse the distinction 
between us and them., that stranger-danger is produced. In particular, it 
is, Bauman argues, when the other'refuses to remain confined to the "far 
away" land, but 'claims a right' to be here with us as a friend (as if he / she 
is a friend), that the other becomes (or is made to become) the stranger - 
becomes the imminent threat of danger to us (59). Here, the danger 
associated with the stranger is not the horror of 'unknowing'. It is, rather, 
precisely the effect of 'knowing' the other - the other who is known to 
pretend as friends/us, thereby making us (or some of us) fail to know. 
These two different facets of the stranger, which Bauman fails to 
distinguish, is, then, closely linked to the political discourse that divides 
'us' - those of us who 'know' and those who 'do not know' (and should, 
therefore, learn to know) the stranger-danger. 
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into the nature of the threat perceived by the presence of the 
homosexual other who exhibits familiarity. According to Moran and 
Skeggs, the stranger who 'personifies danger in the phrase "stranger 
danger"'is a figure that embodies 'proximity, as well as remoteness 
(distance)': qt is not the remote dangerous other ... that the phrase 
"stranger danger" necessarily refers to, but also the one who is 
intimate (known)'(Moran, & Skeggs, 2004: 149). 
Drawing on Bauman's conception of 'the stranger', Gail Mason 
specifies what this paradox of proidmity/ remoteness of an other 
entails (Mason, 2005). The stranger, in Bauman's words, is a figure 
that is 'physically close'to us, and yet remains 'spiritually remote' 
from us: the stranger is someone who 'comes into the life-world and 
settles here', and yet is 'uninvited' (Bauman 59-60). It is when these 
uninvited, unwelcome strangers enter into our home, take their 
place, and make demand for our responsibility and respect that we 
feel threatened by them. This is, as Mason argues, because 'such 
outsiders continue to embody otherness (their difference precludes 
them from ever becoming true friends), but they are no longer at a 
sufficiently safe distance to enable a coherent separation between 
insiders and outsiders' (Mason, 2005: 589). They are known and 
recognized outsiders (rather than unknown and anonymous 
undecidables); yet they demand their rights to be here, refuse to 
acknowledge the fact that they are uninvited, compelling us to 
accept what is unacceptable, and even parody us to the extent that 
we are troubled in distinguishing insiders from outsiders. This, 
according to Mason, explains why hate associated with fear and 
danger felt for strangers is 'directed, not simply toward 
all ... outsiders, 
but disproportionately towards those who are seen to 
challenge the established order of things' (Mason, 2005: 590). 
What is of particular interest here is the way in which the 
figure, 'stranger danger', who dangerously parody us to the extent 
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that we have difficulty in differentiating 'us'from 'them', splits 'we' 
into risk-governing versus risk-explosed (vulnerable) bodies: those 
who can read wisely the signs of remoteness/ otherness in the 
apparent proximity/ sameness of an other, and those who are 
lacking in knowledge of an other, and are, therefore, incompetent in 
reading the borderlines of inside and outside. 
Children, in particular, are figured as bodies who are most 
endangered and at risk from 'the proidmity of strangers' (Ahmed, 
2000: 34). Precisely because they are lacking in knowledge of 'the 
dangers of the wider social (implicitly adult) world', they are 
innocent, and yet always being 'at risk' and potentially vulnerable 
(Jackson, Scott, & Backett-Milburn, 1998: 69 1). 2' And this is how 
the image of what Higonnet and Albinson call 'the naturally innocent 
child body - what one might term the Romantic Child'- begets our 
fear of qoss'(Higonnet & Albinson, 1997: 122). As Anne Higonnet 
argues: 
[Tjhe image of the Romantic child replaces what we have lost, 
or what we fear to lose. Every sweetly sunny, innocently cute 
Romantic child image stows away a dark side: a threat of 
loss ... defined as the opposite of adult sexuality, childhood innocence ... runs the danger of becoming alluringly opposite, 
enticingly off-limits. Innocence suggests violation (Higonnet, 
1998: 28-29,38 quoted from Moran, 2001: 75). 
Embedded in the image of the Romantic child is the fear of 
qoss'- the loss of our nation's 'future' imagined through the 
innocence and purity of our 'past', our children. The unwelcome 
entry of the stranger into our life-world, which disrupts the natural 
continuity of our past with the future, is, then, often symbolised as 
25. For studies that have analysed discourses of children as innocent 
(especially sexually innocent), see Corteen and Scaraton, 1997; Jackson, 
1982; Jackson et al., 1998; Robinson, 2002; Griffin, 1993; Frankham, 
2006. 
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the death of our children: '[tlhe image of the Romantic child', 
Higonnet wrties, is an image that is 'haunted by death' (Higonnet, 
1998: 30). 
Debates surrounding Section 28 were, indeed, 'haunted by 
[the] death' of our children, that is, the death of our nation's future 
citizens. Supporters of Section 28, for example, frequently equated 
positive images of homosexuality taught at school -'converting' 
children to homosexuality - with our death from AIDS (see Seidman, 
1988: 192). As the Conservative MP. Jill Knight states: 
[Llittle children being perverted, diverted or converted from 
normal family life to a lifestyle which is desperately dangerous 
for society and extremely dangerous for them. Any 
venereologist will say that syphilis, gonorrhoea and genital 
herpes are characteristically infections of homosexuals. If that 
were not enough, we now have the terror of AIDS. Very few 
hon. Members fail to appreciate the seriousness of the danger 
that AIDS presents to the whole of our society, yet some of that 
which is being taught to children in our schools would 
undoutedly lead to a great spread of AIDS (HC, 8 May 1987, 
col. 998). 
Yet, the death that haunted the Romantic child - the child who 
served as a powerful political icon during the Section 28 debates - 
was more than the death haunted by AIDS. It was also the death of 
dreams for the 'natural' child - the 'heterosexual' child who would 
grow naturally into adulthood, get married, and have children. 
Associating the death of the natural child with the 'the death in a 
generation', the then Minister for local Government, Rhodes Boyson, 
argues: 
The Bill opposes the positive images of lesbianism and 
homosexuality, as though they were alternative ways of life that 
should be shown to all children in schools. Those images imply 
that one can say to children that they can live in a family with 
a mother and father, but there is an alternative way of life 
which is just as reputable, in which one lives with a person of 
oneýs own sex, and the two are equal. That could undermine 
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the basis of our society. The vast majority of parents, 
irrespective of how they voted yesterday or of how they will vote 
in a general election, feel intensely about this matter. One 
could say that the positive promotion of the images of 
lesbianism and male homosexuality as though they are 
equivalent to family life could bring death in one generation. I 
am not referring to AIDS. I am talldng about death in a 
generation, because there is no future in it - it is the end of 
creation. Any society that is concerned for its future in every 
way and for its continuation must have a clear view about what 
it is doing'(HC, 8 May 1987, col. 1002-3). 
It is from this point of view that 'the figure of the child' - the 
embodiment of innocence and naturalness linked to our past and 
future - becomes, as Ahmed argues, a matter deserving our 
collective 'responsibility' (Ahmed, 2000: 35). It is our responsibility 
to protect the children; for they, being vulnerable to becoming 
victims of strangers, are in need of 'good' adult knowledge and 
protection - the knowledge embodied in the ideal figure of a parent 
(see Gittins, 1998). 
Here, the ideal parents are those who know what is in 'the best 
interests of our children'. They are, in Ahmed's words, the wise 
knowers /citizens: by being 'bound to Law and duty through the 
demands of parenthood', they embody the 'collective knowledge 
about what is, "safe, harmless, trustworthy" and what is "bad, 
dangerous, and hostile"'for our children (Ahmed, 2000: 34). Acting 
as wise arbiters of our children's access to knowledge, parents guide 
our children into developing a good sense of risk assessment; what 
they can (or cannot) eat, where they should (or should not) go, whom 
they can (or cannot) talk to or trust, and how to (or not to) encounter 
a stranger. It is, in other words, through the parent's knowledge and 
power that our innocently vulnerable (or vulnerably innocent) 
children are (to be) protected from all forms/types of the stranger- 
danger. 
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From this point of view, it is relevant here to highlight two 
different stories of our 'meeting'the homosexual/ity told by 
supporters of Section 28 in parliament: the stories of 'our' children 
who are vulnerable to encountering homosexuals on the one hand; 
and the stories of parents who, as wise knowers of the stranger- 
danger, confront homosexuals to protect our children on the other. 
Together, these stories of children and parents constitute a story of 
the (heterosexual) family being attacked, and I shall discuss this in 
more detail in the next section. 
6.4. Ston'es of 'vulnerable' Children 
How vulnerable are children to homosexuality? Here, the 
conservative MP. Greenway (Earling, North), speaking as an ex- 
teacher in the parliamentary debate on Section 28 in 1987, provided 
his answer to the question, which preoccupied many of those who 
supported Section 28. 
Mr. Greenway: 'Children are vulnerable. I taught in schools for 
23 years and saw that children are vulnerable at various ages. 
They are totally and continuously vulnerable between the ages 
of 5 and 12, and they continue to be vulnerable, sometimes to 
adulthood from the age of 13 years, as we know. It is essential 
that children are protected. I do not believe that the House 
would ever say that children should not be protected, and I 
know that Opposition Members will agree with that .... I am 
certain that all hon. Members would agree that children should 
be protected' 
Mr. Banks: From what? 
Mr. Greenway: From any insidious and dangerous influences, 
such as homosexuality (15 December 1987, col. 910). 
But what exactly does this statement, 'children are totally and 
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continuously vulnerable to homosexuality' entail? One particular 
way in which this question was framed in parliament was in terms of 
a discussion as to whether homosexuals can be made. Dame Jill 
Knight (Conservative), for example, in insisting that little children' 
can be easily 'diverted', 'perverted', and 'converted' to a homosexual 
lifestyle - can be made into homosexuals - presented the following 
story: 
I remember the occasion many years ago when we were first 
presented with a Bill on homosexuality and the rights of 
homosexuals. The debate was joined as to whether 
homosexuals were born or made. An elderly gentleman who 
had been a colonel in the Indian army told me that it was his 
belief that homosexuals were made if enough influence was 
exerted upon them. He said that in the hill country and in 
parts of Poona, when he was in the Indian army, drummer 
boys used to be sent out from England - they were often 
orphans - and sent up to the forward areas to the regiments. 
He said -I have never forgotten this - that not one of those 
children had a chance. They all ended up as homosexuals 
because of the life they were forced to lead. I find it outrageous 
that little children should have been perverted in that way (HC, 
8 May 1987, col. 998). 
The story does not explicitly specify the kinds of lifestyle 
drummer boys were 'forced to lead', thereby being 'Perverted' into 
homosexuality. Although the story clearly points to the conclusion 
that little children, if enough influence is exerted upon them, can be 
made into homosexuals, the nature of this 'influence' remains, at 
best, suggestive. Of the particular interest here, however, is the 
apocalyptic tone of the voice in which the event of 'perversion' is 
described. By telling us that 'not one of those children', who were 
sent out from England to the regiments in India, 'had a chance'for 
survival fthey all ended up as homosexualsj, the story, embedded 
within her larger narrative of homosexuality = AIDS = death, invokes 
a felt recognition of urgency in the face of the possible death of our 
children. 
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The story of drummer boys was the story of orphan children - 
children who had no adult family members to protect them, and 
were, therefore, exposed to great risk of damage by 'stranger danger'. 
For children who were safely at home (in England), cared for and 
protected by their parents and other trustful adult members of the 
community, their vulnerability to homosexuality was not a 
vulnerability, but remained an innocent curiosity. As Lord Halsbury, 
in recounting his childhood experience, tells the following story: 
Schoolboy homosexuality starts as post-pubertal curiosity. I 
discussed it with my parents before I ever went to public school 
I discussed it with my outgoing headmaster of my prep school. 
I discussed it again with my tutor at Eton. As an older boy, a 
captain of the house, I was expected to collaborate with my 
headmaster and housemaster in discouraging it wherever I 
could. Why was I always warned against it! It was simply 
because a habit once started may become a permanency and 
can only lead to unhappiness in later life (HL, 18 December 
1986). 
For Halsbury, his experience of keeping away from the 
'stranger danger'was simultaneously the experience of coming close 
to his parents and teachers. It was, at the same time, a learned 
experience, the result of a constant discussion between himself and 
his parents and teachers about his 'vulnerability'. Here, his 
vulnerability to homosexuality was not a negative experience. Quite 
the opposite: his learned' vulnerability was precisely what kept him 
away from the stranger-danger, that is from developing a permanent 
homosexual habit, which would only lead him to 'unhappiness in 
later life'. But what if, as the story implicitly asks, this constant 
discussion between himself and his parents and teachers were 
missing in his experience? Or, what if his vulnerability, rather than 
keeping him away from the stranger danger, made him get close to 
it? For he could only turn away from the stranger-danger after 
learning'- learning what/who the object of distance and phobia is 
(and what/who the object of proximity and safety is). But what if his 
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learning process is being distorted, corrupted, and contaminated by 
the pro. )dmity of strangers? 
Children's vulnerability, which raises these number of chilling 
questions, becomes, as supporters of Section 28 tell in parliament, 
the part of the 'true' stories of parents who fear the qoss' of their 
children. It is to these stories I shall now turn. 
6.5 Stones of Parents in HariýTg 
Here, in the parliamentary debates on Section 28, we find 
detailed, and repetitively told events such as: 'children under two 
have had access to gay and lesbian books in Lambeth play centres 
(HC 9 March 1988, col. 377)'; the book, The Kfzlkman's on his WaY, 
'was taken out from a public library by a 15-year-old girl (HL 1 Feb 
1988, col. 879)'; a Video called How to become a lesbian in 35 minutes 
was shown, under the sponsorship of Haringey council, 'to mentally 
handicapped girls, of whom one was aged 18, one was aged 16, and 
the others were much younger (HC 8 May 1987, col. 997)'; or schools 
in Ealing were invited by council's education committee 'to put on 
their notice boards invitations to children to ring gay and lesbian 
lines' (HC 15 Dec 1987, col. 1002). 
These were the events which were plotted by supporters of 
Section 28 in the form of stories and were presented as evidence that 
homosexuality was Intentionally promoted'by the Labour controlled 
local authority with 'real' or 'possible' damaging consequences and 
moral effects on children. 
As we have seen from the stories of 'vulnerable' children told by 
supporters of Section 28 (see Section 6-5), children, who are most 
vulnerable to the encounter with the homosexual/ity, are the least 
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knowers of the danger associated the homosexual/ity. And their 
vulnerability to the homosexual/ity, if unfelt and unrecognised by 
children, is to be qearned': they need to learn 'true' stories about 
homosexuals in the encounter told by their loved"knowledgeable' 
other, their parents. 
Here, the encounter with homosexuals, experienced by parents 
in the present, evidently tells, supporters of Section 28 argue, the 
kinds of danger children could be faced with in their future. 
Consider, for example, the following story told by Baroness Cox. 
When the Local Government Act 1986 (Amendment) Bill entitled 'an 
act to refrain local authorities from promoting homosexuality' was 
first debated in the House of Lords in 1986, she told the following 
story: 
One of the most deeply disturbing features about the whole of 
this [policy that promotes positive images of lesbian and gay 
men] is the kind of teaching materials and books which are 
being recommended and which are available in teachers 
resource units and in children's sections of public libraries. 
One which has already been referred to by some noble Lords, 
which is called "A Playbook for Kids about Sex", is written for 
very young children. Another book, which is recommended or 
mentioned in ILEA's publications and which is available in the 
children's section of Haringey libraries is called "The Millkman's 
on his Way" I shall not shock your Lordships with quotations 
from it but it describes in very explicit detail intercourse 
between a 16 year old boy and his adult, male, homosexual 
lover. It is material such as this that is causing enormous 
offence and concern to parents and members of the public. I 
urge your Lordships to look at it ... because I think it explains 
why parents are so very upset. It will also help to explain why 
in places such as Haringey children as young as four or five are 
going home from school, and asking their parents whether 
their friends are gay or lesbian. I have mentioned the parents of 
Haringey .... because they 
have been subjected to gross 
intimidation in ways which are totally unacceptable. When 
parents have attended council meetings they have been 
harassed, spat upon, had eggs thrown at them and have even 
been urinated upon. They have been denied the right to put 
their views. After one meeting they were followed home and 
during the night their cars were vandalised. They have received 
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numerous abusive phone calls including death threats and 
what I think are the most ominous of all death threats - death 
threats to their children. They have been told that the callers 
know where their children attend school and they will "get" 
their children. [ ... I It is because of the kind of brutal intimidation to which these parents have been subjected that 
this Bill [Local Government Act 1986 (Amendment) Bill] is 
necessary'(HL 18 December 1986, col. 321). 
Here, Baroness Cox tells a story about the kind of social and 
spatial encounters the parents of Haringey have now faced with the 
(could-be) homosexuals. Here, the encounter is described as 
essentially problematic, involving incidents of violence and threats. 
Children's parents of Haringey were 'harassed', 'spat upon', 'had 
eggs thrown' at them, and 'have been urinated upon'. They were 
'denied'the right to express their views at the local Council meeting. 
They were 'followed' and their cars were 'vandalised'. They 
encountered with menacing phone calls at home and 'death threats 
to their children'. The story does not explicitly name or identify the 
perpetrators of these acts. They remain anonymous and unspecified. 
Yet, the story clearly marks those bodies that could be identified as 
being interested in 'promoting homosexuality, the homosexuals, as 
signs of danger. These homosexuals, encountered by the parents of 
Haringey, assaulted and threatened them ruthlessly, and would even 
violently take their children's lives. 
The story, by contrast, presents parents of Haringey as those 
who are only interested in protecting children's interests. Parents 
were 'upset' and attended the local council meeting only because 
they were concemed with their children's well-being. Described as 
'courageous'in 'protecting' children's innocence, they were seen as 
good and positive (HC, 18 December 1986, col. 320). Being good and 
positive, their confrontation with 'bad' and 'negative' was necessary; 
but their defensive act of 'meetingthe ýmilitant' homosexuals, the 
story suggests, also made the parents of Haringey vulnerable. They 
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themselves faced the danger of being victims of confrontation and 
violence. 
Cox's story portrays parents of Haringey as total victims. 
Interestingly, the story does not tell us what happened 'after' to 
these (could be) homosexuals who perpetrated violence on parents in 
Haringey. The story, as Dijk typically finds in stories of minorities, 
'has only one Resolution category' (Dijk, 1993b: 135) -'this Bill 
[Local Government Act 1986 (Amendment) Bill] is necessary'. Apart 
from this, the story conveys a sense of qack of resolution'. We are left 
with the impression that the parents in Haringey could not do much 
about the acts of violence and threats perpetrated against them. 
Solutions were neither 'attempted' nor 'focused upon' within the 
story (Dijk, 1993a: 112). The event (the encounter) is left as an 
essentially problematic predicament. 
What I am interested in here is not whether the story of the 
parents of Haringey being urinated upon, of their cars being 
vandalised, and of their children being abused with death threats, 
are true, as claimed by Baroness Cox, but in the role played by such 
storytelling in maldng 'general' (moral) truth claims in the context of 
political storytelling. 
Emplotted as an 'unresolved' problematic event, this violent 
encounter, which took place between parents of Haringey and the 
(could-be) homosexuals, can give rise to concern, not just about the 
event itself, but also about the possibility of its problematic 
recurrence. Although the event, experienced and witnessed by 
parents of Haringey, is a threatening event in itself, this 'particular' 
event, if told as part of repeated events of problematic encounters, 
informs 'the general', producing the very figure of the homosexual as 
'stranger danger'. 
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6.6 The Etidence Game I. - 'Straqer Daqer' 
According to Teun A. van DiJk, stories of personal 'experience' 
that provide detailed information about subjective experiences of 
particular events are often used as 'supporting evidences' in an 
argumentative schema for the following reason: they are difficult to 
challenge because the weight of these evidences are 'epistemological' 
(Dijk, 1993b: 126). Personal stories which speak under the 
authority of experience and which are offered as evidences, 
effectively evade a challenge to their truth claims. They are often 
taken as self-evident and transparent; for they, as DiJk argues, 
suggest that 'the events told about are a reliable source of 
knowledge, because they represent a lived, personal experience', and 
that an argumentative conclusion drawn from these evidences is, 
therefore, not 'biased' but simply reveals unassailable 'facts' (Dijk, 
1993b: 126). Hence, if a negative statement or argument about 
sexual minorities, such as homosexuals are 'exhibitionist', 
'promiscuous', and 'act as reservoirs of venereal diseases of all kinds' 
(HL 18 Dec 1986: col. 3 10) may be heard and criticized as 
homophobic, negative personal stories about the meeting with 
sexual minorities, which confirm to such a negative statement, are 
often not; for they are presented as merely expressing 'the facts' as 
witnessed and experienced by people directly involved in concrete 
events (Dijk, 1993b: 140). 
Note here though that 'the facts', unless they are repeatedly 
experienced and jointly told by several other storytellers, remain as 
'particular' facts. In order to make general truth claims, a personal 
story presented in the form of evidence needs to be a part of the 
public story and facts to be the 'common'facts. In other words, the 
facts dramatized in particular events in relation to particular 
characters are to be the one typical example of 'the facts' found in 
many other events regarding similarly related characters. To present 
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itself as universal, rather than particular, same or similar personal 
stories must be, therefore, found across as many different individual 
contexts as possible. And this, in the political evidence game, is 
often done in the form of replication and repetition of a particular 
personal story being used as 'the' evidence, creating stereotypic 
personal/public stories of experiences/ facts. 
Indeed, the potent truth claiming in support of Section 28, for 
example, is not only organized around personal stories of particular 
experiences that elide epistemological challenges or testing, but also 
around repetition of stories that effectively homogenize those 
particular experiences. It is not, therefore, difficult to find other 
personal stories in which events, characters, actions and their 
consequences are arranged and configured in a remarkably similar 
way to the story told by Baroness Cox. The following story told by 
Dame Jill Knight who initiated the clause known as Section 28 into 
the Local Government Bill in 1987 is one such examples. In the 
House of Commons debate in March 1988, Jill Knight tells her own 
personal stories in support of Section 28: 
There is no doubt that children have been subjected to a most 
unhappy, unfair and wrong promotion campaign to try to turn 
them into supporters of homosexuality. If anyone doubts that, 
why did the children's parents complain? When those parents 
complained, why were they subjected to such vicious 
treatment? [ ... JI cannot think 
it right that parents who 
complained about what was being done to their children at 
school should have been kicked and spat upon. If their 
children had not been treated in the way that I have described, 
the parents would not have complained. [ ... II have also been 
astonished at the degree of viciousness that I have 
encountered, as one who initiated the clause. My secretary has 
been abused, and has been the butt of the most appalling 
campaign of pornographic telephone calls. At 2.20 one 
morning, she was woken b someone who ob ected to the yj 
clause, and was subjected to a torrent of pornographic abuse. 
That is not the way to conduct a proper argument, but it tells 
us quite a lot about the kind of people who have been taking 
part in the opposition to the clause [ ... II have 
been strongly 
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supportive of the attempt to protect children, and no amount of 
abuse - or having my car vandalised, which has also 
happened - will stop me protecting them, and protecting the 
family unit. This I shall do, against all opposition. The family 
unit is under attack: there is no doubt of that (HC 9 March 
1988 col. 386-7). 
In this story told by Dame Jill Knight, the then conservative 
Member of Parliament for Birmingham Edgbastone, we find a 
repetitive story of children's parents who, when they complained 
about the promotion of homosexuality, were viciously attacked by 
'militant homosexuals'. An almost identical story of her own is then 
added as a way to support the evidence further: when she initiated 
the clause, Section 28, her secretary, like the parents of Haringey, 
received abusive telephone calls at night, and her own car was 
vandalised. Since specific, her story, like any other personal stories 
of experiences, makes particular as well as implicit truth claims in 
relation to causality: for the story actors who are involved, contexts 
in which actions occur, and the consequences of actions are all 
dramatized in a particular personal setting. Nevertheless, her story, 
familiar as being told and retold in the parliamentary debate with 
similar plots and episodes, is effective in producing general facts for 
those who agree with her argument: homosexuals who seek to 
promote their sexuality are indeed aggressive, assertive and 
dangerous, threatening 'the overwhelming majority of the people' 
(HC 9 March 1988, col. 407). 
What is interesting here is the particular ways in which her 
story is, nevertheless, challenged by those who oppose her truth 
claim. For example, Joan Lestor, Labour MP, argues that: 
The hon. Member for Edgbaston [Dame Jill Knight] said that 
she had been the subject of a great deal of abuse, as had her 
secretary. She said that her car had been vandalised. What was 
the point of saying all that, unless she was saying that 
homosexuals and others who disagreed with her were doing 
those things to her? My car was vandalised last week, but I do 
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not go around accusing people who hold an opposite view of 
mine of doing it (Joan Lestor HC 9 March 1988, col. 412). 
Here, Joan Lestor strongly hints that a close relationship might 
be found between the relevance of the story told by Dame Jill Knight 
and the storyteller's own prejudice on homosexuality. Nevertheless, 
this does not (and cannot) completely falsify the story, in the sense 
that it does not falsify the evidence contained within the story. Here, 
the evidence of experience that tells us what 'really' happened to MP. 
Dame Jill Knight and her secretary remains intact, while the 
presumption that links the events to her argumentative conclusion 
(that is, she and her secretary were abused by those who opposed 
the clause), shielded from testing or proving, is further supported by 
the facts/evidences found in similar stories of experiences told in the 
debate and repeated in her story - that is, the experiences of parents 
who are kicked and spat upon when they complain against the 
promotion of homosexuality campaign at school. 
If the story of personal experience, (re)presented as evidence, 
provides, in such a way, a powerfully persuasive claim to truth and 
validity, there, nevertheless, arises an equally persuasive and 
powerful way in which the story is challenged and contested, if not 
falsified, in the parliamentary debate. This challenge, as I shall 
discuss in the next section, is found in stories of counter- 
experiences told as a means to offer counter-evidences in support of 
counter-argument. The series of personal stories introduced in the 
next section are presented as counter-evidence, demonstrating the 
fact that a campaign to promote homosexuality did not (and could 
not) exist. 
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6.7 The Etidence Game II. - 'Strager Victim' 
In terms of the Section 28 opposers' discourse, it was, first and 
foremost, the 'myth' of the promotion of homosexuality, which was 
questioned and challenged. In rejecting the accusation that the 
Labour party was responsible for the promotion of homosexuality, 
Labour's senior representative, John Cunningham, for example, 
made it clear that: 'it is not and never has been the responsibility or 
the duty of a local authority or a local education authority to 
promote homosexuality, and it has never been Labour party policy 
that they should do so, either' (HC, 15 December 1987, col. 102 1). 
According to MP. Chris Smith, the alleged 'loony left' campaign to 
promote homosexuality did not, in fact, exist; for homosexuality 
could not be promoted by a local authority any more than 
heterosexuality ever could be. As Smith puts it: 
We are what we are. It is impossible to force or encourage 
someone into a different sexuality from that which pertains to 
them. What is needed is not to be involved in changing, 
persuading, forcing, encouraging people into different 
sexualities. What is important is to enable people to 
understand the sexuality that they have, and that cannot be 
changed (HC, 15 December 1987, col. 1007). 
Repeatedly affirming the immutability of sexual orientations, 
Liberal Party MP Simon Hughes, in the 1987 Section 28 debates 
similarly argued that: 'Homosexuals do not happen as a result of 
campaigns for their promotion, just as heterosexuals are not 
suddenly brought into active heterosexualism by having a campaign 
on their behalf (HC, 15 December 1987, col. 992). If promotion were 
effective, 'everyone'MP Mark Fisher (Labour) commented, 'would be 
heterosexual'; for 'the overwhelming mass of material in our culture, 
media, advertising and family lives promotes heterosexuality' (HC, 9 
March 1988, col. 397). Yet, the fact that everyone, in spite of 'all- 
persuasive and all-pervasive culture of heterosexuality', is not 
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heterosexual makes it clear that homosexuality cannot be promoted: 
homosexuals, MP Joan Ruddock (Labour) argues, 'have struggled 
habitually to become heterosexuals', but they did 'not succeed, of 
course'(HC, 15 December 1987, col. 1003). 
From this point of view, a number of counter stories were told 
in the 1987-88 Section 28 debates, which gave evidence to the 'fact' 
that homosexuality was not (and could not) be promoted. Consider, 
for example, the following story told by the Viscount of Falkland. 
Recollecting his childhood and school days, the Viscount of 
FaRdand, recounts: 
I went through what is called the public school system which, 
in the eyes of some foreigners, quite incorrectly is supposed to 
be a hotbed of homosexuality. I must say that I did not see a 
great deal of it ... Nobody has every promoted to me, or sold to 
me, the idea that I should be a homosexual or a heterosexual. I 
seem to remember that when I was about seven years old I had 
vague stirrings of attraction to the opposite sex that have not 
left me in the 45-odd years that have ensured. But nobody 
promoted these ideas to me. It is an absurd idea that one can 
go into a classroom, to a meeting, or on a holiday course, or 
whatever, and that someone can make attractive the idea that 
one can change the drift of one's own sexuality (HL, I Feb 
1988, col. 867-8). 
In this story, the Viscount of Falkland implicitly challenges the 
dominant view of children as both 'deemed incapable of self- 
expression' and 'immune to sexuality' (Foucault, 1980: 42). 
Although no one has intentionally promoted the idea of 
'heterosexuality' to him, he was still able to feel 'stirrings of 
attraction to the opposite sexý as early as when he was about 7 years 
old, and this attraction to the opposite sex, which he had in his early 
childhood, has remained with him intact ever since. What follows 
logically from what he experienced is that his sexual drive, as he 
finds it, is not the product of 'nurture'but of 'nature'. It was 
naturally there to be felt and discovered, rather than to be learned or 
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to be promoted. Fears about the promotion of homosexuality are not, 
therefore, well founded. 
For those who transgresses the boundaries of heterosexuality, 
the fact that no one has promoted 'heterosexuality' or 
'homosexuality', as the Viscount of Falldand claims., is recalled 
differently, however. Consider, for example, the following letter read 
out in the House of Commons by MP. Simon Hughes on 9 March 
1988. In this letter, a young lesbian of 19 years reveals her own 
story of childhood, and tells: 
As a young lesbian of 19 years, I can recall only too well the 
problems I faced during early adolescence and the prejudice 
and hysteria I was confronted with when I 'came out' at 15.1 
was hounded at school; I had people spitting at me, people 
trying to ride their bikes into me, etc. I never went out as 
people kept threatening to beat me up. I left home, and came to 
London when I was 16, but even now my sister is teased and 
victimised because I am a lesbian. There is no way this should 
have happened to me, and, what is worse, is that some friends 
of mine, had even worse happen to them. I got off 'lightly'. 
Measures need to be taken to combat this prejudice, and some 
local councils had begun to do this within education and by 
aiding lesbian and gay groups, etc, with money and resources - 
money and resources that as rate-payers we are entitled to. 
This education is not promotion of homosexuality, it is only a 
presentation of it in a fair, unprejudiced way - no one can be 
turned gay by it, the same way we cannot be taught to be 
straight. But the word promotion is open to interpretation by 
the courts and this is very dangerous ... Many people are going 
through what I did and this must be stopped. If this Bill is 
passed it will be another blow to us and a serious violation of 
our human rights (HC, 9 March 1988, col. 388). 
Here, we hear stories of a young lesbian of 19 years who 
describes her childhood lived in the context of homophobic violence 
and physical abuse. Her story, in particular, recounts her experience 
of encountering 'people' when she 'came out' as a lesbian at 15, and 
the pain of exclusion and violence she has consequently experienced 
in her daily lives. 
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Being a lesbian teenager, the home and school were no longer 
safe places. She was 'hounded at school,, had people 'spitting at' her, 
and 'threateningto beat her up. As a result, she had to give up her 
'home': she had to conceal herself at a safe distance from the 
constant and increasing violence inflicted on her. 
She was a stranger to the innocently vulnerable, and asexually 
heterosexual children. Being a stranger to innocently asexual (and, 
therefore, vulnerably heterosexual) children, she was violently forced 
to unlearn the unnatural knowledge she had acquired, only to 
realise that it was not learned (or promoted) in the first place: 'No 
one', she claims, 'can be turned gay by it [education], the same way 
we cannot be taught to be straight'. Knowing her homosexuality was 
just a 'natural'part of growing up, which she could not learn, 
unlearn or relearn. 
From this point of view, her story, like the story of the Viscount 
of Falldand, contends that one's sexuality is innocently and 
naturally fixed. Yet, at the same time, her story brings an important 
counter interpretation to 'childhood vulnerability'. It was, as she tells 
it, not the presence of positive image, but an absence of it through 
which to voice her 'innocent"natural' homosexuality, that left her 
exposed to great danger and violence. Her story, in other words, 
explicitly questions what it means to be a 'vulnerable' child in a 
society where an 'asexually innocent' child is always defined as a 
hetero-'sexual' child. 
So what does it mean to be a 'vulnerable homosexual' child in 
a society where an innocently, naturally, asexually vulnerable child 
is always defined as a heterosexual child? She said, she 'got off 
lightly', but some of her friends 'had even worse happen to them'. In 
referring to a survey carried out by the Gay Teenage Group in early 
1980s, MP. Ken Livingstone (Labour), for example, describes the 
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harsh realities gay teenagers, who live in London, have faced. He 
reveals that, in this survey of more than 400 gay and lesbian 
teenagers between the ages of 15 and 2 1: 
[T]hree out of five had been verbally abused, that one in five 
had been beaten up, that one in 12 had been sent to a 
psychiatrist, that one in 10 had been thrown out of their 
homes because of their sexuality and that one in 10 had been 
sent to a doctor in the hope that the doctor would cure them 
(HC, 15 December 1987, col. 110 1). 
Yet, the most 'horrifying' fact he found was that 'one in five' of 
them 'had attempted to commit suicide because of the anguish, 
loneliness and despair that they felt'. Here, he adds the following 
story, which was told by a gay teenager who attempted a suicide: 
I remember an incident in the third year when some lad asked 
me if I was queer. I denied it of course and I immediately 
withdrew into my shell even further. I tried suicide with a bottle 
of pills a couple of nights later. It didn't work of course. It just 
made me ill for about a week. Nobody realised what I'd done 
and I didn't tell them (HC, 15 December 1987, col. 10 12). 
Presenting this story and the results of the survey as the 
evidence, Livingstone argues: 'the survey showed that children who 
were homosexual felt that they had had no assistance at school. So 
talk of promotion is nonsense' (HC, 15 December 1987, col. 10 12). 
But where does this 'nonsense' comes from? The nonsense,, 
according to MP. Simon Hughes, is 'founded on prejudice'- the 
prejudice that one can be persuaded to be a homosexual, or one can, 
by the same reasoning, can promote homosexuality. In the House of 
Commons debate on Section 28 held on 9 March 1988,, Simon 
Hughes presents a story recounted by a parent of a gay child to 
support his claim: 
The letter is from a parent of a gay child from Sheffield, written 
in January this year: "I have a daughter who is gay and I 
believe suffered unnecessarily from the pretence that such do 
not e, -dst. I had always thought that what took place between 
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fully consenting adults in private should not be against the 
law, but I had not expected it to touch my own life at all 
closely. I lean to the view that homosexuals are born and not 
made because her upbringing doesn't seem to have been 
different from that of my three other children all of whom are 
heterosexual. In passing I note that my other daughter is left- 
handed and fortunate in having escaped persecution for that 
(HC, 9 March 1988, col. 388). 
This story, which was told from the point of view of a parent, 
reinforces the notion that one's sexuality is inherently fixed, and 
biologically determined rather than a relational construct, culturally, 
politically, institutionally or inter- subjectively promoted or 
promotable. In Section 6.3,1 discussed a particular way in which 
'the figure of the child'is constructed as the (sexually) innocent and 
vulnerable, best protected by wiser and responsible parents (a 
'nurturing' mother and a 'disciplining' father) (Corteen, & Scraton, 
1997: 82). Yet, not all parents are, as Goldson argues, considered as 
wise and responsible parents: there are also bad or failed parents 
who, by being unreasonable, incompetent, naive, or irresponsible, 
leave children under the sick or evil influence of stranger-danger 
(Goldson, 1997: 24). 
In a context where a range of political anxieties concerned with 
the promotion of homosexuality are expressed, parents of gay 
children are, at best, the parents who failed to protect their children. 
At worst, they may themselves be guilty of raising children in 
'strange'ways. In the above story told by a parent of a gay child from 
Sheffield, we, therefore, find ways in which the parent, in explaining 
her daughter's homosexuality, first gives an account of herself (or 
himselq as an ordinary and 'straight' parent. To avoid any possible 
accusation of being a failed or bad parent, the parent, for example, 
tells how the discovery of daughter's homosexuality troubled her/his 
own life. The parent could not even believe that such people exist, 
and has suffered from shock as well as shame. Yet, the parent, at 
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the same time, recounts the pain and hurt felt in response to the 
daughter's gayness as 'unnecessary' pretence or prejudice. As long 
as the parent remembers, 'her upbringing doesn't seem to have been 
different from that of .. three other children all of whom are 
heterosexual'. Without doubt, the daughter has not been brought up 
to be gay. She has not 'became' a lesbian. Rather, like the other 
child who is left-handed, she has been 'always that way' (de 
Lauretis, 1994: x1v). 
This story of the parent of a gay child told during the Section 
28 debates, together with the other counter-stories I have analysed 
so far in this Section, offers plausible counter-evidence about what 
happened: the promotion of homosexuality did not exist because it 
could not exist. But there is something more in this counter- 
storytelling that calls for our attention. What is of particular interest 
here is the way in which stories that deny the political 'accusation' of 
promoting homosexuality produce the possibility of homosexual 
subjects who are not promotable. In other word, it is the way stories 
of accusation, presented as 'evidence', bound up with the 
production/ emergence of the counter-factual (or the counter-causal) 
subject that interests me here. 
The parent whose daughter is 'gay' ends the story by 
comparing her with the other daughter who is born left-handed: 
while the latter is 'fortunate in having escaped persecution' for being 
left-handed, the former is not: the former, in the eyes of the parent, 
is a persecuted body - the body that emerges as being responsible 
for deeds she has not committed. 
Here., her responsibility, as we have seen from the story of a 
young lesbian of 19 years, emerges as an effect of demands made 
upon her by the Other who persecutes her. In horrified response to 
persecution, as Butler argues, 'I offer myself as an "I" and try to 
-197- 
reconstruct my deeds, showing that the deed attributed to me was or 
was not, in fact, among them'- `1 am either owning up to myself as 
the cause of such an action, qualifying my causative contribution, or 
defending myself against the attribution, perhaps locating the cause 
elsewhere' (Butler, 2005: 11). In response to persecution, 1, in other 
words, give an account of myself as a subject being responsible/ 
accountable for 'me' which emerged through persecution. 
What is important to note here, however, is the 'belatedness' of 
my response to the Other. This Other to whom I give account of 
myself as an "I" is 'the first one on the scene, not signalled, 
unparalleled'- the one who, through persecution, 'assigns me before 
I designate him [sic]' (Levinas, 1998: 87). In this traumatic 
encounter., it is, in other words, 'me'who is called into question, 
susceptible to persecution, and T am compelled to respond to the 
other's persecution without first being able to ask myself- 'Where 
does he get his right to command? '(87). 
Being 'already late and guilty for being late' (ibid. ), the very 
language, Butler argues, by which 'I give account of myself - the 
language by which I make myself Intelligible'to both myself and to 
the Other - are 'not', therefore, my 'making' (Butler, 2005: 2 1; 
Levinas, 1998: 87). We can, for example, find that the kinds of 
accounts given in the form of stories, such as those which I have 
analysed in this section, accept the accuser's telling that the 
promotion of homosexuality has a causal relation to this 'normative 
heterosexual' other's trouble and suffering. And, being asked if 'Me' 
was responsible for this suffering, I emerge as a counter-causal 
subject who cannot be the cause of the suffering in question: I 
cannot be the cause of the suffering, because my homosexuality, 
which is the result from an inborn trait or an immutable condition, 
cannot be promotable. 
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Here, it is important to note that the terms by which I emerge 
as a self accounting/ narrating subject is not my own; it is, rather, a 
particular 'product' of my relation to this Other. Yet, it is, 
nevertheless, a production that involves the production of 'truth': in 
this particular instance, it is a production of truth' about 'me' from 
the start (from my birth), suggesting my innate, fixed identity. 
Within the debates on Section 28, what also followed from this 
causal story of immutable homosexual identity/ orientation was the 
claim for equality on the basis of an authentic and unchangeable 
sexual difference. If, as Currah argues, the homosexual identity/ 
orentation is fixed rather than a choice or a lifestyle, the quest for 
'equal rights for protection' under the broad civil-rights/ citizenship 
framework is legitimate'; for 'discrimination on the basis of a trait 
perceived as an unchangeable characteristic is unfair' (Currah, 
1994: 58). As MP. Hughes, based on personal testimonies he read in 
the parliament during the debate on Section 28, argues: 
Those people said that in their earlier years they had been 
exposed to heterosexual advertising and that it had not 
changed them in the slightest ... [Tjhe evidence ... shows that 
people who discover that they have a homosexual orientation 
have no ability to do anything about it or believe that they have 
no ability to do anything about it. Therefore, promoting that 
condition is a logical inconsistency. Of course one can promote 
activity, but promoting a psychological state is probably 
impossible. It certainly could not be promoted by a local 
authority .... I believe that the 
issue is whether people of 
different sexuality should be given the same facilities by their 
local council: the same education, the same information and 
the same support as anybody else. It seems a matter of simple 
civil liberties and human rights that they should' (HC, 9 March 
1988, col. 390). 
But what Idnds of rights are promoted here? Or, to put it 
another way, how has one become the homosexual body that 'has' 
rights here? 
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The 'rights' promoted here are not the 'rights to promote 
homosexuality'. Quite the opposite. The 'natural' homosexual body 
emerged in response to the accusation made upon 'the body that 
promotes homosexuality' was the body that 'will not' and 'cannot' 
promote homosexuality: the 'rights to promote homosexuality' 
should not, therefore, be the 'rights of the homosexuals'. 
Paradoxically, what should still remain 'a legitimate object of 
discrimination' within this emerging homosexual rights discourse is, 
then, the 'Practices' or 'identities' that (are seen to) promote 
homosexuality (Currah, 1994: 58). In other words, the distinction 
between what Smith calls 'the good homosexual' (the 'self-limiting' 
and 'fixed' homosexuals) and and 'the dangerous queer' (the 
'subversive', 'unfixed"proselytizing', and 'promoting' homosexuals), 
which was basic to the homophobic discourse among Conservatives 
who supported Section 28, is reinforced rather than challenged 
(Smith, 1994: 205). 
We perhaps need to note here that the Conservative Earl of 
Halsbury, in introducing his Private Member's Bill in the House in 
1986 (which eventually came to be known as Section 28) clearly 
stated that the measure did not aim at 'responsible' homosexuals, 
but at 'sick' ones who showed 'symptoms' of 'exhibitionism' and 
'promiscuity'; of 'proselytising' and 'boasting' homosexual 
achievements (HL, 18 December 1986, col. 310). These'sick' 
homosexuals, he added, 'persuade[d] other people that their way of 
life' was 'the good one', and acted as 'reservoirs' for venereal disease. 
In another debate on Section 28, the Earl of Halsbury, by reading a 
letter he received from a (responsible) male homosexual, then added 
the homosexual's own understanding of a situation: 
I want to say how fed up I am with my fellow homosexuals. 
They have brought it upon themselves, their unpopularity. 
They are too promiscuous, too aggressive and exhibitionist. I 
cannot stand the sight of them. I wish they would keep 
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themselves to themselves-I cannot help what I am but I can 
help what I do (HL, 1 February 1988, col. 875, Italics added). 
Two things need to be noted here. First, this statement, 'I 
cannot help what I am but I can help what I do', reveals a particular 
way in which signs of 'nature'work in relation to homosexual bodies. 
Here, nature exercises absolute control over the way I can possibly 
'be', but it does not control what I can possibly 'do'- I can keep my 
homosexuality to myself. Yet, this logic whereby (having the natural 
rights) to 'be' a homosexual, and to 'do' promote homosexuality is 
constructed as mutually exclusive is that of the homosexual/ity. On 
'not one occasion', as Cooper and Herman observe, 'did a 
parliamentarian call into question the promotion of heterosexuality' 
during the debates on Section 28 (Cooper & Herman, 1991: 65). 
Rather, the compulsory presumption of heterosexuality, implicit in 
conservative approaches to sexuality, made the concept of 
(heterosexual) nature be actively promoted, enforced, and 
naturalised. 
There is, therefore, a troubling paradox in relation to the 
politics of sexuality, which is here based on the notion of 'nature'. 
As Ahmed argues, the newly emerged idea of 'sexual orientation' as 
naturally fixed and immutable 'does not position the figures of the 
homosexual and heterosexual in a relation of equivalence' (Ahmed, 
2006: 69). While homosexuality is naturalised as a matter of fixed 
sexual orientation, it can only be a deviant/ peculiar natural 
condition, which is to be contained, and never to be promoted: the 
very nature that both unquestionably Is', and is 'to be'promoted as 
the normative nature is heterosexuality. As Stevi Jackson has also 
aptly noted: 
Those who endorse biological and genetic theories assume that 
lesbians and gays constitute a permanent, more or less stable, 
natural minority. To campaign for equal rights on this basis is 
misguided. Homosexuality is not a natural difference that has 
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become stigmatised through some irrational prejudice, but a 
category that only exists in relation to normative 
heterosexuality. It cannot be equal to heterosexuality: it is 
necessarily in opposition to it. Positing sexuality as immutable 
obscures the hierarchical ordering of heterosexuality and 
homosexuality within which the latter is constructed as the 
deviant category in relation to the former. This deviance is not 
accidental, but serves to define the boundaries of compulsory 
heterosexuality Packson, 1998: 73). 
Secondly, the statement, 'I cannot help what I am but I can 
help what I do'reveals that the homosexual subject that emerges as 
'having'the rights to be the homosexual is a subject that knows how 
to govern. and discipline its body - its needs, desires and actions - 
and how, therefore, to relate its body to others. In this way, the 
subject who emerges as having the rights to 'be'the homosexual is 
the subject that has, at the same time, the rights to 'do' 
homosexuality - the rights that are fundamentally linked with 
(governing/ disciplining) responsibilities of the 'doing'. 
Having said this, the next chapter discusses ways in which 
these particular 'identity based'rights claims, that emerged during 
the Section 28 debates, both effect and contribute to the formation 
of what Richardson calls 'relationship based'rights claims in 
Britain - claims that seek the rights to 'do' same-sex relationships in 
the form of civil partnership (Richardson, 2000a: 126). Weeks 
points out that there has been a recent shift in gay and lesbian 
politics in the UX 'from an assertion of identity and presence to a 
claim for full recognition of same-sex partnership rights (Weeks, 
2004- 159). Weeks links this changes occurring in gay and lesbian 
politics to much wider social changes such as 'a weakening of the 
dominance of the traditional notions of family and kinship'and the 
diverse patterns of intimate relationships emerging therefrom (ibid. ). 
While I agree with Weeks that the particular ways in which same-sex 
relationships have become the objects recognition and respect 
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reflects, in part, changes in sexual politics in Britain, this is also 
closely tied to, rather than a shift from, the identity based rights 
claims previously emerged within the discursive context that 
privileged heterosexuality. 
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Chapter 7 
Stories of Doing 'Being' Family 
1 Introducfion 
In the previous two chapters, I discussed ways in which the 
fact/ideal of life in Britain, including the reproduction of life, was 
seen as being threatened by the presence of the homosexual/ity. The 
homosexual/ity 'was' regarded as a 'threat'- a threat to children, the 
family, reproductive relations, and the very survival of the nation - 
which to be, therefore, contained, and never to be promoted 
(Richardson, 2000b: 78-9). 
By contrast, stories that we hear during the debates on the 
Civil Partnership Act no longer depict the life of gay men and 
lesbians as a threat to the nation. It is, rather, represented as a fact/ 
reality of 'modern Britain'in which some of 'us', as Jacqui Smith 
states, make the decision 'to share their home, their finances and 
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the care of their children or of older relatives' as same-sex couples. It 
is, she argues, a 'modern'form of British life that deserves to be 
treated with respect and equality, and to be recognised by the state 
as a family. Giving rights in the form of rights to same-sex couples is 
oca natural progression' towards an Inclusive' British society (HC, 12 
October, 2004, col. 174). 
But as I shall ask in this chapter, how do the forms of lesbian 
and gay life, seen as a threat to the nation in the 1980s, now come 
to signify a fact of 'our'life? What kinds of common/national facts of 
life are 'we'- homosexuals and heterosexuals - now thought of as 
sharing, and perhaps more importantly, for what? 
This chapter, which begins with these questions focuses on the 
ways in which politicians, in telling stories of daily lives of gays and 
lesbians, construct stories of the 'new' Britain. I shall discuss, in 
particular, how these stories that tell of the 'newness' of modem 
Britain, at the same time, makes use of deep cultural memories of 
naturalised and traditional forms of British Iffe represented as the 
'English wedding', producing the 'new'in its most recognized, 
familiar form (Section 7.5). 
With this in mind, I first begin this chapter by providing some 
background information on the Civil Partnership Act (Section 7.2). A 
detailed analysis of stories of gay/lesbian 'partnerships'- stories of 
'alternative families'- told during its debates follows in sections 7.3 
and 7.4. Here, a particular focus is placed on the ways in which 
politicians, in telling the stories of same-sex 'couples', employ a way 
of identifying them as 'normal couples' that deserve our public 
recognition: typical characteristics of normal same- sex 'couples', 
identified and constructed as constituting 'families' are just like' 
married couples except for their 'non-heterosexuality. Subsequent 
sections then follow the complex and contradictory ways in which 
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this concept of 'same-sex couples'was played out and contested 
during the debates on the Civil Partnership Act (7.6 & 7.7). 1 draw 
out its political implications in Section 7.8. 
7.2 The Citil Partnersho Act I 
The Civil Partnership Act 2004, which was first introduced in 
the House of Lords on 30 March 2004 as an attempt to create a new 
legal status of civil partnership for same-sex couples, became law on 
18 November 2004, and came into effect on 5 December 2005. 
The Act's precursor was Lord Lester's Civil Partnership Bill, 
introduced to the House of Lords on 9 January 2002. Prepared in 
collaboration with Stonewall, the Bill, as stated in its explanatory 
note, was 'designed to remedy the lack of protection for cohabiting 
couples (whether of opposite or same sex) in English law and to give 
them the opportunity to register a civil partnership'. After the Bill 
received its Second Reading in the House of Lords, however,, Lord 
Lester withdrew his Bill; he agreed not to take the Bill further so as 
to give the Government time to conduct a major review of the issue. 
On 6 December 2002, Barbara Roche, the then Minister for 
Social Exclusion and Equalities, announced that the Government 
found that there were a 'clear and strong' (The independent, 6 
December 2002) case for allowing same-sex couples the chance to 
register their relationships, and would, therefore, set out its plans 'to 
bring law and practice into line with the reality of people2s lives' 
(Conway & Fairbairn, 2004: 10). The government's proposal for a 
civil partnership registration scheme was then published in 2003 
under the title, Civil Partnership: A fi-amework for the legal 
recognition of same-sax couples. In the forward, Jacqui Smith, the 
then Deputy Minister for Women and Equality, stated that: 
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Today there are thousands of same-sex couples living in stable 
and committed relationships. These relationships span many 
years with couples looking after each other, caring for their 
loved ones and actively participating in society; in fact, living in 
exactly the same way as any other family. They are our 
families, our friends, our colleagues and our neighbours. Yet 
the law rarely recognizes their relationships (Women & Equality 
Unit, 2003). 
The Government proposed to create a new legal status of civil 
registered partnership, which would be 'open only to same-sex 
couples and not to opposite sex couples' (2003: 18). It was claimed 
that unmarried, heterosexual couples already had 'the opportunity 
of obtaining legal (and socially recognized) status for their 
relationship by entering into a marriage'- the opportunity not 
available to same-sex partners who could not marry (2003: 18). 
After a consultation period of three months, the government's 
intention to introduce a Civil Partnership Bill was then announced 
in the Queens Speech in December 2003, and the Bill was finally 
introduced into the House of Lords on 30 March 2004. According to 
the Women & Equality Unit of the DTI (the Department of Trade and 
Industry), the main provisions in the Civil Partnership Bill include: 
responsibility to provide reasonable maintenance for civil partners 
and children of the family; full recognition for the purposes of life 
assurance; ability to succeed to tenancy rights; social security and 
pension benefits; and ability to gain parental responsibility for their 
civil partner's children (DTI, 2004). In Announcing the Bill, Jacqui 
Smith adds: 
Same-sex couples often face a range of unnecessary problems 
in their everyday lives because of a lack of legal recognition of 
their relationships. The Civil Partnership Bill aims to eradicate 
this by providing same-sex couples with the opportunity to gain 
recognition of their relationship for the first time. It shows that 
we really value the diversity of the society we Eve in (Ibid. ). 
Jacqui Smith's statement demonstrates the extent to which the 
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Civil Partnership Bill was proposed with direct reference to the 
Tamily'. Same-sex couples who live 'exactly the same way as any 
other family'face 'unnecessary problems in their everyday lives 
because of a lack of legal recognition of their relationships'. The law, 
therefore, must afford some measure of positive recognition and 
equal respect to the same-sex couple/family relations, granting them 
legal rights and entitlements parallel to those given to 'any other 
family'(Women & Equality Unit, 2003a). 
In what follows, I discuss how stories of everyday reality of 
same-sex intimate life told during the debates on the Civil 
Partnership Act are, in part, structured around the provision of 
evidence to support these claims. To say that same-sex couples 'live 
exactly the same way as any other family'is to suggest that there 
exists a commonly recognized way of 'doing family', which, in turn, is 
to be legally recognized and validated as 'the'family (or families). But 
in what ways do same-sex intimate lives confirm to the way 'we'do 
family (or families)? 
ple 7.3 Real Stories of Real Peo 
In reading Parliamentary debates on the Civil Partnership Act 
in Britain, one may immediately find qualitatively different ways in 
which stories of (or about) gays and lesbians enter the debate in the 
2000s. While stories about homosexuals were recounted in the 
debate in the 1960s and 1980s, they were stories in which gays and 
lesbians remained as nameless and unspecified individuals, beings 
of doubtful roots and existence. This, in turn, allowed what Johnson 
calls 'a fantastical image of sexual perverts'to prevail in the debates 
whereby homosexuals appear as threatening 'phantoms'upon whom 
the fear and prejudice could be easily projected (Johnson, 2004: 38). 
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By contrast, most of gays and lesbians appearing in stories told 
during the debates on Civil Partnership have their names - 
recognisably British names that validate their national origin. We, 
for example, hear stories about: a gay man calls Rex and his partner 
John; a lesbian woman, Alison Brown, who works as a Thames 
Valley police officer; John who is buying a car with his long-term 
male partner; a gay couple, Dick and Ben who are both in their 70s 
and have endured the general prejudice against gay community; 
Paul and James who jointly owned their house; Kate, a lesbian 
woman, who had a history of depression and was cared by her 
partner, Jo; and a gay man, Andrew whose partner has recently 
died. 
The power of these personal names revealed in stories consists 
mostly in representing the real, as they point to actual persons living 
in Britain. At the same time, it tells us that their stories, presented 
as 'real-life examples of real people'are no longer stories of those 
remain in the closet, but those who are publicly identifiable and 
nameable as gays and lesbians (HC, 12 Oct, 2004, col. 184). In other 
words, they appear 'visible' and as such they are made 'real'. 
Here, they are visible in stories not as outsiders, strangers or 
enemies of the nation, but as those who are family members, 
friends, neighbours, colleagues, or fellow citizens. While maintaining 
a clear distance between the self and the homosexual other was the 
norm for those who tell stories about homosexuals during the 
1960s, representative storytellers in the parliament now tell stories 
of gays and lesbians as a welcoming part of their interactive 
personal/ community lives. 
Lord Goodhard, for example, tells about his wife's uncle who, 
as a gay man, was loyal to the public as much as loving to his male 
partner (HL, 25 January 2002, col. 1733). Barbara Roche, a Labour 
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MP, recounts a story about a friend who is in a long-standing 
lesbian relationship and whom she met at her another friend's 
wedding seven years ago (HC, 12 October, 2004, col. 19 1). MP. Jane 
Griffiths (Labour) tells a story of her neighbour, a gay couple, whose 
troubles she knows as she lives in the same area that they inhabit 
(HC, 12 October, 2004, col. 205). And Lord Alh, during the Second 
Reading debate on the Civil Partnerships Bill introduced by Lord 
Lester on 9 January 2002, tells a story of his colleague, the late Lord 
Montague of Oxford (the Labour life peer) who 'had been in a 
relationship for 30 years with a very ]kind and distinguished 
gentleman'(HL, 25 January 2002, col. 1697). 
As much as these stories are about real and visible gay men 
and lesbian women with whom, as Anne McGuire (the Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State for Scotland) states, 'we live and work'in 
Britain, we find events and actions unfolded in stories are 'ordinary' 
situations and part of everyday life activities such as going to the 
hospital, attending a wedding or a funeral, having a haircut, meeting 
neighbours or fiiends, paying tax, being ill, sharing a house and 
caring for a loving intimate partner (HC, 12 Oct 2004, col. 247). Not 
only are gays and lesbians real and visible, they are also ordinary 
and normal, living in the same context as many British 
heterosexuals. Yet, their apparently ordinary lives do not simply 
follow the 'normal' course of life events, as their stories soon identify 
serious troubles and difficulties they have to face. What kinds of 
troubles and difficulties are we talking about here? 
7.4 Real Stories of Real 'Couples' 
7.4.1 Stories of gay/lesbian 'couples" 
Here, the experience of troubles and difficulties recounted 
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during the debates on the Civil Partnership Act involves the 
experience of qack': the lack of legal recognition given to their 
intimate relationships. As Baroness Scotland of Asthal puts it: 
[Slame-sex couples are unable to marry and cannot gain legal 
recognition of their relationships. The lack of legal recognition 
means that same-sex couples face many dffficult issues as they 
seek to organise their lives together (HL, 22 April, 2004, col. 
387). 
Let me offer some of the examples of troubles that stories of 
gay/lesbian 'couples'told during the debates recount. To begin with, 
there is John whose story is told by MP. Jane Griffiths (Labour): 
Story I 
John has been in a relationship for seven years and is buying a 
car with his partner. That is a normal thing to do - couples do 
that all the time. The model comes with a year's free insurance 
but, under the scheme, it applies only to what are described as 
'normal' couples, so John and his partner must decide which of 
them can be insured for free - the other will have to pay (HC, 
12 Oct 2004, col. 205). 
The everyday context here is 'buying a car', and the teller draws 
on the notion of 'normality'to emphasise that the commonality of 
this practice of 'buying a car'is ironically a contentious issue for 
same-sex couples. Buying a car with your partner is what people in 
a long-term, committed couple relationships would do 'all the time': 
the story tells us that this is shared knowledge. Yet, being a 'couple' 
and being recognised as a 'couple' are, in practice, two separate 
things. While some 'couples'are highly visible and given public 
recognition, same-sex'couples'fail to be treated as (normal) couples. 
This, Jane Griffiths argues, is 'wrong. The enduring and committed 
couple relationships, whether heterosexual or gay relationships, 
deserve to be treated with the same respect (HC, 12 Oct 2004, col. 
-211- 
204). 
Some same-sex couples who have supported each other 
financially throughout their lives and shared their home together 
often find no way of gaining pension rights and inheritance tax 
exemption. Take, for example, following two stories. 
Story 2 
17)- . 
Rex is 76. His partner, John, died after they had spent 45 years 
together. Their house was in both names and John left 
everything to Rex in his will. Rex faced a huge tax bill in order 
to be able to stay in his own home. He also lost John's pension. 
Had he been married to a woman for just one day, no tax 
would have been payable, and Rex would have had a survivor's 
pension (HC, 12 Oct 2004, col. 183). 
Story 3 
The story concerns a homosexual couple, Paul and James, who 
lived together for 30 years ... They could not have married even if they wanted to and could not even put their relationship on 
anything but an illicit level. That, to a great or lesser extent, is 
true of all homosexual couples. Paul died suddenly, aged 63. 
He had earned a large salary; James, a small one. They jointly 
owned their house but as its value far exceeds the exemption 
threshold of 242,000 pounds, James faces a large bill for 
inheritance tax which may mean the loss of his home. Matters 
would be very different were he a surviving husband (HL, 25 
Jan 2002, col. 1707-8). 
Rex's and James's expexience teRs us the extent to which the 
lack of legal recognition of same-sex relationships create particular 
issues of hardship and vulnerability for same-sex couples, especially 
when their loved ones die. Marriage gives access to a set of material 
benefits and legal privileges to married people. In the event of the 
spouse's death, for example, the surviving spouse is entitled to 
pension benefits as well as to inheritance rights over the estate of 
her/his deceased partner. And since a spouse is always accepted as 
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next of kin, s/he will be able legally to register the death of her/his 
spouse, and organise the funeral. 
The position of same-sex couples, as the stories of Rex and 
James show, are significantly different. The qack'of legal recognition 
of same-sex relationships, which is experienced by same-sex couples 
as the 'inability' to get married, means that they often have their 
shared house lost to inheritance tax, and have no means of 
establishing status as next of kin in the event of the death of one 
partner (HC Standing Committee D', 19 October 2004, col. 008). 
Given that same-sex intimate relationships are seen as non- 
relationships, the loss involved in same-sex relationships is a non- 
loss -a loss that is not counted as the loss, or a loss that should not 
be displayed as the loss (see Ahmed, 2004: 156). For example, 
Baroness Gould of Potternewton tells the following story: 
Story 4 
A gay couple in Yorkshire had been together for over 40 years 
and both partners were in their 70s. The union was never 
accepted by the family of the elder partner. On his admission to 
hospital with cancer, his life-long partner was denied visiting 
rights and heard about his declining health and ultimate death 
from friends. The family refused his request to attend the 
funeral and the ultimate humiliation was being evicted from 
their joint home with no keepsakes and only his memories of 
their happy years together. I cannot think of any worse 
treatment of an old man who had devoted his life to his partner 
(HL, 22 April 2004, col. 403). 
The story recounts the pain, anxiety, and humiliation 
experienced by a gay couple who had been together for 40 years. 
However committed and long-term their relationship may be, the 
rights of same-sex partners to care for each other at times of illness 
and to grieve the loss' of the loved one is simply denied by the 
deceased partner's 'family'. For the bereaved gay man, it is, as the 
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story reveals, the loss' of a qife-long partner' to whom he 'devoted 
his life'. Yet, it is not a qoss'he can publicly moum at the funeral, as 
he is not supported in this grief. he is, in Doka's words, a 
'disenfranchised' moumer (Doka, 1989). 
According to Doka, a grief that is 'not, or cannot be openly 
acknowledged, publicly mourned or socially supported'is a 
'disenfranchised grief (Doka, 1989: 4). Disenfranchised grief is the 
grief of qoss' in which the qoss' is not recognised as qoss' (or the 
griever is not recognised as griever) and is found in relationships 
that are not recognised by society as significant ties. A society that 
does not recognise the ways in which same-sex partners have given 
their qived' relationship meaning and significance, does not 
recognise the suffering and pain resulting from the 'death' of the 
relationship. In the eyes of the family and society that never 
accepted the union, there never was a relationship to be lost or 
mourned. As MP. Chris Bryant (Labour) also saw it: 
When I was curate in High Wycombe, I used to visit patients in 
the local hospital. It was not uncommon to meet people who 
had been prevented by the parents of their partner even from 
visiting the person whom they loved and had lived with for 
many years. This was at the time when HIV/AIDS was new and 
many people did not have much understanding of it. Many 
parents blamed the illness on their son's partner. I am glad to 
say that the world has moved on for many families, but still 
that injustice exists. The injustice is compounded if there is a 
death. The bereaved partner is often excluded from the funeral 
arrangements. I have conducted countless funerals that the 
partner was not even allowed to attend, and many at which the 
partner was forced to sit right at the back and not take part, 
and no mention was made of the relationship. Sometimes the 
bereaved partner had to have separate ceremonies, because the 
families took precedence over the partner. That was caused by 
bigotry in many cases, and it led to injustice that was allowed 
by the law (HC, 12 Oct 2004, col. 225-6). 
Our 'culture', which does not recognise the death of 
homosexual-relationships, is a culture that perhaps recognises the 
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death of relationship (or promiscuity as it is alleged) 'from the start' 
(Ahmed, 2004: 156; Nunokawa, 1991: 319). Homosexual 
relationships /lifestyles /promiscuity that are identified as purposeftil 
resistance to the family values, and displaced into the signs of 
AIDS=gay disease=death, are perhaps always 'already dead, dying, or 
endangered registers', subject to extinction (Nunokawa, 1991: 311). 
As Simon Watney, in analysing media portrayals of AIDS in Britain 
during 1980s, also observes: 'the spectacle of AIDS calmly and 
constantly entertains the possible prospect of the death of all .... gay 
men from AIDS ... without the slightest flicker of concern, regret, or 
grief (Watney, 1987 quoted from Nunokawa, 1991: 311). 
If someone who had lost a homosexual partners was prevented 
from grieving publicly in Britain, this, according to Chris Bryant, 
was caused by bigotry, however. Those who blamed homosexual 
lifestyles'for AIDS equated homosexuality with promiscuity: they 
said 'same-sex couples could not love one another'- being 'couples' 
(HC, 12 October 2004, col. 225). This, Bryant argues, is wrong. 
There are same-sex couples we know, who 'have lived together for 
many years, in sickness and in health, and have provided one 
another, and sometimes children in their care, with the ]kind of love 
and support from which many other families could learn much'(HC, 
12 October 2004, col. 225). The 'fact of loving homosexual 
relationships' has been the 'fact of life'for many gays and lesbians in 
the UX (HC, 12 October 2004, col. 230). 
But what does it mean to speak of the 'fact' here?; for, as I shall 
argue in the next section, it is clear from stories told above that the 
'fact of loving/losing homosexual relationships', in order to be 
presented/ claimed as 'fact', requires to be recognised as Tact'in the 
first place. As it is asked by Butler, 'if you've actually lost the lover 
who was never recognized to be your lover, then did you really lose 
that personT (Butler, 2002: 25) Can this love/loss be a 'fact? Or if 
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this 'fact', as Bryant argues, was not recognised as a 'fact' in the 
past, but is now awaiting our recognition in the present, how does it 
become a fact? 
7.4.2 Stories of 'normal' couples 
Stories of same-sex couples told during the debates on the Civil 
Partnership Act (7.4.1) inform us two things. On the one hand, they 
tell us that one's experience of loss'does not necessarily mean that 
one is entitled to experience that 'loss'. One can, for example, 
encounter an event like the 'disenfranchised loss' of a life-long 
partner, and feel wronged and humiliated. However, the question is 
whether s/he, in the eyes of the other, has an entitlement (or rights) 
to feel wronged and humiliated here (see Sacks, 1995: 242-248). 
On the other hand, stories reveal us that it is the 'normal 
(heterosexual, married) couple'who have the entitlements /rights. We 
are, for example, told that: if had Rex 'been married to a woman for 
just one day' he 'would have had a survivor's pension' (Story 2); or 
were James 'a surviving husband', he would not have lost his home 
to inheritance tax (Story 3). MP. Charles Henry (Conservative), in 
recounting his marriage, also tells us that: 
When I got married, Eke everyone else who has got married, I 
became eligible for certain rights and entitlements and, to go 
with that, certain responsibilities as well. So when one of us 
dies, the surviving spouse is entitled to inherit the family home 
and the family assets without being subjected to inheritance 
tax. We can benefit from the other one's pension contributions, 
particularly in the circumstances of death. For those people 
who live in social housing, the tenancy would transfer 
automatically from one to the other without any question of 
whether that was right. Marriage also brings with it certain 
entitlements that are so self-evident that it is not possible to 
conceive of the position being otherwise. For example, in the 
event of one spouse being injured in an accident, the other is 
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entitled to give their opinion on what should happen and what 
is the appropriate medical treatment; they are entitled to visit 
their spouse in hospital without anyone being able to say, 'You 
shouldn't be here - You're not entitled'. A spouse can act as an 
active next of kin: my wife and I have to fill in a form for our 
children at school saying who should be called in the event of 
an accident, and we name each other as next of kin. That, to 
me, is so self-evidently right that it is inconceivable that it 
could be done in any other way' (HC, 12 Oct 2004, col. 230; 
Italics added) 
The story formulates the entitlements/ rights that he, as a 
married man, has in relation to various events such as 'having 
exemption from inheritance taxý, 'gaining pension rights', 'acting as a 
next of kin', or 'visiting a spouse in hospital' as 'our' shared 
experience/knowledge. As a married heterosexual man, he has 
entitlements/ rights to experience such events in a way that same- 
sex couples do not. His entitlements/ rights is something that is 
taken for granted and accepted by everybody: if you are married, and 
visiting your spouse in hospital, no one, claims Henry, would say, 
'You shouldn't be here - you're not entitled'. 
Being a normal - married, heterosexual - couple carries a set of 
entitlements/ rights: this is presented as the 'common sense' of a 
society, the 'very bounds of the thinkable' (Eagleton 1991: 58). In 
Henry's own words, those rights that he, as married man, enjoy is 
'so self-evidently right' that 'it is not possible to conceive of the 
position being otherwise'. Now, it is within this very boundary of 
what is thinkable, we find that politicians, in telling the stories of 
same-sex couples, use certain kinds of typical descriptions (used to 
describe 'the normal - heterosexual, married'- couple) to construct 
the 'normal - same-sex - couple'who should have the equivalent 
entitlements/rights. The point is discussed in more detail below 
(7.4.3). 
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7.4.3 Stories of 'families' 
From the story of John and his partner (Story 1), Rex and John 
(Story 2), Paul and James (Story 3), and a gay couple in Yorkshire 
(Story 4), we find that politicians, in telling the fact that they are a 
normal 'couple' or a 'union'- which, nevertheless, is not recognised 
as such in society - employ ways of identifying them as a normal 
'couple'. 
Stories, for example, invariably start in the same way: X and Y 
lived together for Z years, emphasising their life-long commitment, 
monogamy and cohabitation. The commitment they have made to 
each other, as described in stories, is a 'for richer for poorer', in 
sickness and in health', 'to love and to cherish', 'till death do us part' 
kind of commitment -a 'marriage-like' commitment. And for many, 
this marriage like 'living together', which is premised on 'the gravity 
of the financial and emotional responsibilities of supporting and 
caring' (HL, 25 Jan 2002, col. 1706) for each other, is what makes 
same-sex bonds indistinguishable from those found in heterosexual 
union (at least in its ideal practice): in Lord Lester of Herne Hill's 
words, for example, a homosexual relationship Is no more a 
pretended family relationship than is a caring, sharing and loving 
relationship between two heterosexuals who live together in a stable, 
long-term relationship' (HL, 25 Jan 2002, col. 1692). There, he 
argues, is growing evidence that shows: 'same-sex partners are as 
capable as heterosexual spouses of forming intimate, permanent, 
committed, monogamous, loyal and enduring relationships, of 
furnishing emotional and spiritual support; and of providing 
physical care, financial support and assistance in running the 
common household' (HL, 25 Jan 2002, col. 1692). 
In Chapter 6,1 discussed the ways in which the increased 
acceptance/ promotion of homosexual Iffestyle'was seen to pose a 
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direct challenge to the traditional family life, as David Wilshire, who 
introduced Section 28 in the Committee Stage of the Local 
Government Bill 1987-8) puts it: 'Homosexuality is being promoted 
at the ratepayers' expense, and the traditional family as we know it 
is under attack' (Letter to the Guardian, 12 December 1987). Here, 
the family as we know it, which was seen as 'under attack', was the 
'natural'family unit founded on the heterosexual couple -'a 
reproductive, biological paring'between one man and one woman - 
and their dependent children (Fineman, 1995: 145). The 
heterosexual family (heterosexual coupledom), legally privileged 
through marriage and idealised as the natural habitat for the life of 
children (the life of future national citizens), was presented as 
vulnerable to inherently dangerous and promiscuous homosexual 
lifestyles/ perversion/ seduction/ corruption. 
Returning to stories told during the debates on the Civil 
Partnership Act, we find that: (1) family ýpractice/ performance', 
rather than the (married heterosexual) family 'form/ structure' is 
emphasised as the central qualification for what constitutes a valid 
family relationship. At the same time, it is, as I shall argue further in 
the next section: (2) a particular way of 'doing' family - doing the 
same as what marriage already does - through which the boundaries 
and implications of 'beingin 'families'are increasingly drawn in 
parliament. 
Significantly, these two arguments (1 and 2), combined 
together, introduce and constitute a parado. 3dcal status of 
(traditional/modern) family in Britain, that is: 'the family as we know 
it'is both changed and unchanged. While the family we know it is 
changed in the sense that the traditional 'a married couple with two 
children'family form/structure is no longer the central determinant 
of what a family is, the family 'performative values' related to 
marriage still constitutes a key element in defining what 'today's 
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family/ families' is/ are. As Alan Duncan (Conservative) states: 
Today's families come in many shapes and sizes and people 
face many challenges. Marriage breaks up, parents remarry 
and the structure of the family changes. Many families no 
longer fit perfectly into the traditional two-parents-and-2.4- 
children framework, but are extended families in which there 
has been remarriage and same-sex relationships. The latter are 
increasingly acknowledged and accepted, even by 
grandparents, who 25 years ago would have found such 
relationships abhorrent. No one suggests that the absence of 
traditional arrangements within those new family units has led 
to the absence of bonds of loyalty, commitment and support 
that hold families together. Despite the difficulties of modem 
life those values have shown a reassuring durability (HC, 12 
October 2004, col. 186). 
Here, the family is presented as having no unified or 
permanent 'form': today's family life is 'diverse', and no longer fit into 
the idealised, traditional (nuclear) family form. The family, Lord 
Lester claims, 'has changed dramatically and continues to change' 
(HL, 25 Jan 2002, col. 1693). The rising divorce rate, increases in 
remarriage, the eidstence of single parenthood, delayed marriage and 
the emergence of gay and lesbian partnerships all contribute to the 
emergence of 'new family units', which, according to Duncan, have 
been increasingly acknowledged and accepted as 'families'in our 
society. 
This change, which has hitherto often been interpreted as a 
sign of 'family breakdown', does not, however, necessarily mean that 
we experience the decline in 'performative values' of family life. Quite 
the opposite. While the 'structure' of the family relationships is 
evidently changing, Duncan argues, there exists an enduring 
continuity in the way we 'do'family. The 'family we know it', which is 
both changed and unchanged, is both a category of the past/ 
tradition and present/modem. 
The 'fact' that 'families are changing', which was repeatedly 
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presented by politicians during the debates on the Civil Partnership 
Act, is accompanied by claims that the law should reflect today's 
changed family patterns, and allow those same-sex couples, who 
choose to 'do'family, to gain legal recognition of their relationship 
(HL, 22 April 2004, col. 388). Extending rights and legal protection 
to 'stable, long-term, committed' same-sex couple relationships, it 
was argued, would not change (undermine'orweakenj our ideas of 
family life (HC, 12 October, 2004, col. 175). This is because: 'what 
the Bill [Civil Partnership Bill] does', according to Duncan, Is 
recognise what already is' (HC 12 October 2004, col. 187). Gay 
couples are 'a fact of life ... in our country', and the recognition of 
stable, committed same-sex couple relationships is 'a way of 
protecting the family in changed times' (HC 12 October 2004, col. 
184). Rather than undermining the family life, the Bill, Jacqui Smith 
argues, recognises the 'realities of modem Britain' (HC, 12 October 
2004, col. 175). 
From this point of view, one might conclude that the Civil 
Partnership Act simply recognises same-sex couple relationships, 
which 'already exist' as a changed fact in (modern) Britain: 'the 
couple made itself what it is'; and 'all that the public and the state 
need to do is assent to this fait accompl? (Halley, 2001: 99). Yet, it is 
more correct to say that the very sense of the 'change' that deserves 
our recognition is generated through the projection of 'continuity'- 
the continuity of 'the traditional family life we know it'. If the 
idealised heterosexual coupling sanctioned by marriage ýmay be 
becoming increasingly less typical'today, it is, nevertheless, a 
continuing ideal (a looking glass) through which today's same-sex 
relationships are examined (reflected) and recognised (Gavigan, 
1992: 605). In the next section, I discuss the point in more detail 
(7.5). 
-221- 
7.5 A wedding 
26 
In creating 'the nation's people' out of difference, modern 
national narratives, Bhabha argues, engage with a Idnd of 'double 
narrative movement': the 'pedagogical' on the one hand, and the 
'performative'on the other (Bhabha, 1990: 299). The pedagogical 
narrative, according to Bhabha, constructs the nation and national 
identity through an appeal to the 'tradition of the people'- the 
tradition (the 'totality of social institutions and practicesl that 
teaches the nation and national identity as 'imrnemorial' and 
'timeless' (Leoussi, 200 1: 249). The performative narrative, on the 
other hand, 'erases' the 'pedagogic', and instead creates 'the people' 
as 'subjects' of the nation - the subjects who turns 'the scraps, 
patches and rags of daily life' into 'the signs of a coherent national 
culture', renewing and reinventing the nation and national identity 
at every moment/location of their living (Bhabha, 1990: 297; Allen, 
199 5: 6 15). The people, according to Bhabha, are then 'the 
articulation of a doubling of the national address' (300). We 'are', as 
bearers or carriers of the tradition, what we 'were'(the people'in the 
past), and what we are told as we are - the 'object' of narrating the 
nation by national pedagogues. Yet, we are, at the same time, the 
'subjects' of the nation who, by performing a modem national life in 
the present, are actively involved in the process of retelling/ 
recreating its signs and traditions. Within this double movement 
between the narratives of pedagogy and the performative, we, then, 
have: 
a contested cultural territory where the people .... [are] thought 
in a double-time; the people are the historical 'objects' of a 
26. The approach taken in this section 7.5 has been influenced by Allen's 
excellent discussion of 'heterosexuality's pedagogical narrative' at a 
number of points. See Allen, D. (1995). Homosexuality and Narrative. 
Modern Fiction Studies, 41(3-4), 609-634. 
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nationalist pedagogy, giving the discourse an authority that is 
based on the pre-given or constituted historical origin or event; 
the people are also the 'subjects' of a process of signification 
that must erase any prior or onginary presence of the nation- 
people to demonstrate the prodigious, living principle of the 
people as that continual process by which the national life is 
redeemed and signified as a repeating and reproductive 
process .... In the production of the nation as narration there is 
a split between the continuist, accumulative temporality of the 
pedagogical, and the repetitious, recursive strategy of the 
performative. It is through this process of splitting that the 
conceptual ambivalence of modern society becomes the site of 
writing the nation (Bhabha, 1990: 297). 
Bhabha's discussion of ambivalence involved in national 
narratives is useful in understanding a tension existing within the 
narratives of 'the British family'found in the debates on the Civil 
Partnership Act. There is a tension between the pedagogical and the 
performative in the narrative address of 'the British family', which, in 
turn, is linked to its double temporality. On the one hand, there is 
the 'pedagogical narrative' of the British family, which emphasises 
the pre-given, traditional, eternal image of the family associated with 
the institution of marriage. On the other hand, there is the 
'performative narrative'that emphasises the daily re-creation and 
invention of families, disturbing the temporality of the pedagogical 
narrative of the British family. A particular way in which this tension 
is expressed and resolved in stories told during the debates on the 
Civil Partnership Act can be illustrated in the following story, told by 
Barbara Roche (Labour). 
Seven years ago, I went to a beautiful summer wedding with 
my husband and daughter. I love weddings - it is like seeing a 
Shakespeare play performed with a different cast - and attend 
them with great anticipation. On that lovely day, we were all 
very pleased for the happy couple. Like anyone who is married, 
I remembered my own wedding, now some 27 years ago, and 
recalled the emotions, the commitment and the shared 
responsibilities that I embraced on that occasion. I turned to a 
friend who was sitting beside me at the ceremony and talked 
about that. She is in a long-standing lesbian relationship. We 
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were all enjoying the lovely occasion., but she told me that the 
possibility of a commitment to her long-standing partner in 
which rights and responsibilities were exchanged was not open 
to her. That made a great impression on me, and I discussed it 
with my family and friends afterwards. I vowed that if I ever 
had the opportunity to do something about it, I would. I was 
therefore pleased to have had the opportunity in December 
2002, when I was a Minister, to say that Civil Partnerships for 
same-sex couples were a good thing. Before I made that 
announcement, there was a great deal of nervousness in 
government about what would happen, how people would react 
and what they would say. Would the heavens fall in? However, 
I made the announcement and that did not happen - life went 
on as before, and society did not appear to have suffered any 
disruption. Almost as soon as I made the announcement, my 
offices in the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and in my 
constituency received many messages of support from people 
who had been in same-sex relationships for years. They loved 
and cared for one another in sickness and in health, but had 
never had the opportunity to register their relationship and 
enjoy the rights that many of us take for granted [ .... I Make no 
mistake - we are doing something of fundamental significance 
for equality and the society in which I want my daughter to 
grow up [ ..... II believe that we are doing something very important ... that other parliamentarians will look back on in future years, and say, "I wish I could have been here then. " 
Our parliament has grown up, our country is growing up and 
we truly are striving for a society that is equal and in which 
there is social justice (HC, 12 October 2004, col. 191-2) 
The story, which is told by MP. Barbara Roche (Labour) during 
the second reading debate on the Civil Partnership Bill in 2004, 
depicts the British wedding as a continuous and timeless ritual that 
people in Britain replicate and perform. The English wedding, 
according to Barbara Roche, is like a 'Shakespeare play, performed 
and re-performed with 'a different cast' over time: it is what she 
performed in the past and her friend is now performing after her. 
And the script of the 'wedding', as she recalls, remains very much 
the same: the wedding is a joyful public event in which couples 
make 'commitment' and embrace 'shared responsibilities', which is 
recognised, in turn, by the British law. Here, in telling the story of 
her friend's wedding, Roche tells how her past memories of wedding 
-224- 
continue to live effectively in the present. It is through the shared 
form of living found in the tradition, wedding, that she could connect 
herself to her friend, and her past to the present. 
Yet, her story soon finds the presence of another *iend' at the 
wedding, who disr-upts this overall picture of continuity and unity. 
This is a friend who is in a long-term lesbian relationship. In spite of 
her wish to be a part of the 'cast', she is not allowed to follow this 
timeless sort of script that 'we' share: 'the possibility of a 
commitment to her long-standing partner in which rights and 
responsibilities were exchanged was not open to her. 'The story, 
then, deals with Roche's reactions to this unjust treatment of same- 
sex couples. She declared, I vowed that if I ever had the opportunity 
to do something about it, I would', and this made her eventually to 
respond to the goodness of civil Partnerships in 2002. 
The announcement of the plan to introduce civil partnership 
legislation, contrary to what others had expected, did not bring any 
upset to people's lives: 'life went on as before, and society did not 
appear to have suffered any disruption, ' For civil partnership 
legislation simply recognises what is already familiar. What Roche 
sees in civil partnership is the mirror image of the wedding: it gives 
same-sex couples who qoved and cared for one another in sickness 
and in health'the opportunity to embrace the commitment and 
shared responsibilities for each other. And with this mirroring, she 
turns the presence of discontinuity and disunity into a progressive 
ideal of continuity and unity - into a coherent but, at the same time, 
progressive national culture. Her story tells us that the recognition 
of same-sex couples does not change our life. It rather signifies the 
growth of our ability (or `wilIj to recognize their similarity with us. 
Now, I discuss some of the compleidties involved in this 
mirroring. In Section 7.4., 1 discussed particular ways in which 
-225- 
politicians, in telling performative narratives of gay men and women 
living as 'family', both erase and save 'the British family as we know 
it'. Here, the continuity of 'the traditional British family we know it', 
as those who oppose the Bill subtly reveal during the debates, is 
maintained through a circular argument: 'the present family life'is 
seen to be a continuation of 'the traditional family life we know it', 
which is, nevertheless, itself a construction of the present -a 
construction of the way 'the' traditional family life is redefined in the 
present. 
Roche's story follows a similar circular process: what Roche 
sees in civil partnership registration is the mirror image of the 
wedding - the continuation of what she performed 27 years ago. Yet 
this mirroring is the result of the construction of 'the wedding' in the 
present -a construction of the way she remembers her wedding in 
the present (not as the union between one man and one woman, but 
as the union of two people who exchange rights and responsibilities). 
Now, something, we may note, is lost in this mirroring, 
however. This (perhaps) 'new' configuration of the wedding (or the 
new configuration of 'the traditional family we know itj provides a 
new framework for thinking about same-sex relationships. The fact 
of 'their' living arrangement appears not to be 'new; it appears to be 
consistent with the way 'we' do wedding/family in the present. Yet, 
the image of same-sex couples constructed as just-like married/ 
marriageable couples is followed by a certain loss. If not, why, we 
may ask, 'civil partnership'and not'same-sex marriage? Or is civil 
partnership, as it is often thought of, marriage in all but name? 
From this point of view, I discuss some of the comple,, dties and 
ambivalence involved in the Civil Partnership Bill (Section 7.6); and 
how this ambivalence invites stories that challenge the heart of the 
'construction' that what constitutes a real (married-like) 'couple' is 
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what (supporters of the Civil partnership Act argue) it does (Section 
7.7). 
7.6 Citil Partnersbo Act 11 
Although the civil partnership status, Women & Equality Unit 
states, 'is not the same thing as gay marriage' (Women & Equality 
Unit, 2006), it has clearly been designed to be close to marriage. As 
Jacqui Smith, the then Deputy Minister for Women and Equality, 
announced during the Second Reading debate on the Civil 
Partnership Bill: 
We seek to create a parallel but different legal relationship that 
mirrors as fully as possible the rights and responsibilities 
enjoyed by those who can marry, and that uses civil marriage 
as a template for the processes, rights and responsibilities that 
go with civil partnership (HC, 9 November 2004, col. 776). 
Indeed, a registered same-sex partnership, in legal terms', is 
more or less marriage in all but name (Auchmuty, 2004: 102). 
According to Baroness O'Cathain, the Civil Partnership Bill almost 
exactly copied the legal provisions available to married couples to 
the extent that it creates 'a parody of marriage for homosexual 
couples' (HL, 22 April. 2004, col. 406). She argues: 
This is a gay marriage Bill in all but name ... Like marriage, 
those within the prohibited degrees of relationship by 
consanguinity or affinity are not able to enter. Like marriage, 
the relationship will have a legal status. No one in an e, -6sting 
marriage or civil partnership will be able to enter into a 
partnership until the previous relationship is legally dissolved. 
it is just a mirror image. Like marriage, during the e--Aistence of 
the legal relationship, the two partners will be treated jointly 
for income-related benefits and for state pensions, and they will 
be able to gain parental responsibility for each other's 
children. They will also be recognised for immigration purpose. 
Like marriage, civil partnerships can only be ended by a court 
order, which is granted on the same grounds as most divorces: 
irretrievable breakdown. Like marriage, on dissolution, the 
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courts will consider arrangements for property division, 
residence arrangements and contact arrangements with 
children. Like marriage, on the death of one partner, the other 
will have the rights to register the death and to claim a survivor 
pension, eligibility for bereavement benefits and for 
compensation for fatal accidents or criminal injuries. Also, they 
will have recognition under inheritance and intestacy rules to 
tenancy succession rights - real problems for many. The Bill 
may not use the word 'marriage', but the Government have 
gone to great lengths to ensure that, in almost every other way, 
it is identical (HL, 22 April. 2004, col. 406). 
If the Civil Partnership Bill, a Government bill, was introduced 
in the parliament with the intention to grant same-sex couples 
substantially the same rights as heterosexual married couples, the 
Government had, nevertheless, explicitly denied that civil 
partnership was 'gay marriage'. The Government's consultation 
document on civil partnership, for example, sternly insisted that: 'It 
is a matter of public record that the Government has no plans to 
introduce same-sex marriage'(Women & Equality Unit, 2003a: 13). 
As Jacqui Smith, during the Second Reading debate on the Civil 
Partnership Bill in the House of Commons, also announced: The 
whole point ... is that civil partnership is not civil marriage, for a 
variety of reasons, such as the traditions and history - religious and 
otherwise - that accompany marriage' (HC 19 November 2004, col. 
776). 
According to Stychin, this can be read as a strategy 'on the part 
of the government'to secure partnership rights for same-sex couples 
with less political controversy (Stychin, 2005). Yet, this is more than 
a strategy. In the course of debates in the House of Lords in 2004, 
Lord Fillkin, Constitutional Affairs Minister, made clear that the 
government position on this issue was not a result of a mere 
strategy. As Filkin stated: 'the concept of same-sex marriage is a 
contradiction in terms, which is why our position is utterly clear; we 
are against it, and do not intend to promote it or allow it to take 
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place' (11, Feb. 2004, col. 1094-5). 
As it has been defined and understood in the common law 
since 1866, marriage, as Lord Goodhart argues, has been 'the union 
of one man with one woman voluntarily entered into ... to the 
exclusion of all others' (HL, 24 June 2004, col. 1355). Contrary to the 
notion of 'the family', seen as to be expanded to include various 
forms of 'families' existing in modern Britain, marriage is more or 
less defined in terms of 'what it always has been and will be'- it is a 
union of man and woman - and this definition is 'not' challenged 
during the debates on the Civil Partnership Act. 
Seen as a timeless institution that involves the union of man 
and woman, what marriage (uniquely) 'does'is also defined in terms 
of what it (uniquely) always has been 'doing'. Its 'doing', as it is 
repeatedly argued by those who oppose the Bill in particular, 
distinctively involves the procreation and the raising of children 
within the family, and is, therefore, the foundational building block 
of society. As Baroness Wilcox argues: 
Marriage involves a publicly declared commitment. It has an 
inter-generational role in linking former generations and future 
generations. It is the environment where shared values and 
support are best transmitted. Above all - Little mentioned in 
the Bill - marriage has children at its heart (25 Jan 2002, col. 
1699). 
Now, the Civil Partnership Act, which almost exactly copies the 
legal provisions available to married couples, can be, indeed, seen as 
the gay marriage Act in all but name: 'a good deal of the 429 pages 
of the Act', as Washington and Alexander note, 'consists of 
provisions which are copied more or less directly from the statues 
that regulate married heterosexual famidy life (Washington & 
Alexander, 2005). Yet, there are discernible difference between 
marriage and Civil Partnership, which, according to the supporters 
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of the Civil Partnership Act, make the concept of same-sex marriage 
contradictory in terms. This difference is reflected in the fact that, in 
contrast to marriage, there is 'no mention of sex in the Civil 
Partnership' (Barker, 2006: 241). 
The heterosexual family founded on marriage is what Fineman 
calls 'the sexual family': the sexual connection between a man and 
woman, which is (potentially) linked to procreation, is an essential 
element of the couple relationship called marriage (Fineman, 1995: 
145). This is paralleled in law. In Britain, marriage involves legally 
established expectations of sexual activity and sexual exclusivity 
between a groom/husband and a bride/wife. Section 12 (a) and (b) 
of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, for example, states that a 
marriage which has not been consummated due to the incapacity of 
either spouse or to the wilful refusal of one to consummate it is 
grounds to nullify the marriage. Sexual exclusivity is also made 
essential to marriage: amongst the five matrimonial offences listed 
as grounds for divorce, adultery is placed first (Section 1 (2)(a)). 
By contrast, there is no requirement of consummation for the 
validity of civil partnership. Nor is adultery a ground for dissolution. 
According to The Women and Equality Unit publication, Responses 
to Civil Partnership, adultery or consummation only 'has a specific 
meaning within the context of heterosexual relationships', and it is 
therefore, not 'desirable to read this across to same-sex civil 
partnerships' (Women & Equality Unit, 2003b: 36-7). 
Interestingly, the absence of these two concepts, for the 
supporters of the Civil Partnership Act, are precisely what make civil 
partnerships as something 'distinct', 'separate from' and 'not related 
to marriage'(HL, 17 Nov 2004, col. 1464). For example, when Lord 
Tebbit, during the debates on the Civil Partnership Bill, demanded a 
clear explanation from Baroness Scotland of Asthal for the difference 
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between civil partnerships and civil marriage, she states: 
[O]ne of the major differences is, of course, consummation. For 
a marriage to be valid, it has to be consummated by one man 
and one woman ... There is no provision for consummation in 
the Civil Partnership Bill. We do not look at the nature of the 
sexual relationship that enters into the civil partnership. It is 
totally different in nature (HL 17 November 2004, col. 1479) 
A similar point is made in relation to adultery. Baroness 
Scotland, in another House of Lords debate on the Civil Partnership 
Bill, argues: 
It is right to say that the Bill is silent on the nature of the 
sexual relationship that e-Nists between the couple, save to 
require that they must be of the same sex. We have not 
replicated in the Bill the grounds of adultery ... There is no 
adultery in it' (HL 10 May 2004, col. GC19). 
There is an important thing to note hear. As Barker argues, the 
fact that adultery and non-consummation are omitted as grounds 
for dissolution of civil partnerships does not mean that the Bill, 
therefore, gives recognition to non-monogamous and non-sexual 
relationships; for the Bill includes the concept of 'unreasonable 
behaviour'under which such matters could be dealt with (See 
Barker 2006). The government, in response to the consultation prior 
to the Civil Partnership Act, granted that: The absence of any sexual 
activity within a relationship might be evidence of unreasonable 
behaviour leading to the irretrievable breakdown of a civil 
partnership, if brought about by the conduct of one of the parties' 
(Women and Equality Unit, 2003b: 37). A similar statement is made 
in relation to the matter of sexual infidelity. The conduct of a civil 
partner who is 'sexually unfaithful' could be included under the 
unreasonable behaviour ground for dissolution (ibid.: 36). 
However, what constitutes an un/reasonable behaviour here is 
still open to parties who enter civil partnership and would, therefore, 
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'have the capacity to tell of of their reasonable expectation of what 
that relationship would entail'(HL, 10 May 2004, col. GC 19). As it is 
also made clear by the government's consultation document, 
whether 'sexual infidelity' or 'the absence of any sexual activity' 
amounted to unreasonable behaviour upon which dissolution 
proceedings could be grounded would be 'a matter for individual 
dissolution proceedings' (Women &. Equality Unit, 2003b: 36). 
From this point of view, it is clear that neither sexual 
exclusivity nor sexual activity are, in legal terms, essential in the 
creation of a civil partnership under the Bill. And this, according to 
the supporters of the Bill, should not be regarded as a negative gap 
between marriage and the civil partnership, but as reflecting what 
civil partnership is fundamentally about. As Baroness Scotland of 
Asthal argues: 
The Bill is not about the sexual content of the marriage; it is 
about the quality of the relationship of two people of the same 
gender who enter a registered partnership. A clear distinction 
is made between a marriage and the estate that we are now 
offering to same-sex couples by way of registration. They are 
different. We have tried to make that absolutely clear. Civil 
partnership is not marriage, but it is a recognition of a 
relationship which has value (HL 10 May 2004, col. GC 19). 
Yet, it is precisely at this point we come to the question being 
raised by those who denounce the Civil Partnership Bill as a 
discriminatory Bill. The extent to which the Civil Partnership Bin is 
not about 'the sexual content of the marriage' but about 'the quality' 
of the relationship that has family value, the exclusion from the Bill 
family members (such as siblings or other close relations) - who 'do' 
family but 'cannot marry', and therefore face similar problems as 
same-sex couples - is discriminatory. It is to these stories I shall 
now turn. 
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7.7 Stories offamilies II 
If the need for the Civil Partnership Bill, as Baroness Scotland 
of Asthal argues, derives from the fact that same-sex couples who 
'do'family are unable to marry, and therefore experience the specific 
problems, such as being dispossessed of a family home because of 
inheritance tax, the Conservative peer, Baroness O'Cathain, is 
certain that the Civil partnership Bill should be extended to those 
birth family members who also 'cannot marry' and face similar 
problems as same-sex couples do (HL, 24 Jun 2004, col. 1358; HL, 
18 November 2004, col. 1455). As Baroness O'Cathain argues: 
Ministers have argued that same-sex couples in long-term 
relationships ... were discriminated against in law and suffered 
serious hardship. However, the cases ... applying to same-sex 
couples also apply for the most part to family members who 
live together. Their position in terms of inheritance tax, joint 
assessment for income-related benefit and tenancy succession 
rights is essentially the same as for single-sex couples. The Bill 
provides legal remedy for same-sex couples, but not family 
members. A son caring for his widowed father who has 
Alzheimer's disease has to pay tax on his inheritance, despite 
the fact that he has given up his job to care for his father and 
could well be regarded as unemployable as a result. That could 
mean being forced to sell the family house to pay the tax. Most 
of us will know of family members who share a house on a 
long-term basis - sons or daughters who live with their elderly 
parents, providing care and companionship; sisters who move 
in together after they are widowed and live out their old age 
together; nieces and nephews who give up well paid jobs to 
move in with aunts or uncles, to nurse them in long-term 
illnesses; and so on (HL, 24 June 2004, col. 1364). 
Indeed, many politicians, during the debates on the Civil 
Partnership Bill, told, and were told, stories of birth family 
members - siblings and family carers - who had supported each 
other, shared their home together, and shown sacrificial love and 
commitment; and yet, as they were unable to marry, had to 
experience the similar hardship and pain as same-sex couples (24 
Jun 2004, col. 1366). Consider, for example, the following three 
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stories told during the debates: 
I know of a case in your Lordships' House, for example, 
involving siblings. For many years a Peer had lived happily with 
his brother and sister, but on the death of his brother, he and 
his sister were obliged to sell the family home, which they did 
not want to do, and move into other accommodation which was 
not as satisfactory. This is a problem that should concern us 
(HL, 24 June 2004, col. 1373). 
I have one [letter] here. The original was sent by a lady whose 
name and address I shall not reveal to the House, as she is an 
elderly spinster who wants to remain anonymous. The letter 
states: 'I live with my single brother and have done so since my 
mother died in... 1983. He had lived with her all his life. I 
retired from work to look after her as she was 85 and had 
cancer. She died within ... moths of my leaving. Stephen - that is [my] brother - really needed me to run the home ... When my 
mother died I felt I should continue to live with him. I am now 
79 and Stephen is 75. 'That is a real case involving real people 
suffering real injustice [... ] 'Stephen'and the elderly spinster 
will not be able to pass their advantage down the generations, 
so inheritance tax will be paid pretty soon for that 75-year-old 
man and 79-year-old woman (HC, 9 November 2004, col. 
728-9). 
I recently received a letter from a constituent in Killyleagh in 
County Down. That lady looked after a handicapped child for 
14 years. She then went back to work. She then had to look 
after her mother for another 16 years. She then reached 
pension age and instead of receiving a pension of 977.45 a 
week, she was reduced to E61.47 per week because she had 
failed to apply for attendance allowance while she cared for her 
handicapped child. She did so at her own time and expense; 
she applied for no grants or allowances. She was then 
discriminated against when she reached pension age. Under 
the Bill., a person in a same-sex partnership would not be 
discriminated against. Ordinary people will lose out under the 
Bill [the Civil Partnership Bill] if enacted. More than 90 per 
cent of the people of the United Kingdom will be discriminated 
against if the Bill becomes law (HL, 24 June 2004, col. 1377-8). 
These are some of those stories told by politicians who 
denounced the Civil Partnership Bill as discriminatory. These are 
stories of the 'people' who, according to Lord Tebbit, 'have no 
opportumty to marry, whose commitment to each other is at least as 
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great as that of any who would qualify under the Bill as drafted, and 
who would suffer similar disadvantages, hurt and discrimination as 
if they were not related in any way' (HL, 10 May 2004, col. GC34). 
Yet, their difficult circumstances of 'doing' family are not addressed 
in the Civil Partnership Bill. In calling the Civil Partnership Bill as a 
'cruel Bill' and 'an unfair discriminatory Bill', Lord Tebbit argues: 
[T]the central argument of this Bill is that same-sex couples 
would be prohibited entering into marriage so there should be 
something for them. The Bill provides it. What about those who 
are still prohibited; for example, a mother and a daughter? 
Why should they not be able to register a partnership in order 
that they may benefit from the same tax concessions as would 
be granted in this case? There is no way in which the mother 
and daughter can achieve those advantages. Nor can brothers, 
nor sisters, nor father and son. Those are all expressly 
excluded. They are all brushed aside. They are a difference that 
does not matter, because the Bill remedies one inequality. By 
so doing, it creates an another enormous inequality (HL, 10 
May 2004, col. 13GC). 
For many, the Civil Partnership Bill, described as a 
discriminatory Bill, undermines 'the traditional family as we know it' 
to the extent that: it Ignores traditional family relationships in the 
way it distributes benefits' (HL, 24 June 2004, col. 137 1); and 
privileges 'chosen families' over (and against) 'committed birth 
families' (HL, 24 June 2004,1378). What is particularly interesting 
here is the way in which politicians, by telling the fact that family 
members - siblings and carers - are just like' same-sex couples who 
deserve our public recognition, use same kinds of descriptions 
employed to describe (married-like) same-sex couples (see Section 
7.4.3. ). Baroness Wilcox, for examples states: 
Unmarried siblings who share a long commitment to each other 
and share the home together for many long years - dare I say, 
for richer for poorer, in sickness and health? They cannot 
marry. They are bound by love and fate not to be able to do so. 
No society would ever allow that they should. But they are 
surely just as capable of making and practising the same vow 
as others who wish to become civil partners (HL, 12 May 2004, 
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col. GC 117). 
In Section 7.4,1 discussed ways in which the 'family practice' 
rather than the formal status of relationship has been emphasised 
as the defining feature of what constitutes the valid (marriage-like) 
couple/family relationships. It is, as I argued earlier, a particular 
way of 'doing' family - 'doing' here defined in terms of caring, 
sharing, cohabiting, loving and fulfilling mutual responsibilities - 
through which both boundaries and implications of being in families 
are drawn in the parliament. The purpose of the Civil Partnership 
Bill, as it is explained, is to give (married-like) same-sex couples who 
'do'family (but are unable to marry) legal rights and entitlements 
parallel to those given to married couples. Just and equal treatment 
for same-sex relationships, it is argued, would resolve many difficult 
issues same-sex couples face in everyday life, which many married 
couples take for granted. 
Those who denounce the Civil Partnership Bill as a 
discriminatory Bill, however, argue that the kinds of 'doing family', 
which supporters of the Civil Partnership Bill find in same-sex 
relationships, is commonplace in many interdependent, committed 
(birth) family relationships. If the legal status of the same-sex 
relationship, recognised by the Civil Partnership Bill, is not 
marriage, the exclusion of (birth) family members from the Bill is not 
justifiable. This, in turn, leads to another related argument, that is: 
should civil partnership be available to (birth) family members and 
close relatives, 'we must remove its similarities with marriage' (HL, 
10 May 2004, col. GC54). For example, there is no 'reason for the 
Bill to imitate the civil marriage ceremony' as it is, Baroness 
O'Cathain argues, obvious that 'two sisters would feel uncomfortable 
going through a kind of marriage ceremony in order to get legal 
recognition for their co-dependent relationship' (Ibid. ). 
-236- 
By contrast, if the Civil Partnership Bill is the same-sex 
'marriage' Bill (in all but name), then the Bill, they argue, 
undermines the institution of marriage: 'marriage is no longer 
unique'(HC, 12 October 2004, col. 203). The unique place of 
marriage in the law derives from what it uniquely 'does': it uniquely 
involves the procreation and the raising of the children within the 
family, and is, as such, the foundational building block of society. 
Not only does the Civil Partnership Bill, if it is the same-sex marriage 
Bill, strikes at this most basic aspect of what marriage 'is' and 'does', 
it also takes away from marriage its unique status as a protected 
institution in British society. 
Here, the heart of the argument is that: what married couples 
'do' is what same- sex couples 'do not' (or 'cannotl; and what 
marriage 'does' is the opposite of what civil partnership 'does'. The 
'doing'family within marriage, according to those who oppose the 
Bill, involves more than what same-sex couples 'do': it involves 
'natural' sexual practices between one man and one woman, closely 
linked, in turn, to the creation of natural home for nation's children. 
By contrast, the Civil Partnership Bill, Lord Maginnis of Drumglass 
argues, 'deals with couples who want to indulge... in a relationship 
which most likely involves unnatural sexual practices' (HL, 24 June 
2004, col. 1371). The Bill, by sending out the message that the 
homo-'sexual'and hetero-'sexual' couple relationships are equally 
valid, devalues marriage, and ', will encourage the proliferation of 
homosexuality' (HC, 12 October 2004, col. 217). 
What is of particular interest here is the ways in which such 
arguments are challenged (or not challenged) by the supporters of 
the Civil Partnership Bill. Generally speaking, those who supported 
the Civil Partnership Bill did not challenge the normative definition 
of 'sex' linked to heterosexuality and marriage practices. Nor was 
there any challenge to the way marriage is uniquely valued in 
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society. Throughout the debates, supporters of the Civil Partnership 
Act repeatedly affirmed that marriage is 'the surest foundation for 
raising children'in society, and we, therefore, 'should not do 
anything to undermine the institution of marriage' (HC, 9 November 
2004, col. 76 1). From here, they, nevertheless, went to great lengths 
to argue that the Civil Partnership Bill was not a gay marriage Bill, 
and would not, therefore, undermine the institution of marriage. The 
point is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
7.8 Hating it botb mays? 
Those who support the Civil Partnership Act, as I show in 
section 7.6, were careful to insist that the legislation was not about 
recognising lesbian and gay 'sex', and the absence of sex in the Civil 
Partnership Act was what makes civil partnership different from and 
'not related to'marriage (HL, 17 November 2004, col. 1464). 
According to Barker, 'the absence of sex'in the Civil Partnership Bill 
could, as it is often argued, be said to indicate 'a shift from 
recognition of relationships' based on their similarity to a 'conjugal', 
sexual relationship, 'towards much more functional criteria and 
pragmatic concerns for legally recognising relationships' (Barker, 
2006: 244). Yet, this interpretation of the Act, as Barker himself 
rightly notes, is clearly not unproblematic. 
Bounded by same rights and responsibilities that marriage has 
today, a registered civil partnership is intended to be 'Permanent' as 
well as 'exclusive' (Women and Equality Unit, 2003: 19). Civil 
partnerships could be ended only by a formal, court-based process, 
and this is felt to be In keeping with the serious nature of the 
responsibilities that civil partners have towards each other' (HL, 22 
April, 2004, col. 390). Couples entering into a civil partnership will 
be able to hold a ceremony to celebrate: it was often this symbolic 
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significance of the civil partnership, rather than the advantages civil 
partnerships may bring to those who enter partnerships, that are 
emphasised as the main cause behind the Bill. As Lord Alli, the 
youngest and first openly gay peer in parliament, reveals his own 
personal interest in the Civil Partnership Act as follows: 
I have been with my partner for 22 years. In fact, next month 
we celebrate 23 years together. This legislation [the Civil 
Partnership Act] might allow us to benefit from what straight 
couples up and down the country can do. We can if we wish 
register our union, not because of the fiscal benefits, important 
as they may be, and not only because of the protections that 
we wish to give each other, but because we want our 
partnership recognised by the state and elevated above 
friendships or close acquaintances. We would do it because we 
loved each other and we wanted ... a lifelong relationship. The Bill is about that, recognising the special different status of 
committed, loving same-sex relationships and giving them legal 
protection on that basis (HL 22 April 2004, col. 409). 
If the Civil Partnership Bill, as Baroness Scotland of Asthal 
argues, is 'not about the sexual content of the marriage ... [butlabout 
the quality of the relationship of two people of the same gender who 
enter a registered partnership' (HL 10 May 2004, col. GC19), this 
'quality' of the relationship, intended to be 'exclusive', 'intimate', 
'permanent', qoving, 'committed' and 'above friendships', is 
certainly analogous to a conjugal relationship - the relationship that 
is seen to have sexual elements at its heart. 
Throughout the debates on the Civil Partnership Act, we, 
indeed, find an assumption, which was explicitly and implicitly made 
by those who supported the Bill, that is: civil partnerships are same- 
sex/'sexual' relationships that will be entered into by those who are 
tsexually oriented towards the same-sex'(Stychin, 2005: 554; HL 22 
April. 2004, col. 396). People who are gay, according to Duncan, 'are 
never going to enter into a heterosexual marriage' (HC 12 October 
2004, col. 203). And this is because, 'the sexual orientation towards 
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the same sex'is what 'people are born with': it, in other words, 
'cannot be changed'(HL, 22 April. 2004, col. 395). When the 
supporters of the Civil Partnership Act spoke of the need for civil 
partnership, a separate but a parallel institution to marriage, they 
were precisely relying on this logic of sexual difference. As Duncan 
argues: 
They [Civil partnership and marriage] are separate institutions 
for different groups of people. Gay men and lesbians are 
different precisely because of who they love, so the formal 
recognition of that love will itself create differences. One can 
therefore argue strongly that the Bill does not undermine or 
compete with marriage. After all, we are not exactly fishing in 
the same pool (HC, 12 October 2004, col. 184) 
The category of the same-sex partnership, sexually 
essentialised in this way, provided an important means to justify the 
need for the Bill: If same- sex/sexual' relationship is 'simply a fact of 
life'that we have to come to terms with, we must certainly be 'more 
in favour of stable homosexual relationships than those that are 
not'. (see HC, 12 October 2004, col. 217; HC 12 October 2004, col. 
23 1; HL 22 April 2004, col. 427; HL 22 April 2004, col. 398; HC, 12 
October, col. 2 17). Or, it was said that 'we cannot have both ways' 
(HC, 9 November 2004, col. 756). We cannot both 'complain'that gay 
and lesbian partnerships are inherently unstable, promiscuous, and 
transitory, and yet, 'when the opportunity for civil registration comes 
along - giving people the chance to declare their commitment, with 
the welter of rights and responsibilities that flow from that 
commitment - say that those people should not have that right to 
declare their commitment' (HC, 9 November 2004, col. 756). Rather 
than facing this dilemma, it is argued that we need to support the 
Government's attempt 'to encourage long-term stable relationships 
as being more in the interests of society as a whole than a culture of 
transient or promiscuous relationships' (HL, 22 April 2004, col. 398). 
After all, the aim of the Bill, it was argued, is not to undermine 
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marriage, but is about (and should be about) 'promoting' fully 
committed, stable same-sex relationships, as it is 'preferable': 
It is preferable for a homosexual lifestyle to be lived within the 
context of a single committed relationship and recognised as 
such. This is not 'marriage', nor do I think it claims to be. God 
gave us that wonderful sacrament as the building-block for 
society, ordained for the procreation of children and nurturing 
them; as a remedy against sin; and for the mutual society, help 
and comfort that the one ought to have in the other, both in 
prosperity and in adversity. However, for the safety and 
harmony of society, I believe that some legal protection should 
be sought to support those loving monogamous relationships 
and to protect them better in age and sickness and in death 
(HL, 25 January 2002, col. 1699). 
From what has been discussed so far, it becomes clear that 
civil partnerships are 'about' gay and lesbian 'sexual' relationships. 
Yet it is, at the same time, is 'not about' gay and lesbian sexual 
relationships. Or to put it another way, it is 'not about"recognising' 
gay and lesbian 'sex' as a valid family practice; it is about 
recognising and promoting long-term, monogamous, and 'de- 
sexualised' relationships as preferable/ recognisable /valid same-sex 
relationships. 
The 'doing sex' defined as a valid family practice is that of 
heterosexual married couples - heterosexual intercourse. In the case 
of same-sex couples relationships, 'doing sex'should be made 
irrelevant, invisible and unrecognisable in order for same-sex 
couples to appear/ recognisable as normal couples who 'do family'. 
This is why stories of Just-like-married'same-sex couples, which I 
analysed in Section 7.4, are entirely silent on gay and lesbian 'sex' 
(or 'no sexJ. Here, gay/lesbian couples are just like (heterosexual) 
'us' insofar as 'they' are de-sexualised - insofar as 'they' are capable 
of living the same way as 'we' do family (and yet, 
fail to live the same 
way 'we' do 'family/ sexJ (DTI, 2004). And this particular way in 
which gay/lesbian couples become the real and normal couples 
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deserving our recognition explains why it invites stories about family 
members who will be allegedly be disadvantaged by the Civil 
Partnership Act. 
Indeed, it is this unstoried gay/lesbian sex which allowed for 
stories of gay/lesbian relationships to be heard in the parliament as 
stories of 'us'. We are told as having been on 'a long j ourney' -a 
journey from 'beliefs and habits'that were 'hostile to gay 
relationships' to an approach that recognises 'the validity of the wish 
of our friends and our friends' children who happen to be gay to 
enshrine their loving and faithful in law' (HC, 12 October 2004, col. 
246). But this journey is marked by a consistent disavowal of gay/ 
lesbian sex: if, in the past, stories gay/lesbian sex were told as 
stories of sexual perversion and seduction, they are only becoming 
untellable /unspeakable to the extent that the law now enshrines 
'the' sex as 'heterosex' (the only heterosexl, so nonheterosexual sex 
disappears (Brook, 2000: 150). We are told that we are 'grown up' 
(HC, 12 October 2004, col. 192). And the Civil Partnership Act is 
said to be one of the 'final steps' of 'our'journey - the journey 
towards tolerant, equal, just, modern British society (HC, 12 October 
2004, col. 246). Yet, 'we'must have forgotten to remember that the 
end of 'our'journey is not really the end of the journey. As 'our"told' 
stories is always faced with the challenge of 'untold' stories of the 
other, the end of our journey is inseparably bound up with the 
beginning of the journey of the other. Where the journey ends is still 
an unsettled question. 
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Conclusion 
I am aToreigner', a person deemed to be other than a British 
citizen. My foreignness is articulated most explicitly in U. K. 
immigration law, but also subtly in my daily life through differences 
I find in language, thinking, gestures, emotional expressions, and 
even in tastes of food. Categorised as a foreigner, I am an outsider 
and an alien who does not have any legitimate relation to this 
society. For my interrupted eight years of staying in Britain as an 
overseas student, I have constantly struggled with patterns of 
thought, emotion and behaviour I have found difficult to 
understand, experiencing a radical separateness in relation to 
others. Since I started research on issues around 'sexual citizenship' 
in Britain, I have, therefore, constantly asked myself a question: how 
can I, as a foreigner, write about British sexual citizenship - about 
their experience as 'sexual citizensT 
In his The Value of Narrativity, Hayden White argues that story 
is 'a metacode, a human universal on the basis of which 
transcultural. messages about the nature of a shared reality can be 
transmitted' (White, 1980: 6). And to the extent that story functions 
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as a metacode, 'a panglobal fact of culture', it provides a particular 
solution for the issue of translatability between cultures, the 
problem of knowing/telling the world/lives of others. 
My experience of listening to/reading western sexual stories, 
nevertheless, problematises and complicates the very notion of 
translatability. While Western sexual stories offered me the capacity 
to imagine myself in the place of others, stories I heard and read by 
no means provided a simple solution for the problem of knowing/ 
telling the world/lives of others. Rather the space opened up to the 
experience of otherness, the space I am invited to visit through 
stories is marked by contradictions. And part of the reason is 
because storytelling is never neutral, but is intrinsically political. 
MY research was initially focused on personal stories people tell 
about their experiences of belonging/ exclusion as gays and lesbians 
in Britain. With the passing of the Civil Partnership Bill in 2004,1 
was, in particular, interested in hearing stories of what this civil 
partnership might mean (or not mean) for them and for their 
intimate/ couple /family relationships. 
I interviewed 14 lesbian women in late 2004 and early 2005. In 
a number of different ways, the people whom I interviewed drew and 
crossed the boundaries between what they identified as our 
'commonness' and 'difference'. For some women, the fact that I was 
a lesbian was important, and our 'commonness', they said, clearly 
affected their decision to take part in my research. Others, especially 
older lesbians, very much identified the story I told them - being a 
lesbian'without a name in South Korea - with their own experiences 
in the past in Britain, and were willing to talk about their stories by 
comparing and contrasting theirs with mine. In many cases, they 
tried to both generalise and contextualise their stories as much as 
possible, so as to help me to understand the country- specific (and 
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personal- specific) context of their experiences, which could be very 
different from mine, and they often asked me questions about my 
own personal views on their stories - whether theirs are very much 
different from or similar to stories I heard in South Korea. Stories 
were, therefore, often told by articulating experiences that are 
shared by others. Yet, they, at the same time, made it clear that 
their personal stories were just part of many 'different' stories I could 
hear in Britain, and I should not, therefore, over-generalise their 
stories as 'the'lesbian story in Britain. They were willing to tell other 
'different' women's stories they heard or knew as much as their own, 
and although the boundaries drawn between their stories and other 
women)s stories they deemed 'different' were often crossed, 
acknowledging that other 'different' stories exist and were often be 
'excluded'were an important parts of the story telling/listening 
during the interview. 
It was when I was preparing for a conference paper on Lesbian 
Citizenship in Britain that I first read parliamentary debates on the 
Civil Partnership Act. I read through the debates in early 2005. 
Admittedly, I was surprised to find that many personal stories of 
same-sex experiences, extensively told and heard in the debates, 
were justly recognised as 'our' stories. Yet, stories were proliferating 
in particular ways. Many 'personal' stories were repeated stories of 
'one) particular story - many stories were reducible to the 'one' story. 
And this 'one' story, presented as evidence for a political claim, was 
told as if it could represent all other stories. But in this 'one Story' 
(or 'all' stories), I found that many 'stories' I heard during the 
interview remained 'private' stories, unable to negotiate the 
difference between 'our' stories and ýmy' experience. 'Stories' seemed 
to have been qost' in their translation to become the 'Story'. 
With this experience of reading the parliamentary debates in 
2005,1 decided to include parliamentary stories as part of my 
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research. I originally intended to compare and contrast stories I was 
told during the interviews and stories I read from the debates. I was 
interested in analysing the ways in which personal stories I was told 
during the interviews were un/told during the debates, and thus 
name and reveal 'the loss'. Yet, as the analysis of parliamentary 
stories has subsequently became my main focus of analysis, I 
decided not to do so: I decided to deal with this loss' in a rather 
different way. 
My thesis deals with the 'conditions' and 'context'upon which 
this loss has taken place in the political sphere, in parliament; and 
the ways in which we can both theorise and analyse the loss by 
examining political storytelling practices themselves. 
In Chapter 4, for example, I argued that there are particular 
contextual and institutional rules that govern storytelling in 
parliament, which both limit and enable ways in which personal 
stories can be told and heard. Stories in parliament, I argued, are 
mostly told to produce empirical evidence - to produce irrefutable 
facts' of experience - and have, therefore, a tendency to universalise 
'the' experience of one instead exploring or validating differences 
within the experience or between experiences. 
Such institutional features of storytelling in parliament are 
then analysed in terms of three different social/ historical contexts in 
which sexual stories enter the parliamentary debates. In Chapter 5,1 
discussed ways in which the context of silence and uncertainty, 
closely associated with the law that criminalised (male) homosexual 
acts during 1960s, placed limits on who could tell personal 
experiential stories of/about the homosexual/ homosexuality and 
how, producing particular versions of the truth' regarding the 
homosexual, the homosexual divided into the 'homosexual-criminal, 
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and the 'heterosexual-victim'. 
Stories about homosexuals told during the debates on the 
Sexual Offences Act in the 1960s were mostly told, as I have shown 
in Chapter 5, by heterosexual MPs who either had accidentally met 
'them'in the past, or had to work on the problem of homosexuality. 
By contrast, in chapter 6 and 7,1 discussed ways in which 'personal 
stories of homosexual experience'have gradually (and increasingly) 
entered the political debates, and been represented as personal 'true' 
stories of experiences (Chapter 6) and 'our' stories in the parliament 
(Chapter 7). 
The focus of my analysis here was on the ways in which they 
entered the debates as 'the evidence of experience'. In the context 
whereby the very notion of ýpromotion' of homosexuality haunted the 
political debates on Section 28 during the late 1980s, I found 
problematic ways in which personal stories of homosexual 
experience had to enter the debates, offering counter-evidence to the 
effect that homosexuality can 'never' be promoted (Chapter 6). In the 
face of an accusation that the recognition of same-sex couple 
relationships in the form of civil partnerships could 'undermine' or 
'weaken' marriage, we are told stories of same-sex couples who are 
simply just-like' married couples. Stories presented as 
uncontestable evidence as such in parliament then serve to foreclose 
the possibility of telling stories otherwise: practically no stories that 
countered the promotion of 'heterosexuality' or 'marriage' were told, 
nor could they be heard. 
Here, in analyzing stories recounted in the parliamentary 
debates on same-sex sexualities, I attempted to show both the 
problematic aspects and the effects of political storytelling involved 
in the making of sexual citizenship in Britain. One of the underlying 
issues at stake in the relationship between storytelling and sexual 
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citizenship is that: if personal storytelling is significant in the 
process of recognition of injustice and suffering of sexual minorities, 
what is recognized is dependent on where stories are told and 
listened to, and how stories travel between different locations of their 
re/production. And this, I suggest, requires us to rethink more 
critically the thesis of 'stories of intimate/ sexual citizenship' 
currently mobilized in Britain, which I discussed in Chapter 3. 
In Chapter 3,1 explored the ways in which contemporary 
academic discussions around 'stories of sexual/intimate citizenship' 
have been organized, in part, as an attempt to configure sexual/ 
intimate citizenship beyond the dilemmas facing postmodern and 
counter storytelling perspectives. As I reviewed in Chapter 2, both 
postmodern and marginal approaches to stories celebrate 
'narrative's turn'in social sciences: stories are advocated either as 
authentic voices of experience on the part of the marginal; or as 
transgressive voices that challenge any privileged claims to 
foundational/universal truth (see Chapter 2). In their different ways, 
postmodern and marginal storytelling perspectives make stories 
significant in the struggle against injustice; but they do so by failing 
to recognise stories as intersubjective communicative 'actions' 
(Plummer, 1995: 20). 
Storytelling, as Plummer rightly argues, is not simply a matter 
of representation: stories are not simply about experiential voices/ 
representations of the margins or 'transgressive' critical practices 
that resist any consensual representations of the real. Rather, 
stories, as a mode of communication, involve actively intervening in 
and constructing shared, intersubjective meanings of our lives, 
which, according to Plummer, makes an Inclusive' project of 
intimate/sexual citizenship possible (see Chapter 3). Let me 
elaborate this point in more detail. The point in discussion is closely 
linked to the question it asks, that is: What'does a story do? Or, to 
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put the question another way, 'what' do we do with stories? 
What does a story do? A story, as I discussed in Chapter 4, 
links a series of events (happenings) in a specific order - with a 
beginning, middle, and end (see Hinchman &, Hinchman, 1997: xvi). 
A particular ways in which the series of events are recounted is 
called emplotment (see Chapter 4). Ricoeur conceptualizes 
'emplotment' as 'the synthesis of the heterogeneous', in which 
various heterogeneous elements (such as agents, actions, 
occurrences and moments) scattered in time and space are 
composed together to 'redescribe' reality (Kearney, 1998: 242). Here, 
emplotment is what makes the events meaningful. Without 
emplotment, Francesca Polletta argues, 'events would be mere 
occurrences, discontinuous and separate moments, rather than 
episodes in an unfolding story' (Polletta, 1998: 42 1). Through 
emplotment, a series of events are selected, connected in time and 
through causality, and organized into a relational whole that 
attributes causal/moral significance to events and their 
heterogeneous elements. And in this way, a story, rather than a 
mere representations of events, does 'convey the meaning of events': 
it is, in other words, an interpreative, moral construct (Davis, 2002: 
12). 
Moreover, stories are joint' communicative constructs. 
Storytelling acts involve, as I discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, 
csomeone telling someone else that something happened'- it entails 
inter- subjective joint actions'that involve both the storyteller and 
audiences/ readers (see Ken Plummer, 1995: 20). Stories, in other 
words, are shared social activities in which tellers and listerners/ 
readers constitute a significant feature of the narrative situation: my 
story, in order to convey meanings for my experience, needs to 
communicate with stories of others; and by inviting audiences/ 
readers of my story to consider particular experiential contexts 
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through emotional and imaginative involvments, it, in turn, creates 
experiences for others (see Chapter 2). 
Now, in calling for a politics of intimate/sexual citizenship that 
involves this intersubjective process of story-telling/ listening, 
Plummer argues that stories of intimate citizenship is the 'most 
appropriate model of communication when it comes to the 
clarification of ethics and moralities and the settling of conflicts' 
(Plummer, 2003: 101). This is because the Idnds of questions we are 
now facing in relation to intimate issues are not abstract 
philosophical questions, but the common questions of 'living 
everyday life' (Plummer, 2001: 248). From the stories people tell 
about their intimate lives, we can learn how people, in their daily 
lives, confront moral issues, deal with them, and make choices and 
decisions. Further, stories that reveal differently situated everyday 
moralities may help us to understand ethics in terms of specific 
experiential context; to recognize pluralistic forms of life; to imagine 
new ways of forming intimacies; and to, therefore, develop a new 
public language of rights and responsibilities in relation to social 
intimacies (see Chapter 3 and 4). 
I am sympathetic with this progressive ideal of 'stories of 
intimate/sexual citizenship'- the ideal that sees sexual citizenship 
as being shaped by and through the stories people tell about their 
sexual/intimate experiences, needs and rights. Yet, seeing stories 
and storyteling as intersubjective activities that involves 'someone 
telling someone else that something happened'also means that we 
need to take 'questions of power' associated with storytelling 
practices seriously (Benett and Royale, 1995: 59). 
In chapter 4,1 discussed the ways in which Plummer, by 
asking the question 'when', addresses the relationship that stories 
have with issues of power. Stories, according to Plummer 'have their 
V^ 
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times': stories whose time has come are those that have entered the 
'culture of public problems'- 'the political spectacle'- and those that 
have, therefore, successfully transformed matters of the personal 
into the public, the political (Plummer, 1995: 129). Yet, as I argued 
throughout this thesis, the way power relations interplay with 
stories - the ways in which private narratives of Tbecome integrated 
into public narratives of Ve'- does not only involve the question of 
'when', but also the question of 'where' and 'how'. In other words, in 
addition to the question of 'what' and 'when', we need to address the 
question: where are stories, as 'our' stories, being told and listened 
to and how do recognized 'our' stories 'here' relate to 'their' 
unrecognized stories told 'there' (or to the production of 'their' 
stories)? 
Considering the question of where and how leads us to think 
about stories' circulation process, locating storytelling within 
interactive personal/ social/ institutional networks and power 
relations whereby stories are part of the circulating stories, flowing 
from (or flowing into) other contexts and levels with important 
'political effects'. And this returns my attention to many personal 
stories I heard during the interviews - the often complex ways in 
which they bridged and challenged I' and 'we', and the loss' that 
they revealed and countered against 'circulating' public narratives 
about 'us' (or 'theml through storytelling. In this thesis, by putting 
the question of 'where'into the analysis of storytelling practices, I 
made a small contribution to the analysis of personal stories around 
the intimate/sexual and their relationship to the public narratives of 
'we'; but I have focused exclusively upon stories told within one 
specific institutional contexts of retelling, parliament. There, I find, 
is much more to be done. Perhaps future research might focus on 
the very circulation process of sexual citizenship stories by 
examining the process of dis/connections among stories told in 
-251- 
various levels and contexts. It might give equal treatment to personal 
stories told within different personal/ community networks; to the 
way in which the stories of 'we'were negotiated on the basis of 
individual experience at a personal/ community level; and compare 
and contrast with personal stories told by their counterparts in the 
official public sphere, the parliament. At least, this is my intention 
after this thesis. 
-252- 
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The following abbreviations are used for in the citations of 
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HC = United Kingdom Parliamentary Debates (Hansardl, 
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